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Abstract  
The crisis in Burundi began when President Pierre Nkurunziza declared that he would 
pursue a third term despite a two-term limitation in Burundi’s Constitution. Opposition 
parties along, with some members of President Nkurunziza’s own National Council for 
Defence of Democracy, Forces for the Defence of Democracy (CNDD-FDD), argued that 
President Nkurunziza’s decision to extend his rule beyond the maximum two-terms was 
in direct violation of the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation agreement, also referred to as 
the Arusha agreement, signed in 2000. This action triggered opposition parties and civil 
society groups to organize peaceful protests to challenge President Nkurunziza’s third 
term bid. In response, government forces and Imbonerakure youth militia coordinated a 
campaign of repression and intimidation. The country of Burundi is characterized by 
political violence, targeted assassinations, and accusations of torture and rape by both 
government forces and armed opposition groups. The purpose of this study was to 
examine how the conflict surrounding presidential term limit manipulation affected the 
perception of peace and stability among people in Burundi. Understanding this 
phenomenon is extremely important because the recent hike in violence among 
Burundians has negatively affected the peace and stability of the nation. Through a 
mixed-method case study approach, the study’s main findings indicate the significant 
fracturing of citizen perceptions of peace and stability along identity lines, significant 
fear and insecurity among Burundians about the current crisis, as well as the continuing 
impact of the long-standing violence in the country’s past. Keywords: presidential term 
limits, conflict resolution, political violence, term limit manipulation, qualitative case 
study, and quantitative survey. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study 
Problem Statement 
Leadership change through presidential term limitations have generated unrest 
and violence across the African continent. It has been argued that two-term limits foster 
checks and balances and promote political stability by enabling a change of guards and 
serving as a deterrent to presidential abuse of power (Kiwuwa, 2013). Many African 
leaders, however, have bypassed or opposed term limit mandates in their respective 
constitutions to stay in power. When this phenomenon became a problem in many 
African countries, the consequence of term limit manipulations sparked a wave of 
protests, violence, unrest, and uncertainty, as seen in Burundi.  
The Burundian crisis began on April 25, 2015 as a result of President Pierre 
Nkurunziza’s desire to pursue a third term despite the maximum two-term limitation in 
Burundi’s Constitution. President Nkurunziza came to power in 2005, when he was 
chosen by Parliament to serve as president after the end of the twelve-year ethnic civil 
war (1993-2005), which claimed an estimated 300,000 lives. President Nkurunziza and 
his supporters, including members of the Imbonerakure youth militia, trained and armed 
by the governing National Council for Defence of Democracy, Forces for the Defense of 
Democracy (CNDD-FDD), maintain that he was elected by Parliament in 2005 as part of 
the Arusha agreement and not by direct universal suffrage. Hence, they argue, 
Nkurunziza’s third term should count as a second term (Armed Conflict Location & 
Event Dataset, 2016; Ahluwalia, 2016; Human Rights Watch, 2014; Siegle, 2015; 
Thomas-Greenfield, 2015; Vandeginste, 2015).  
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Along with some members of President Pierre Nkurunziza’s own CNDD-FDD, 
the opposition––National Council for the Restoration of Arusha agreement and Rule of 
Law (CNARED)––argued that President Nkurunziza’s decision to extend his rule past the 
maximum allowable two terms was in direct violation of Article 96 of Burundi’s 
Constitution and out of compliance with the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation agreement, 
also known as the Arusha agreement. The Arusha agreement was created in 2000 after 
prolonged dialogues that were spearheaded by former Tanzanian Presidents Julius 
Nyerere and South African Nelson Mandela. Opponents of President Nkurunziza further 
contended that the Arusha agreement should trump Burundi’s Constitution or that the 
Constitution should clarify the Arusha agreement (Ahluwalia, 2016; Nantulya, 2015). 
The Arusha agreement is a framework that ended the civil war and a series of 
violent conflicts. Its purpose was to usher in a power-sharing government, to provide 
checks on presidential power, and to promote political stability. Secondly, the Arusha 
agreement was implemented to ensure that no specific ethnic group could comprise more 
than 50% of military and security services. Both the Arusha agreement and the 
Constitution also prevented any ethnic group from occupying more than 60% 
representation in cabinet positions and in diplomatic and consular assignments. Thirdly, 
the Arusha agreement was a coalition building and a conflict resolution mechanism. 
Lastly, the Arusha agreement integrated former combatants into new, cohesive, and 
representative security forces. That is, the new national defense force would include 60% 
officers from the former government army and 40% who were former combatants 
(Armed Conflict Location & Event Dataset, 2016; Ahluwalia, 2016; Daley, 2006; 
Hatungimana et al., 2007; Nindorera, 2012; Russell, 2015; Siegle, 2015; Thomas-
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Greenfield, 2015; Vandeginste, 2015). 
While the conflict in Burundi centers around term limit manipulation, issues of 
identity seems to be dominant. Given Burundi’s history of conflict, Burundians are 
concerned that the conflict could reignite the already fragile ethnic division between 
Hutus and Tutsis—the country’s two major ethnic groups. Additionally, acts of violence 
such as sexual harassment, rape, and torture are common in the current conflict. Human 
Rights Watch (2017a) and Amnesty International (2017a) have reported violence directed 
against women by government forces, the Imbonerakure youth militia, and armed 
opposition groups increased since the conflict began in April, 2015. The report further 
noted that some security forces and Imbonerakure youth militia raped women in front of 
their families while arresting a male family member. Much of the violence appeared to 
have been directed at family members of alleged government opponents. The report 
concluded that sexual violence seemed to be used as a means to claim power over 
individuals linked to opposition parties or groups. In such instances, violence against 
women is used to send a message to perceived opponents (Human Rights Watch; 2017a; 
Amnesty International, 2017a).  
President Nkurunziza’s decision to manipulate the Constitution, violating the 
Arusha agreement, triggered unprecedented demonstrations by opposition parties and 
civil society groups to challenge his third term bid. In response, government forces and 
the feared CNDD-FDD Imbonerakure youth militia coordinated a campaign of repression 
and intimidation against opponents of President Nkurunziza’s third-term bid. The group 
was accused of political violence that targeted opposition members and members of civil 
society groups. The name Imbonerakure, which means those who see far, originated from 
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the native Kirundi dialect, and the group emerged from the same disbanded militia as the 
ruling party (Nindorera, 2012; UN News Centre, 2015).  
The former United Nations (UN) Human Rights Chief, Zeid Raad al-Hussein, 
claimed that his office began “receiving consistent testimonies indicating that 
Imbonerakure members operate under instructions from the ruling party and with the 
support of the national police and intelligence services, which provide them with 
weapons, vehicles and sometimes uniforms” (UN News Centre, 2015, p.1). The 
repression and intimidation spiraled into violence following a failed military coup d'état 
in May, 2015. After the failed coup, the crisis escalated, with security forces and armed 
opposition perpetrating more violence. Despite pleas from regional organizations and the 
international community to postpone the July, 2015 election until the crisis was mediated 
and peace and stability returned, President Nkurunziza and his CNDD-FDD party held an 
election. The election was boycotted by opposition parties, the UN, the African Union 
(AU), the European Union (EU), and the United States, all of whom rejected the election 
results due to their lack of credibility. This crisis led to the deaths of an estimated 1,155 
people between April 26th, 2015 and April 25th, 2016 and to the displacement of over 
300,000 refugees fleeing abduction, violence, and torture (Armed conflict Location & 
Event Dataset, 2016; Ahluwalia, 2016; Siegle, 2015; UNHCR, 2016: Vircoulon, 2015).  
In addition to circumventing Burundi’s Constitution and the Arusha agreement, 
opposition parties and civil society groups feared that President Nkurunziza was 
preparing to eliminate constitutional presidential term limits completely, allowing him to 
contest a fourth term in 2020. For instance, the National Commission of the Inter-
Burundian Dialogue (CNDI), tasked with finding solutions to the deep political crisis, 
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revealed that a majority of the Burundians consulted “support the suppression of the 
presidential term limits and stand for the amendment of the constitution” (Uwimana, 
2017, P. 1), and President Nkurunziza suggested that the “will of the people is above the 
judiciary” (Fraser, 2017, p. 2). The majority of CNDD-FDD hardliners welcomed this 
report, as most of them supported eliminating presidential term limits. In juxtaposition, 
Jérèmie Ngendakumana, spokesman for CNARED, contended that “Burundians are not 
calm and not ready for the amendment. They are gripped by fear following the murders 
observed on a daily basis, kidnapping cases, forced disappearances, [and] arbitrary 
arrests” (Uwimana, 2017, p. 2).  
In recent developments, President Pierre Nkurunziza and CNDD-FDD party 
loyalists sought constitutional amendments that would allow Nkurunziza to rule Burundi 
until 2034. The May 2018 referendum, it was feared, could trigger further deadly 
violence (Kaneza, 2018). Recommended amendments in the referendum included a 
change of the current constitutional limitation on presidential terms to two durations of 
seven years each, a change that would allow President Nkurunziza to stay in power for 
two additional seven-year terms (Johnson, 2017). Any attempt by President Nkurunziza 
to eliminate presidential term limits could create another intractable conflict, 
destabilizing the Greater Lakes Region.  
ACLED (2016) stated that the conflict in Burundi claimed about 1,155 people 
between April 26, 2015 and April 25, 2016. Of this number, at least 690 of the reported 
dead (roughly 60%) were civilians. Furthermore, the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees (UNHCR) stated that the number of refugees fleeing abductions, violence, 
and torture in Burundi exceeded 300,000. Over 180,000 Burundian refugees crossed into 
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Tanzania, over 81,000 into Rwanda, over 42,000 into Uganda, over 18,000 into the DRC, 
and over 1,700 into Zambia (UNHCR, 2016).  
Figure 1. Burundian refugee exodus. Note. Thousands of Burundians who have fled to 
Tanzanian territory on Lake Tanganyika, using an old ferry that can carry a maximum of 
600 people. © UNHCR/T.W. Monboe. 
A 2016 Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset (ACLED) report suggested 
that many civilians who opposed President Nkurunziza’s government or the ruling 
CNDD-FDD who were looking for a better life throughout the Great Lakes Region 
became victims of the crisis. Similarly, Siegle (2015) implied that the exodus of refugees 
to neighboring countries occurred due to fears of mass violence and the threat of a return 
to civil war. As Burundi finds a solution to the current conflict, the upcoming May 2018 
referendum to amend the country’s Constitution could jeopardize the East African 
Community (EAC) inter-Burundi dialogue and exacerbate violence further. Many 
7 
observers are also worried that the proposed changes to the Constitution could prolong 
the longstanding ethnic tension between Hutus and Tutsis.  
An initial review of the literature indicated that a lack of checks and balances, 
weak government institutions, electoral malpractice, greed and corruption, and fear of 
punishment were key motivating factors for some African leaders to extend their grip on 
power. From this conceptualization, the main purpose of the study emerged: to 
understand how conflict surrounding presidential term limit manipulation has affected 
perceptions of peace and stability among people in Burundi. Understanding this 
phenomenon is extremely important because the recent rise in violence among 
Burundians negatively affects the economic conditions, as well as the peace and stability, 
of the nation. The other purpose of this study was to use conflict resolution approaches 
and analytical theories to expand research into and knowledge of circumstances of 
political violence in Africa, particularly in Burundi. The proposition that guided this 
study was that the impact of presidential term limits manipulations on peace and security 
in Burundi would differ along ethnic lines but not differ significantly along gender lines. 
The goal was to provide findings that would add new theoretical standards and provide 
recommendations for assessing future conflicts associated with presidential term limit 
manipulation.  
Historical Overview of Burundi 
A key feature of the political structure of Burundi is the more than four decades of 
on-and-off intractable conflict over control of power, resources, wealth, and economic 
opportunity, as well as a history of inequitable policies between the Tutsi minority and 
the Hutu majority. Burundi’s population constitutes three main ethnic groups: Hutu 
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(85%), Tutsi (14%), and Twa (1%). Historically, Tutsi ethnic groups have held power, 
dominated the security forces, and controlled the education sector. The Twa people were 
viewed as second-class citizens and had little role in the political and economic system. 
For the majority Hutus, these marginalizations affected every aspect of society, causing 
them to develop resentment toward the Tutsi minority. It is important to note that 
animosity between the Hutus and Tutsis in the region started during colonialism. The 
divide and rule approach that the Belgians established for dealing with indigenous people 
gave rise to the ethnic division between the Hutus and Tutsis, as it allowed Tutsis to gain 
higher levels of education, enjoy more success, and seize and consolidate more powerful 
positions than the Hutus (Ndikumana, 1998; Nindorera, 2012; Uvin, 1999).  
As far back as 1962, when the country attained independence from Belgium, 
ethnic conflict has overshadowed most of Burundi’s history. Violent conflicts in 1965, 
1972, 1988, 1991, and 1993 claimed hundreds of thousands of Burundian’s lives (Daley, 
2006; Ndikumana, 1998; Nindorera, 2012; Russell, 2015; United Nations Security 
Council, 2004). Burundi’s beleaguered past was a critical factor contributing to the 
current crisis. In April and May of 1972, an uprising headed by Hutu military officers 
against the Tutsi government of President Michel Michombero broke out in Burundi. In 
response to the uprising, the Tutsi-led government, assisted by Tutsi youth militia known 
as Jeunesses Révolutionnaires Rwagasore, went on a systematic killing spree that led to 
the deaths of an estimated 200,000 Hutus. A similar event occurred in the 1993 civil war, 
when Tutsi-dominated armed forces assassinated Hutu President Melchior Ndadaye and 
the Hutu majority responded with a killing spree against the Tutsi minority. The civil 
war, which lasted from 1993-2005, claimed an estimated 300,000 lives, and an almost 1.2 
9 
million Burundians fled the country. Some Hutus understood the massacre of the Tutsis 
in 1993 as payback for the occurrences of 1972 (Daley, 2006; Ndikumana, 1998; 
Nindorera, 2012; Russell, 2015).  
In subsequent years, two rebel factions—the CNDD-FDD and the Party for the 
Liberation of the Hutu People-National Forces of Liberation (Palipehutu-FNL)––took up 
arms against Burundi’s military. The main demands of the rebel groups included 
returning to democratic majority rule, ending their marginalization and the nation’s 
constant cycles of violence, and, most importantly, restructuring Tutsi-controlled armed 
forces and security services. Moreover, in January, 1994, in the midst of the war, the 
Hutu-dominated Front for Democracy in Burundi (FRODEBU) party elected Cyprien 
Ntayamira as president. In April, 1994, President Ntayamira’s plan was eliminated along 
with Rwandan President Juvéna Habyaimana’s, a fellow Hutu. Both presidents were 
killed, which sparked the Rwandan genocide and worsened Burundi’s civil war 
(Ndikumana, 1998; Nindorera, 2012; Russell, 2015). Throughout Burundi’s history, 
politicians and civil society groups from both of the ethnic groups tried to preserve some 
degree of ethnic equilibrium in government, but they failed to avert massacres of both 
Hutus and Tutsis. 
As CNDD-FDD and Palipehutu–FNL fought against Tutsi controlled armed 
forces, the CNDD rapidly gained support among Hutus, and its members began to 
perceive themselves as the country’s largest and most cohesive rebel group. Both rebel 
groups had opposing views, tactics, strategies, and solutions to the civil war. After a 
peace agreement to end the civil war was negotiated between rebel groups, political 
parties, and combatants, several rebel groups were disarmed, disbanded, and integrated 
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into the national army and government. The current president, Pierre Nkurunziza, was 
active in the conflict, joining the CNDD-FDD and eventually becoming chairman of the 
group after the CNDD-FDD separated into factions (Hatungimana, Theron, & Popic, 
2007; Nantulya, 2015: Ndikumana, 1998; Nindorera, 2012; Russell, 2015). 
As these violent conflicts transpired, their consequences were particularly dire for 
women. For example, after the 1993-2005 Burundian civil war, women and girls were 
affected disproportionately. Of the grave consequences of the conflicts in Burundi, gross 
human rights violations––such as rape, torture, and other forms of sexual violence–– 
became very alarming, and they continued even after the cessation of the war. Yeboah 
(2017) claimed that “violence was a part of the everyday lives of most women and girls 
during the periods of series of conflicts the country experienced” (p. 83). The conflicts 
reinforced pre-existing patterns of gendered violence and increased the marginalization of 
women. Likewise, throughout and after the series of wars in Burundi, existing disparities 
increased and social safety nets broke down, making women more vulnerable to gender-
based violence and exploitation (Yeboah, 2017). 
Although most of the violent conflicts in Burundi have deep roots in political and 
ethnic tensions––which, to a large degree, are the consequences of political struggles–– 
the current crisis is more political than ethnic in nature. Nonetheless, many Burundians, 
policymakers, and scholars fear that prolonged ethnic tension could deepen violence if 
the political crisis is not resolved. 
Violence by Ruling Party Youth and Security Forces 
Opposition leaders, opponents of President Nkurunziza’s third-term bid, civil 
society groups, journalists, civilians, and members of President Nkurunziza’s own 
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CNDD-FDD party who opposed him were harassed, arrested, unlawfully detained, and 
even assassinated. So far, the crisis has been characterized by a daily retaliatory form of 
violence among government forces, Imbonerakure youth militia, armed factions of 
several opposition groups, or individuals perceived to be rivals of President Nkurunziza 
and CNDD-FDD (Thomas-Greenfield, 2015; Vircoulon, 2015). In December, 2015, 
armed gunmen targeted four military installations throughout Bujumbura; the following 
day, people found dozens of dead bodies dispersed in the streets. Many accused 
Burundi’s security forces of summarily executing opposition members in neighborhoods 
and arresting hundreds more (Armed conflict Location & Event Dataset, 2016; Human 
Rights Watch, 2017a).  
Human Rights Watch’s (2017a) country summary for Burundi indicates that 
intelligence services, along with security forces, regularly partnered with Imbonerakure 
youth militia to conduct abductions, disappearances, torture, rape, and killings. Another 
Human Rights Watch (2017b) report added, “Members of the Imbonerakure have been 
involved in scores of human rights violations in Burundi since at least 2009” (p. 3). The 
report adds “Between December 30, 2014 and January 3, 2015, Imbonerakure members, 
Burundian soldiers, and police officers committed at least 47 extrajudicial executions” 
(Human Rights Watch, 2017b). For example, a spokesperson for the Union for Peace and 
Development-Zigamibanga (UPD) opposition party, Patrice Gahungu, and UPD 
president, Zedi Feruzi, were killed in May, 2015 (Armed conflict Location & Event 
Dataset, 2016; Human Rights Watch, 2016b).  
On August 3, 2015, an unidentified gunman on a motorcycle attempted to 
assassinate the leader of the Association for the Protection of Human Rights and 
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Detained Persons (APRODH), Pierre Claver Mbonimpa; Mbonimpa survived with severe 
injuries, however. Mbonimpa’s son-in-law, Pascal Nshimirimana, was killed near his 
home in Bujumbura in October, 2015, and his son, Welly Nzitonda, was killed on 
November 6, 2015 after security services stopped him (Human Rights Watch, 2016a). 
Security forces and Imbonerakure sometimes raped women whose male family members 
were believed to be opponents of the government, such as the National Liberation Forces 
(FNL). In some instances, “Imbonerakure and police raped women who attempted to 
cross into Tanzania, apparently to deter them from leaving Burundi” (Human Rights 
Watch, 2017b, p. 3). 
Figure 2. Protester and police interactions. Note. In the Ngagara district of Bujumbura 
(AP), demonstrators trying to march to the town centre flee as police disperse them with 
tear gas.  
Human Rights Watch (2017) and ACLED (2016) also reported that the numbers 
of disappearances and clandestine kidnappings increased from late 2015 to 2016. In 
December, 2015, for instance, several plainclothes men believed to be part of intelligence 
13 
services abducted Marie-Claudette Kwizera, of the human rights group Ligue Iteka, and 
her whereabouts remain unknown. Similarly, Jean Bigirimana, a reporter with the 
independent newspaper Iwacu, disappeared in July, 2016 after leaving his residence in 
Burundi’s capital, Bujumbura, for Bugarama, in Muramvya province.  
It is apparent that the crisis in Burundi has progressed down a dangerous yet 
familiar path, and little change has occurred to halt the violence. The continued human 
rights violations have also led to an influx of refugees seeking safety in neighboring 
countries. The crisis has had a continuing effect on the population, including inculcating 
a persistent fear of attacks and a return to civil war (Thomas-Greenfield, 2015).  
Violence by Armed Opposition Groups 
Although originally nonviolent, some anti third-term bid protesters eventually 
resorted to violence. According to reports by ACLED (2016) and Human Rights Watch 
(2016a), various armed opposition groups systematically used violence against security 
forces, civilians, and government officials. Throwing grenades at police patrols and 
police stations and attacking military bases around Bujumbura, government opponents in 
certain Bujumbura neighborhoods increased this violence (ACLED, 2016). ACLED 
(2016) and Human Rights Watch (2017b) reported, in April, 2016, that unknown gunmen 
in Bujumbura used rockets to assassinate Brigadier General Athanase Kararuza, an army 
advisor to the office of the vice president. Unidentified also gunmen killed numerous 
high-profile government officials in Bujumbura, including Jean Bikomagu, former army 
chief of staff, and Adolphe Nshimirimana, the former head of intelligence services.  
In Bururi province, unknown armed men killed numerous CNDD-FDD party 
supporters in April and May of 2016, including Jean Claude Bikorimana. Three 
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government supporters were among four individuals killed at a bar on April, 2016; an 
additional assault on the same day assassinated CNDD-FDD a party supporter, Japhet 
Karibwami, at his residence (Human Rights Watch, 2017a). In November, 2016, 
unidentified gunmen assaulted and severely injured Willy Nyamitwe, President 
Nkurunziza’s communications aide, close to his residence in Bujumbura. The 
assassination of Environmental Minister Emmanuel Niyonkuru on January 1, 2017, and 
various other acts of violence and terror indicate that Burundi remains deeply troubled 
(British Broadcasting Corporation, 2017a).  
It is clear that violence orchestrated by government forces, Imbonerakure youth 
militia, and armed opposition groups has been systematic and shows no sign of ending. 
These violent events, and many others, have further undermined the peace and stability of 
Burundi and the Great Lakes Region generally. Leaders around the region, as well as 
international organizations, are concerned about mass violence, the risk of renewal of 
civil war, an influx of refugees, and extrajudicial killings. Furthermore, incendiary 
rhetoric from both the ruling party and opposition leaders has exacerbated the division 
between Hutus and Tutsis.  
Role of the International Community 
From the outset of the crisis in April, 2015, the AU, EU, and UN spearheaded 
numerous intervention frameworks to bring about peace and stability, but these efforts to 
prevent government forces and armed opposition groups from committing violence have 
been unsuccessful. As Ahluwalia (2016) argued, “the world is deeply conscious of the 
propensity of ethnic violence in this region to descend into genocide” (p. 1). One could 
argue that Burundi’s current crisis, in which both government and armed opposition 
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groups targeted civilians, could escalate into civil war, creating serious consequences that 
would ripple across the region.  
In August, 2015, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) agreed on a 
resolution to deploy 228 police officers to Burundi to aid UN human rights observers, but 
President Nkurunziza and his government rejected the deployment (ACLED, 2016; 
Ahluwalia, 2016: Human Rights Watch, 2017a). Similarly, in December, 2015, the AU 
authorized the use of 5,000 peacekeepers, called the African Prevention and Protection 
Mission in Burundi (MAPROBU), but the government of Burundi declined the proposal. 
The Burundian government withdrew its membership from the International Criminal 
Court (ICC) after the court initiated an inquiry into the Burundi crisis (Human Rights 
Watch, 2017a).  
In his United States Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing, Thierry 
Vircoulon, the Central Africa Project Director for International Crisis Group (2015), 
proffered the following warning:  
The present patterns of violence are a reminder of what happened before the civil 
war broke out in 1993. For the Burundians, the story is repeating itself. The déjà 
vu feelings and the memories of the civil war are the reasons why so many of 
them have left their country. (p. 3) 
Although the institutional restructuring among high-ranking government and senior 
military officials was based on ethnic lines (Siegle, 2015), thus far, however, mass ethnic 
violence has not been common in the current crisis; however, the AU and UN fear that 
prolonged ethnic tension could deepen existing violence in the future.  
Moreover, the consequences of the crisis in Burundi entail economic, social, 
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political, and security repercussions for the Greater Lakes Region. Arguably, further 
crisis in Burundi might provoke an armed invasion from Rwanda, where resentments 
from of the 1994 genocide still linger. Such an invasion could trigger military responses 
from surrounding nations concerned about Rwanda’s influence in the Greater Lakes 
Region (Siegle, 2015; Thomas-Greenfield, 2015). Earlier conflicts in the Great Lakes 
Region were rooted in similar identity problems as well as in nationalism, structural 
violence, power struggles, issues of governance, exploitation, and unequal access to 
resources. These dynamics have been strong drivers of conflict in the Great Lakes 
Region, but the AU, EU, UN, and other international organizations have framed a 
conflict resolution roadmap for resolving the Burundi crisis.  
Such a unique roadmap is needed because of Burundi’s particular circumstances. 
Historically, Burundi spent over ten years recuperating from a violent civil war and trying 
to reclaim greater social structure, but recent violence and oppression has brought 
memories of the past to the surface, buoyed by an accelerating outflow of refugees and 
increasingly desperate economic conditions. Burundi serves as a clear example in Africa 
of how a president will take extreme measures and use extreme means to maintain power, 
destabilizing a decade of peace, stability, and post-conflict reconstruction (Siegle, 2015; 
Thomas-Greenfield, 2015; Vircoulon, 2015).  
Term limit manipulations as a continental problem. Over the past few 
decades, most African leaders were trapped in a complex web of term limit 
manipulations. In the Great Lakes Region, the dilemma of term limit manipulations 
raised many contentious and divisive sentiments within the region and elsewhere. 
Leaders in both the Republic of the Congo and Rwanda endeavored to change 
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constitutional limitations on presidential terms. In the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DRC), President Joseph Kabila demonstrated his steadfast desire to retain power by 
delaying the 2016 presidential election. It is important to note President Kabila is now in 
the seventh year of a five-year term. The term limit manipulations phenomenon remains a 
prevalent threat to peace and stability across the Great Lakes Region, but presidential 
term limit circumvention has also increased across the continent and sparked unrest and 
instability, often degenerating into violence and instability. This was the case in Burundi, 
where unrest developed into a seemingly intractable crisis, with street conflicts between 
security forces, Imbonerakure youth militia, armed opposition groups, security forces 
conducting arrests of suspected protesters throughout the country, grenade attacks 
targeting security forces, and violence against Internally Displaced People (IDPs) 
attempting to flee (ACLED, 2016).  
From a historical point of view, many African leaders saw the presidency as a 
lifetime profession; Prempeh (2008) used the phrase “The Big Man” (p. 109); Kiwuwa 
(2013) used “presidential careerism” (p. 262); and Akech (2011) used the term “imperial 
presidency” (p. 98). These phrases describe African leaders who entrenched themselves 
in power and systematically manipulated their constitutions. As Tangri and Mwenda 
(2010) argued, “Politics in many African countries has been characterized by perpetual 
incumbency in leadership. This was particularly the case in Africa’s early independence 
decades when many presidents held power for indefinite periods” (p. 32). In the past, 
Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Sékou Toure of Guinea, Jean-Bédel Bokassa of Central 
African Republic, Félix Houphouet-Boigny of Cote d’ Ivoire, Hastings Banda of Malawi, 
and Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya bestowed on themselves president-for-life status (Akech, 
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2011; Baker, 2002; Bamfo, 2005; Tangri & Mwenda, 2010). This phenomenon 
manifested throughout the continent. Cameroon’s Paul Biya, Uganda’s Yoweri 
Museveni, Sudan’s Omar Al-Bashir, Equatorial Guinea’s Teodoro Obiang Nguema 
Mbasogo, Republic of the Congo’s Denis Sassou-Nguesso, Eritrea’s Isaias Afewerki, 
Chad’s Idriss Deby, and Djibouti’s Ismail Omar Guelleh all used their powers to 
undermine presidential term limitations in their individual countries. Most of these 
leaders came to office with progressive ideas, but they soon became consumed with 
greed, corruption, and using protective means to upholding their powers. They exploited 
their countries’ weak institutions and used their positions to enrich themselves, their 
families, and inner circles. (Table 1 shows Africa’s past and present long-serving leaders 
who circumvented term limits to stay in power.) Accordingly, “Term limits or enforced 
power alternation has come to symbolize not only an attack on the democratic freedom to 
choose one’s leaders, but equally an unwelcome limitation and check on the power and 
potential of the incumbency” (Kiwuwa, 2013, p. 265). It is clear that term limit 
manipulations have contributed to the slowing down of good governance and 
democratization and, oftentimes, has contributed to violence and unrest.  
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Table 1
Past and Present Long-Serving African Leaders 
Country President Assumed Office 
Algeria Abdelaziz Bouteflika 1999-present 
Angola Jose Eduardo dos Santos 1979-2017 
Cameroon Paul Biya 1982-present 
Chad Idriss Deby 1990-present 
DRC Joseph Kabila 2001-present 
Djibouti Ismail Omar Guelleh 1999-present 
Eritrea Isaias Afewerki 1993-present 
Equatorial Guinea Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo 1979-present 
The Gambia Yahya Jammeh 1994-2017 
Uganda Yoweri Museveni 1986-present 
Sudan Omar Al-Bashir 1989-present 
Republic of the Congo Denis Sassou Nguesso 1979-1992 & 
1997-present 
Rwanda Paul Kagame 2000-present 
Zimbabwe Robert Mugabe 1980-2017 
In some instances, the presidency lasts until death. Baker (2002) agreed that some 
African leaders “want to be recognized until death as father figures of the nation or as 
those who brought democracy” (p. 287). For example, Gnassingbé Eyadéma of Togo 
died after 38 years as president. Muammar el-Qaddafi of Libya ruled his country for 42 
years until he met his violent and ruthless death. Omar Bongo of Gabon died in office 
after 41 years at the helm, and Guinea Bissau’s João Bernardo Vieira was assassinated 
after a combined 31 years as prime minister and president. Rwanda’s Juvénal 
Habyarimana was assassinated after 21 years in office. Guinea’s Lansana Conté died 
after 24 years in office, while Ethiopia’s Meles Zenawi ruled for 21 years before he died. 
In some cases, the presidency is a family affair or business. For instance, after the death 
of presidents Omar Bongo and Gnassingbé, both were succeeded by their sons.  
Manipulating constitutions by amending term limits, for the most part, worked for 
incumbents, but it has also created violence. President Obama noted this problem at the 
AU summit in Addis Ababa in 2015, at which he argued, “When a leader tries to change 
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the rules in the middle of the game just to stay in office, it risks instability and strife, as 
we’ve seen in Burundi” (Baker, 2015, p. 4). A year later, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-
Moon shared the same sentiment at the 26th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the AU. 
He warned that African leaders “should not use legal loopholes or undemocratic 
constitutional changes to cling to power, and they should respect term limits” (Blair & 
Maasho, 2016, p. 1). Third termers and the rise of president-for-life syndrome have 
generated regional and international outcry.   
Many African leaders have continued to use one of the most common tactics for 
maintaining their grip on power: manipulating constitutions, imposing constraints on 
political competition, using violence, and, sometimes, changing rules to extend their grip 
on power in such a manner that their main opponents are excluded (Baker, 2002; Bamfo, 
2005; Boadi, 2015; Widner, 2005). Some African leaders went as far as manipulating 
official rules to stop their rivals. In 2007, presidential nominee Nigeria Olusegun 
Obasanjo blocked his challenger, Vice-President Abubakar Atiku, from receiving the 
ruling party’s nomination. Former Zambian President Chiluba barred Kenneth Kaunda, 
from running in the 1996 presidential election by changing the Constitution to require 
Zambian lineage for all presidential contestants (Akech, 2011). In some instances, in 
places where intense multiparty elections were established, leaders conducted electoral 
malpractice (Akech, 2011; Prempeh, 2008; Tangri & Mwenda, 2010). In Burundi, the 
ruling party orchestrated election rigging, coercive methods, assassinations, violence 
against opposition leaders and their supporters, and members of civil society groups 
during and after election cycles (Human Rights Watch 2016a; Vandeginste, 2011, 2015; 
Yarwood, 2016).  
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In the last decade, some African heads of state stepped down after their terms 
ended, paving the way for the peaceful transfer of power. Olusegun Obasanjo in Nigeria, 
John Kufuor in Ghana, Mwai Kibaki in Kenya, Hifikepunye Pohamba in Namibia, 
Jakaya Kikwete in Tanzania, Armando Guebuza in Mozambique, Thomas Boni Yayi in 
Benin, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf of Liberia, and Ernest Bai Koroma of Sierra Leone all left 
office as required by their respective constitutions. In Ghana’s 2016 presidential election, 
Nana Akufo-Addo defeated incumbent president John Dramani Mahama after serving 
only one term in office. Similarly, in Nigeria, for the first time, an incumbent lost a re-
election bid and power transferred peacefully.  
Efforts by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to 
restrict regional leaders from extending their terms in office beyond the two terms failed 
because the “two terms in office has been dropped for the time being by heads of state in 
May, 2015. Togo and The Gambia, both with presidents who have been in power for 
more than two terms, opposed the idea” (Vines, 2015, p. 2). In the Gambia, the long-term 
president lost his fifth term bid in the December 2016 presidential election, and power 
transferred peacefully with the help of ECOWAS forces intervening to remove President 
Jammeh. As in Nigeria, this was the first time in the Gambia’s history that a sitting 
president lost a re-election bid. In Togo, President Faure Gnassingbe currently faces 
nationwide demonstrations against his government as opposition parties and civil society 
groups are seeking an end of five decades of a ruling dynasty from father to son, electoral 
reform, and the reinstatement of presidential term limits, which the legislature amended 
in 2002. The demonstration against Togo’s president has claimed seven lives to date, and 
many more have been wounded (Akwei, 2017). 
22 
Interestingly, some African leaders are defying the conventional wisdom of term 
limit manipulations by shortening term limit mandates. In Senegal, President Macky Sall 
pushed for a referendum to reduce the country’s presidential term limits from seven years 
to five years. Similarly, in Benin, the legislature overruled President Patrice Talon’s bill 
for a referendum to change the Constitution, including a provision to lower presidential 
terms from the current two five-year terms, to one six-year term in office (British 
Broadcasting Corporation, 2017b). In the Gambia, the new President, Adama Barrow, 
vowed to push a two-term limit. These leaders’ efforts to lower term limits juxtaposed 
with the actions of some other African leaders, including those who scrapped term limits 
to stay in power. Indeed, momentum exists behind African leaders adhering to term limit 
mandates, but, as Prempeh (2008) argued, “Africa’s current presidents may be term-
limited but by all accounts, they have not yet been tamed” (p. 110). To illustrate this 
point, 93-year-old Zimbabwean former President Robert Mugabe vowed for decades to 
maintain power until he died (Dzirutwe, 2016). Mugabe finally surrendered to the 
mounting pressure of a military overthrow and impeachment (British Broadcasting 
Corporation, 2017c). Former president Yahya Jammeh of the Gambia had the same 
sentiment, desiring to rule the Gambia for “one billion years” (British Broadcasting 
Corporation, 2011, p. 1); yet, he too, was defeated and forced out of power. As Bamfo 
(2005) argued, the aspiration to cling to power remains a fundamental problem for 
current African leaders, just as it did for those in the not-too distant past. The Great Lakes 
Region is a prime example of the phenomenon of term limit manipulations becoming a 
regional security threat. 
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Successful and Unsuccessful term limit manipulations. Constitutional 
engineering, or constitutional coups, is nothing new in Africa. Since post-independence, 
presidential term limit manipulations generated controversy all over the continent, and in 
recent years, this trend seems to be on the rise in many African countries. Yoweri 
Museveni of Uganda set the example for this trend. In 1986, shortly after assuming 
power, President Museveni asserted that the “problem of Africa in general and Uganda in 
particular is not the people but leaders who want to overstay in power” (Tangri & 
Mwenda, 2010, pp. 31-32). However, in 2005, Museveni successfully changed Uganda’s 
Constitution, allowing him to pursue a third term in office. Ugandan parliament, on 
September 12, 2017, unanimously approved a law to eliminate age limits from Uganda’s 
Constitution, possibly permitting President Museveni to extend his rule. Currently, 
Uganda’s Constitution bars anybody over 75 years old from running for president, which 
prevents 73-year-old President Museveni from running in the presidential election 
scheduled for 2021 (Biryabarema, 2017). In Cameroon, President Paul Biya successfully 
eliminated a two-term limit in 2008. In 1999, former President Samuel Nujoma of 
Namibia changed the country’s Constitution to let him pursue a third term in office. 
President Nujoma argued that the constitutional restriction did not apply to him because 
he was indirectly elected before serving his first term. President Pierre Nkurunziza of 
Burundi resorted to the same argument as President Samuel Nujoma. After he failed to 
reach a constitutional revision that would permit him to stand for a third term, President 
Nkurunziza argued that the 2005 election did not count due to the fact that parliament had 
elected him. The constitutional court agreed and ruled that President Nkurunziza was 
qualified to run again (British Broadcasting Corporation, 2016a).  
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In neighboring Burundi, Paul Kagame of Rwanda also extended constitutional 
limitations to preserve his grip on power. President Kagame spearheaded a referendum in 
December, 2015 to eliminate two-term limits in Rwanda’s Constitution, which allowed 
him to run for a third term in 2017 (Boadi, 2015). As Kiwuwa (2013) noted, these 
concerted tactics by leaders to restrict their young democracies in the name of their 
continuous service to the public troubles democratic transitions. Table 2 shows a detailed 
list of successful and unsuccessful attempts to extend or remove presidential term limits 
in Africa.  
Table 2 
Countries Where Extending Presidential Term Limit Mandates Were Proposed or 
Removed 
Country  Year Amendment Proposed Result 
Algeria 2008 Passed 
Burkina Faso 2014 Failed 
Burundi  2018 Passed 
Cameroon 2008 Passed 
Chad 2004 Passed 
Republic of Congo 2015 Passed 
Djibouti 2010 Passed 
Gabon 2003 Passed 
Guinea  2001 Passed 
Malawi 2003 Failed 
Namibia 1999 Passed 
Niger 2010 Failed 
Nigeria 2006 Failed 
Togo 2002 Passed 
Tunisia 2002 Passed 
Uganda 2005 Passed 
Rwanda 2015 Passed 
Zambia  2001 Failed 
President Denis Sassou N’Guesso of Republic of Congo (also known as Congo-
Brazzaville) endeavored to change the Constitution in April, 2015. A referendum was 
held in October, 2015, in which term and age limits were removed. This permitted 
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President Denis Sassou N’Guesso to prolong his tenure in office. These leaders joined a 
growing list of past and present African presidents who pursued amending their 
constitutions to maintain power. Some African leaders’ desires to manipulate 
constitutions were met with civic resistance. Tangri and Mwenda (2010) argued, “in 
Africa, presidential incumbents who have stepped down have done so because of the 
strength of domestic and international pressures” (p. 31). Nigeria’s Senate dropped a 
strategic constitutional amendment in 2006 that would have allowed President Olusegun 
Obasanjo to seek a third term in office. Zambia’s Frederick Chiluba was prevented from 
seeking a third term in 2001. In 2002, the aspirations of Malawi’s Bakili Muluzi to 
change the Constitution, which would have allowed him a third term, were deserted in the 
face of protests against him (Akech, 2011; Lynch & Crawford, 2011; Prempeh, 2008; 
Tangri & Mwenda, 2010). Presidents Olusegun Obasanjo, Frederick Chiluba, and Bakili 
Muluzi relinquished power because of domestic and international pressures that were 
mounted against them.  
In October, 2014, President Blaise Compaoré of Burkina Faso was overthrown in 
a widespread uprising after trying to prolong his 27 years in office by removing the two-
term limits that had been inserted into the Constitution in 2000. A similar event occurred 
in Senegal in 2012, where Former President Abdoulaye Wade argued that the provisions 
of the Constitution he ushered in 2001 did not apply retroactively to his first term because 
the mandate came into being after his first election. The constitutional council allowed 
Wade to run for a third term, which incited thousands of citizens to take to the streets to 
contest the move. Wade, however, was defeated and relinquished power (Carter, 2016; 
Cornado, 2012; Yarwood, 2016).  
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The styles and tactics of constitutional engineering used vary depending on 
environment. In some instances, where the leader’s party controls parliament, the leaders 
resort to these legislatures for constitutional alterations through a parliamentary vote. In 
other cases, leaders refer to courts to seek interpretation of the Constitution, as in 
Burundi’s case, or hold referenda, as in Rwanda’s case, to force constitutional alterations 
in their favor.  
Support for and against presidential term limits. Numerous positions have 
been advanced in support of and against the implementation of presidential term limits in 
Africa. Recent instances of term limit circumventions have led to significant unrest, 
which demonstrated the difference between the interests of the political elite and the 
people whom they claim to represent. Kenya’s opposition leader, Raila Odinga, has been 
a vocal critic of presidential term limit circumvention in Africa. He “warned the continent 
against encouraging sitting presidents to change their country’s constitutions to remove 
term limits, saying that this could lead to political turmoil” (Leftie, 2015, P. 1). Former 
UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, echoing this view, argued, “Term limits may ensure 
that a Presidency does not become a long-term place of impunity because of legal 
immunities that may come with the office” (2016, p. 6). For instance, Dulani (2015), in a 
study detailing the levels of public support for presidential term limits in Africa, stated, 
“Results from 34 African countries show that there is strong support for presidential term 
limits among citizens across almost all countries” (p. 2). Another vocal critic of 
presidential term limit manipulations is Mo Ibrahim, a Sudanese billionaire who, in 2007, 
founded the Mo Ibrahim Foundation. The Mo Ibrahim Foundation awards $5 million in 
initial compensation, and a $200,000 yearly payment for life, to any African leader who 
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strengthens democracy, human rights, and the democratic transfer of power to their 
successors after their term ends (Cowell, 2013; McBain, 2013). Hifikepunye Pohamba, 
former Namibian president, won the award in 2014, and former Liberian President Ellen 
Johnson Sirleaf won the prize in February, 2018, making her the fifth winner.  
On the other hand, opponents of presidential term limits believe that term limits 
are unconstitutional because they violate the rights of people to vote into office a leader 
or president of their choosing for as long as they desire. Lebas (2016) argued that “term 
limits are fairly weak as a tool for limiting executive power, and they do not address the 
deeper sources of Africa’s democratic deficit” (p. 170). In response to President Obama’s 
criticism of African leaders’ failure to respect presidential term limits, President Yoweri 
Museveni vigorously stated, “For us in Uganda, we rejected this business of term limits. 
If I am in power because I am voted by the people, then I am there by the will of the 
people” (Vanguard, 2015, p. 2). Furthermore, former Zimbabwean President Robert 
Mugabe alluded to the term limitation principle being unfairly applied between African 
and western countries. He argued, “European leaders do not face the same term limits, 
yet are considered full democracies” (Du Plessis, 2015). 
Although many incumbents have contended that term limits are contrary to 
African norms, this rationale disregards African-led initiatives and institutions that 
demonstrate the opposite to be true. In other words, presidential term limit mandates are  
measure to tackle the problem of long-serving presidents through establishing policies 
against presidents for life and moving away from one-party authoritarian leaders.  
Presidential term limitations as a concept of democracy. It is important to note 
that presidential term limits are not a guarantee of democracy but are a core principle of 
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good governance. Democracy entails strong institutions and leaders who are elected 
freely and popularly by the will of the people through credible elections. Differing views 
exist on whether presidential term limits should be a main principle of democracy in 
Africa. Scholars such as Mann (1994) have succinctly argued that term limits weaken 
democracy by putting an end to professional politicians. Maltz (2007), for example, 
found that, aside from encouraging leadership rotation, presidential term limits, when 
they are reinforced, can assist to uphold democracy by avoiding downward spirals into 
oppression and autocracy. Hammerstad (2004) believed that, “A prudent look at the 
continent’s post-colonial history should, thus, lead to the conclusion that term limits are 
not just desirable, but necessary” (p. 96).  
Furthermore, Hammerstad (2004) stressed that democracy “is not only understood 
as majority rule and regular elections. It includes all the paraphernalia of democratic 
governance: checks and balances, independence of the judiciary, political party pluralism, 
minority protection, constitutional protection, [and] freedom of speech and association” 
(p. 3). The African Union’s (AU’s) own definition of democracy, stated in the Lomé 
Declaration of 2000, clearly recognized seven particular components of democracy: the 
impartiality of democratic structures, impartial electoral commissions, comprehensive 
voter registration systems, multi-party politics, a wide-ranging political system, 
presidential term limits for heads of state, and the impartiality of the judiciary system 
(Hammerstad, 2004). Arguably, the majority of Africans, as Dulani (2015) argued, are 
increasingly demanding presidential term limits and democracies in Africa, even as a 
growing number of African leaders are undermining term limitations using electoral 
maneuvering and the increasing oppression and intimidation of opposing parties. Clearly, 
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a development is re-emerging across Africa in which presidential term limits are 
increasingly under attack.  
Relevance of the Study 
In recent years, many leaders in Africa have attempted to circumvent their 
constitutions to stay in power beyond their tenures. This tactic is known as term limit 
manipulation. In some cases, they do so by silencing political opponents through targeted 
marginalization, and sometimes they employ violence. Due to employing these strategies, 
violence and unrest were extensively experienced between political leaders, government 
sanctioned militaries, civil society groups, and citizens in Burundi, DRC, Togo, and 
more. Despite issues surrounding presidential term limit manipulation, very few 
researchers have thoroughly studied this phenomenon.  
Lack of research on how presidential term limits are manipulated or removed in 
Africa limits the ability to grasp the phenomenon. In some instances in which efforts to 
examine this phenomenon have occurred, the arguments were essentially outlined within 
the framework of the comparative political science discipline. For instance, earlier 
research by Van Ham and Lindberg (2015) examined the impact of electoral 
manipulation means accessible to presidents, such as the use of violence and intimidation, 
to prolong their grip on power. Lindberg and Clark (2008) studied military interventions 
as a means of regime change and democratization. Bamfo (2005) and Maltz (2007) 
mainly explored the merits of term limits, the devastating impact that long-term 
leadership had on the improvement of political institutions, and the effects of 
democratization. Goldsmith (2015) examined the impact of the lack of presidential term 
limits on civil violence, insecurity, and conflict. Prempeh (2008) studied the balance 
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between legislative and executive branches in instances where power was vested in the 
executive.  
While these scholars have provided key understandings of term limit 
manipulations, they lack a conflict resolution framework, and their results have been 
limited to the political science discipline. To improve the study of presidential term limits 
in Africa, it is important to examine the conflict in Burundi through the prism of the field 
of conflict resolution. The current knowledge and research requires expansion for a more 
thorough grasp of the situation. Therefore, the researcher, for the present study, 
implemented a logical framework that started with the root causes of term limit 
manipulation with the hope that results of the study will be useful, in the field of conflict 
resolution and peace studies, for addressing disputes and conflicts related to term limit 
manipulation.  
The aim of this study was not to make broad generalizations about presidential 
term limit manipulations in Africa; instead, the emphasis was on Burundi, but insights 
came from other African countries where term limit manipulations triggered violence, 
unrest, and uncertainty. The researcher chose Burundi because it offered an important 
example concerning peace building and conflict resolution mechanisms in Africa. This is 
because the country has a protracted history of power struggles, violent ethnic conflicts, 
and prolonged conflict resolution methods, and it is now resorting back to violence. 
Definition of Terms 
The following terminologies used in this dissertation are precisely described in  
political context: checks and balances, constitutional engineering, corruption, 
democratization, ethnic violence, good governance, political violence, presidential term 
31 
limits, term limit manipulation, and big man syndrome. 
Checks and balances: Ensures that the executive, judiciary, and legislative 
branches of government check each other’s powers. Checks and balances stop any single 
branch from abusing power.  
Constitutional engineering: A process by which presidents or political leaders 
embark on changing presidential term limits in constitutions to benefit themselves. 
Oftentimes, they employ the legislature or the judiciary to change the Constitution. In 
some instances, they hold referenda to force constitutional alterations. Constitutional 
engineering is very similar to constitutional coups.  
Corruption: The act of abuse of power by government officials to extract from 
government revenue/resources, or the same from the private sector, for individual 
enrichment, extending their grip on power.  
Democratization: The process whereby more democratic systems of government 
are introduced to give the population equal participation and whereby decisions occur 
collectively. In essence, democratization means rule by the people.  
Ethnic violence: Violence between two or more opposing ethnic groups, driven 
by ethnic animosity.  
Good governance: The effectiveness of institutions and decision-making 
methods that allow states to conduct their affairs efficiently. Good governance has many 
characteristics, such as respect for the rule of law, fairness and inclusivity, accountability, 
and transparency.  
Political violence: Violence against citizens that is politically motivated. Political 
violence is perpetrated by individuals and governments to achieve political goals. 
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Political violence includes civil wars, demonstrations, revolutions, riots, and 
insurgencies.  
Presidential term limits: Laws in national constitutions that limit the total 
number of years/terms that a president can stay in office. In some countries, this means 
that a leader can only serve two 4-year or two 5-year terms.  
Term Limit manipulation: The act of changing a Constitution to allow a 
president to extend his or her grip on power.  
The Big Man syndrome: A term use to describe oppressive, authoritarian, and 
corrupt leaders who rule their countries for a long time. In sum, power is bestowed on 
one person—the president.  
Research Questions 
Since the focus of this dissertation was on exposing the conflict surrounding 
presidential term limit manipulation in Burundi, it was appropriate to formulate a 
research question to help inquire into the root causes of violence. To understand this 
phenomenon, it was appropriate to ask the following questions:  
Qualitative Question 
1. How has term limit manipulation affected the perceptions of peace and stability
among people in Burundi?  
Sub-Questions 
1. Why did President Nkurunziza manipulate Burundi’s Constitution to stay in
power? 
2. How has term limit manipulation impacted Burundians?
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3. How can Burundians avoid more violence and create a pathway of peace and
stability? 
Quantitative Questions 
1. What are the differences in perceptions between Hutus and Tutsis towards the
conflict surrounding presidential term limit manipulation? 
2. What are the differences in perceptions between men and women towards the
conflict surrounding presidential term limit manipulation? 
Organization of the Study 
The dissertation is structured into five chapters. Chapter 1 examines the conflict 
surrounding presidential term limit manipulation. The chapter provided a historical 
overview of conflict in Burundi, which set the foundation for this research. This chapter 
also examined the overarching issue with presidential term limit manipulations in Africa 
and argument for and against presidential term limits in Africa. Chapter 2 reviews the 
literature and discusses the main concepts pertinent to the topic. The literature review is 
divided into six sections. The first section covers lack of checks and balances, which 
enable some African leaders to extend their tenures in office. Section two examines the 
role of weak government institutions in democratic process. Section three analyzes 
electoral malpractice, which leaders use to gain an edge over their opponents, and the role 
that electoral malpractice plays in presidential longevity. Section four looks at greed and 
corruption, which influences leaders who overstay their mandates. Section five analyzes 
fear of punishment for corruption or human rights violations. Finally, section six looks at 
the theoretical framework used to explain and explore conflict. Elite theory, intergroup 
conflict theory, and structural violence theory can all shed light on the root causes of 
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these conflicts. 
Chapter 3 describes the methodological style used in this study. The chapter 
examines the instruments used in the research––survey techniques, data collection 
methods, data analysis methods, and validity and reliability checks––and the ethical 
issues. Chapter 4 details the examination of the data and presents the research results. In 
Chapter 5, a summary of findings is presented, followed by discussions, the conclusion of 
the study, and recommendations for future research.  
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Introduction 
This chapter, the literature review, sets an important foundation for the present 
study, as it links frameworks and ideas of presidential term limit manipulations, 
democratization, and violence. The literature relevant to research into presidential term 
limits in Africa and Burundi is diverse and describes complex dynamics. The focus of the 
literature is on whether African leaders should respect term limits, democratic 
institutions, democratization, and related issues.  
After the end of the Cold War, the adoption of mandated presidential term limits 
in Africa became a widespread movement across the continent, but many African leaders 
resorted to changing their country’s constitutions to remove term limits provisions. 
Akech (2011) asserted, “between 1960 and 1962 alone, thirteen newly sovereign African 
states, beginning with Kwame Nkrumah’s Ghana, amended or replaced their 
independence constitutions in favor of new ‘rules of the game’ that centralized public 
power in a one-person presidency” (p. 98). In the last decade, this approach came under 
increasing attack, with some leaders circumventing their constitutions to extend their 
terms. As Bamfo (2005) argued, African leaders emulated the behavior of other 
incumbents who pursued term extensions, whether their efforts were successful or not.  
In this section, the researcher examines pertinent literature on presidential term 
limitations, violence, and democracy in Africa, with emphasis placed on Burundi. The 
researcher defines presidential term limits and how they differ from one African country 
to another and outlines two opposing sides regarding presidential term limitations—
arguments for and against term limits. Next examined is whether presidential term limits 
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are worth embracing as a basic component of democracy in Africa. 
Finally, the focus of the literature review was on five reasons considered most 
relevant to the research problem: first, a lack of checks and balances; second, weak 
government institutions; third, electoral malpractice; fourth, greed and corruption; and, 
fifth, fear of punishment. The results of this study add to the current scholarship base by 
examining the impact of these five concepts in relation to term limit manipulation in 
Burundi. The researcher applied elite theory, intergroup conflict theory, and structural 
violence theory to analyze the root causes of the crisis. These theories provided a filter 
for explaining and understanding how the conflict surrounding presidential term limit 
manipulation has affected perceptions of peace and stability among people in Burundi.  
What are Presidential Term Limits? 
Presidential term limits are a vital medium to “check presidential power, but they 
concern the requirement to leave office after a number of terms” (Cranenburgh, 2011, p. 
446). For instance, under Ghana’s, Egypt’s, and Nigeria’s constitutions, a president is 
eligible to serve a maximum of two four-year terms in office. In Burundi, Sierra Leone, 
Kenya, South Africa, Tunisia, and Tanzania, an incumbent is allowed to serve a 
maximum of two five-year terms, while in Liberia and Ethiopia, presidents are mandated 
under their constitutions to serve a maximum two six-year terms. Presidential term limits 
are a core element of democratic government and are essential to checking presidential 
power (Bamfo 2005; Kiwuwa, 2013). According to Maltz (2007), “Presidential term 
limits have become one of the defining features of democracy” (p. 129). Presidential term 
limits, however, are not a guarantee of democracy, but a core principle of good 
governance.  
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The implementation of mandated presidential term limits was never completely 
addressed in Africa until the 1990s. In the 1990s, a second wave of democracy ushered in 
term limits to prevent one-party systems and to introduce multi-party elections across the 
continent. Throughout Africa, the trend of mandated presidential term limits became 
important following events in Burundi, Rwanda, and elsewhere, where leaders succeeded 
in manipulating limitations when pursuing additional terms in office.  
Presidential term limits benefit the cornerstone of democratic principles. On the 
one hand, they encourage the transfer of power away from of incumbents, significantly 
support policy and structural changes, and advance the chances of political-party changes 
in the power structure of a country. On the other hand, a long term in office could lead to 
a power buildup, and more arrogance, along with and the propensity to exploit it (Bamfo, 
2005; Kiwuwa, 2013; Maltz, 2007; Prempeh, 2008). There are five reasons why African 
leaders are able to cling to power (particularly, President Nkurunziza: (a), a lack of 
checks and balances; (b) weak government institutions; (c) electoral malpractice; (d) 
greed and corruption; and (e) fear of punishment.  
Lack of Checks and Balances 
In a democratic system, the executive, legislative, and judiciary branches work in 
tandem, which means that they depend on each other for legitimacy. These three 
branches are independent of each other and check each other’s potential abuses of power. 
On paper, most African countries incorporate these features, but power rests with the 
executive branch, making checks and balances problematic. Given the imposing strength 
of the executive branch, most legislatures in Africa do not check its power (Cranenburgh, 
2011; Keating, 2011; Lynch & Crawford, 2011, Prempeh, 2008; Rakner & De walle, 
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2008; Tripp, 2004). 
Despite the formation of multiparty politics across Africa, several scholars have 
noted, there differences in the degree to which democratization drove the reinforcement 
of formal institutions that check the executive branch. As Diamond (2008) explained, 
Africa is ruled by longstanding repressive personal rulers and power is highly 
concentrated in the hands of overpowering executives. Opalo (2012) stated, “In Africa as 
elsewhere, one of the best sources of protection for hard-won democratic gains in a 
country is the presence of an independent and resourceful legislature” (p. 85). Prempeh 
(2008) alluded to the fact that that “Constitutional design has helped to ensure 
presidential dominance over the legislature (p. 115). Bamfo (2005) echoed the same 
view, arguing that “Africa’s new democracies are still characterized by centralization of 
power around the presidency” (p. 347). Posner and Young (2007), providing an 
optimistic view, argued, “Across sub-Saharan Africa, formal institutional rules are 
coming to matter much more than they used to and have displaced violence as the 
primary source of constraints on executive behavior” (p. 98).  
Boadi (2015) provided an optimistic view on the separation of powers, arguing 
that, “Parliaments have been flourishing, making at least some legislative oversight of the 
executive increasingly common in sub-Saharan Africa” (p. 102). Tripp (2004), however, 
held a pessimistic view, stating, “Power is concentrated and personalized in the 
executive, usually with a supportive military in the background in the context of civilian 
rule” (p. 7). As Prempeh (2008) emphasized, “Most of Africa’s legislatures have suffered 
substantial gaps in their institutional lives since independence. Those that do have a 
record of continuous existence have operated largely under single-party regimes” (p. 
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114). This pattern is familiar across the continent. Some African presidents unilaterally 
pass laws without consulting with their legislatures.  
In December, 2015, President Yahya Jammeh of the Gambia declared the country 
an Islamic State without consulting parliament (British Broadcasting Corporation, 
2015a). In a similar vein, in 1996, President Frederick Chiluba of Zambia declared his 
country an officially a Christian state without consulting his party, his cabinet, or the 
national legislature (Prempeh, 2008). Kiwuwa (2013) and McMahon’s (2004) important 
discussion focused on whether the shift of African countries towards democracy was 
clear-cut and whether democratization in Africa failed to accomplish what were believed 
to be the principles of democracy. On imperial presidents, Tripp (2004) contended, 
Power in their dictatorships was virtually equated with the ruling strongmen, who 
personally directed the administration and political institutions, arbitrarily passed 
laws to suit their own purposes, banned independent political organizations, 
maintained power through various forms of patronage, and used the military as a 
personal army. They used the state to perpetrate violence against citizens 
arbitrarily, with little regard for the law. (p. 4)  
Increasingly, imperial presidents who controlled power over the other two 
branches of government undermined the separation of powers specified in many African 
constitutions. Given the power of the executive branch, the task of checking presidential 
power was left to the judiciary branch. Judiciaries across Africa, however, experienced 
the same problems that undermine legislative effectiveness (Prempeh, 2008). Burundi 
experienced several clashes between the executive and the legislative branches as well as 
disagreements between the executive and the judiciary. In 2015, Burundian President 
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Pierre Nkurunziza turned to the courts after a failed constitutional revision to authorize 
him to pursue a third term in office. Under pressure from the government, the 
constitutional court granted Nkurunziza the ability to run for a third term (Ahluwalia, 
2016; British Broadcasting Corporation, 2015b; Vandeginste, 2015). Ahluwalia (2016) 
further noted that after Burundi’s constitutional court allowed President Nkurunziza to 
stand for a third term, one of the court’s magistrates absconded the country on the basis 
that he received several death threats. Since 2010, Burundi’s legislature passed laws 
primarily targeting civil society groups and restraining democratic space. In June, 2013, 
the government passed a law restricting freedom of the press and, six months later, 
passed another law limiting public gatherings (Council on Foreign Relations, 2015). 
These proposals were intended to strengthen the executive branch while weakening the 
legislature’s role in checking the president’s power. One could argue that if checks and 
balances were effective and robust in Burundi, President Pierre Nkurunziza would be less 
likely to manipulate the Constitution to extend his tenure past the maximum two terms. 
Clearly, in Burundi, President Nkurunziza wields more power than do the nation’s other 
political institutions and structures. The legislature and the judiciary protected the 
interests of President Nkurunziza and CNDD-FDD leadership rather than upholding 
overall political institutions and structures. 
The question that reverberated in this literature was whether or not the concept of 
separation of powers was upheld in Africa and, particularly, in Burundi. Cranenburgh 
(2011) and Vencovsky (2007) suggested that the institutional context, especially the 
complete concentration of power in the executive branch, needed challenging to bolster 
democratization. Cranenburgh (2011) added that another way to tackle “executive 
41 
dominance is to limit presidential power, in the words of Prempeh, to tame African 
‘imperial presidents’” (p. 446). It should be evident that an imbalance between a strong 
executive branch and weak legislature and judiciary enabled President Nkurunziza to 
manipulate Burundi’s Constitution to stay in power. The failure to check the powers of 
President Pierre Nkurunziza encompassed weak government institutions that allowed him 
unrestricted powers. Cranenburgh (2011) offered a prescription for confronting 
institutional apparatuses to check executive power, contending, “it is necessary to first 
examine the ways in which executive power is constituted and executive-legislative 
relations are structured in African countries in a section on the hybrid nature of these 
regimes” (p. 446). Ndikumana (2005) recommended that for institutional effectiveness 
and political stability to be sustained, there ought to be a “set of rules that not only reward 
success but also allow efficient institutions to veto the inefficient ones. In the case of 
Burundi, sheer force has prevailed as the only rule of the game in politics” (p. 22). These 
prescriptions seemed plausible, but, historically, the culture of corruption and impunity in 
Burundi was a main factor that impeded the effectiveness of the legislative and judicial 
branches in upholding the principle of separation of powers.  
Weak Government Institutions 
The literature on weak government institutions in Africa, and particularly in 
Burundi, focused on weak opposition parties and weak government institutions, while 
presidential term limits did occur in stable democratic countries. In other words, the 
components of effective political structures are only as robust as the institutions that 
preserve them. As such, a lack of checks and balances strengthens weak government 
institutions, which enables leaders to manipulate term limits. As Craig (2015), quoting 
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Thierry Vircoulon, Central African project director for the International Crisis Group, 
stated, “The lack of strong institutions is the reason why you have a strong man. So, 
strong men are not going to build up strong institutions; strong men are going to build 
weak institutions to remain in power” (p. 1). Africa suffers from an overpowering 
executive. As Prempeh (2008) noted, “Africa found itself beset by the strange paradox of 
strong presidents sitting atop weak state—states that routinely lacked the requisite 
institutional capacities and resources to fulfill even their most basic foundations” (p. 
111).  
This was the case in Burundi, where President Nkurunziza and ruling elites 
preyed on weak institutions to safeguard their powers and wealth and suppressed those 
who threatened their power. Ndikumana (1998) underlined this point, describing how 
“key institutions such as the military, the judiciary, and the education system are 
controlled by ethnic and regional entities” so that “the population feels alienated and 
disappointed by the inability of the state to protect its rights and advance its interests” (p. 
30). For instance, after the controversial 2015 presidential election, President Nkurunziza 
appointed his loyal supporters to every important institution of government to suppress 
dissent.  
Another noted motive for periodic third-term presidents was the absence of robust 
political opposition in several African countries. Convincing evidence exists to suggest 
that weak opposition to individual leaders often determines that a president can stand for 
a third term. As Lebas (2016) noted, “Executives are able to act with impunity because 
there is no strong, organized opposition to challenge entrenched incumbents and push 
them toward a genuine political opening” (p. 171). Brown and Kaiser (2007) found that 
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representative government and civil society groups, two important cornerstones in a 
democracy, both tend to be ineffective in Africa as a whole. Rakner and De walle (2008) 
noted, “A stable and numerically viable opposition is a key requisite for horizontal 
accountability through legislative checks on executive power” (p. 109). McMahon (2004) 
suggested, “Many political parties in Africa do not have a broad support base of 
individual financial and volunteer contributions upon which to draw” (p. 302). Rakner 
and De walle (2008) believed that “three main factors appear to weaken opposition 
parties throughout the region: the advantages of incumbency that stem from executive 
dominance; the opposition’s limited access to resources; and the low legitimacy of 
opposition politics in the region” (p. 112). Burundi has weak government institutions; 
some of them are so weak that they appear not to exist at all. If an opposing party is 
strong and effective, the ruling government often suppresses it (Vandeginste, 2015). 
Oftentimes, the executive branch has suppressed opposition parties, making it impossible 
for them to function. Rakner and De walle (2008) agreed that “the strong presidency and 
the authoritarian legacy of many African countries tend to weaken parties generally and 
especially oppositions” (p.113). A 2015 Freedom House report outlining the suppression 
of opposition parties in Burundi stated that the 2010 local elections were affected by 
electoral wrongdoings, limitations on freedom of association for leaders of opposition 
parties, a ban on all opposition party gatherings, and the arrest of more than a dozen 
opposition activists. In 2014, President Nkurunziza’s regime constantly interrupted 
opposition party events, barring meetings and protests and targeting opposition 
supporters with harassment, arrests, violent attacks, and, in some cases, extrajudicial 
killings (Freedom House, 2015).  
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According to a Human Rights Watch (2014) report, “Most leading opposition 
figures who had fled the country after boycotting the 2010 elections returned to Burundi, 
encouraged by the government, in advance of the 2015 general elections. However, 
opposition party members continued to face obstruction and harassment” (p. 1). 
Opposition leader Zedi Feruzi, of Union for Peace and Democracy-Zigamibanga (UPD), 
for instance, was gunned down, along with his security guard, by government forces in 
May, 2015. Unidentified armed men assassinated Patrice Gahungu, spokesperson for 
UPD, on September 2015 (Amnesty International, 2015). Vandeginste (2015) argued that 
President Nkurunziza’s “CNDD-FDD’s dominant position allowed it to eliminate 
parliamentary opposition and “to divide and rule over opposition parties, which it 
systematically split into a ‘real’ and a government-friendly wing” (p. 625). These types of 
violence and intimidation are common in Burundi to a point that they effectively stop 
opposing candidates from involvement in election-related events and scare off their 
supporters from voting for the opposition. Gaynor (2014) contended that these systems 
are “at the core of Burundi’s problems. It is an institutionalized system of corruption, 
social exclusion, impunity, unpredictability, a total lack of accountability and 
clientelism” (p. 205). This strategy, manifested in Burundi for decades, weakened 
opposition parties and reduced the democratic space available to challenge the 
government. Zakaria (1997) characterized the outcome of this kind of limitation on 
political participation as “illiberal democracies” (p. 26). Similarly, Ottaway (2003) used 
the term semiauthoritarian to describe these types of political setting.  
The absence of strong government institutions, such as a strong legislature and 
judiciary and an effective opposition party to effectively challenge an authoritarian 
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leader, seems to be one factor that enabled President Pierre Nkurunziza to extend his 
tenure past the maximum two terms. As Hausken and Ncube (2014) noted, a resilient 
opposing party is one that is well structured and is not “easily silenced by the incumbent 
regime. We suspect that another reason why most African presidents are re-elected 
without contestation is that the opposition is silenced or is so disorganized that it cannot 
conduct a large-scale contestation” (p. 612). The judiciary, legislature, and other 
governmental institutions, which are supposed to check the abuse of power in the 
executive branch, are all examples of weak opposition in Burundi.  
Government institutions set up to check executive abuses of power have not 
fulfilled their purpose in Burundi. As such, institutional weakness facilitates impunity 
and enabled President Pierre Nkurunziza to manipulate the country’s political systems, 
extending his tenure past the maximum two terms. Solid institutional reforms are needed 
to bolster good governance and democratic principles.  
Electoral Malpractice 
Among the drivers of long incumbency is electoral malpractice. In most elections 
in Africa, incumbent leaders have a vast advantage over their counterparts in accessing 
state funds, which allows them the upper hand in elections (Bhasin & Gandhi, 2013; 
Zamfir, 2016). Furthermore, Gyimah-Boadi (2007) argued that the presidency enables 
political leaders to “manipulate electoral institutions, electoral rules and procedures; to 
siphon off state resources and deploy them into partisan use in elections; to commission 
development projects; [and] to extort donations from private businesspeople and rent-
seekers” (p. 29). Similarly, Zamfir (2016) added, “globally, incumbent leaders and ruling 
parties tend to win elections, but this appears more pronounced in Africa and can be 
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explained by a multiplicity of factors” (p .3). Based on these assessments, the power of 
incumbency severely affects the political process between opposing candidates and 
political parties. Before delving into the literature on electoral malpractice in Africa and 
Burundi in particular, it is important to define what the term means. Birch (2011) defined 
electoral malpractices as the manipulation of electoral processes—such as the 
manipulation of electoral systems, the manipulation of electorates, and the manipulation 
of voting—to help one party or an opponent in an election. Birch (2011) further 
explained that electoral malpractice goes by a number of terms: electoral corruption, 
electoral malfeasance, electoral fraud, electoral misconduct, and electoral manipulation. 
Electoral malpractice was characterized into three stages—pre-election stages, election 
stages, and post-election stages (Birch, 2011; Olawole, Adewunmi, & Oluwale, 2013). In 
all stages, incumbents use oppressive tactics to cling to power. As Bhasin and Gandhi, 
(2013) stated, “To achieve their goals, authoritarian incumbents have an array of 
strategies to choose from manipulation of electoral rules, media dominance, vote-buying, 
and electoral fraud” (p. 621). This hinders democratization efforts and the likelihood of 
free and fair elections. It also distorts the political playing field. For example, in Burundi, 
the opposition that protested repeated police harassment and intimidation of its supporters 
and members boycotted the 2015 presidential elections over fears that the political and 
security atmosphere might not guarantee free and fair elections. This was also the case in 
the 2010 presidential elections, when seventeen political parties decided to boycott the 
election due to deteriorating political and security threats.  
It is important to note that elections facilitate participation and political 
competition, but, most importantly, they encourage the peaceful transfer of power. 
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Nevertheless, many African leaders deem losing an election as losing access to state 
resources, power, and patronage. To maintain their power, political elites take advantage 
of weak government institutions, manipulating polls, intimidating opponents, and, 
oftentimes, orchestrating violence against voters. Some cases of violent post-election 
conflict include Gabon in 2016, Uganda in 2016, Burundi in 2015 and 2010, Côte 
d’Ivoire in 2010, Kenya in 2007, and 2008 in Zimbabwe. In Zimbabwe’s case, after 
President Robert Mugabe lost the elections, he managed to retain power by settling for a 
power-sharing government with the opposition in 2008.  
From this assessment, it is reasonable to argue free and fair elections are both key 
sources of, and fundamental steps towards, effective democracy. The concept of a free 
and fair election comprises freedom of assembly, speech, and movement, and freedom 
from intimidation. A fair election consists of transparency and accountability in the 
electoral process, impartial electoral regulations, equal opportunities for all political 
parties, equal and unbiased access to the media, an independent and impartial election 
management board or election commission, and flawed counts/vote-rigging (Birch, 2007; 
Bratton, 2008; Mapuva, 2013; Van Ham & Lindberg, 2015). These issues were evident in 
Burundi, where President Pierre Nkurunziza and his CNDD-FDD party used their powers 
and resources during pre-election phases, election phases, and post-election phases to 
silence political rivals and their followers. For instance, after the election of 2010, top-
level CNDD-FDD officials, along with security services, harassed and interrogated 
various reporters about their reporting and threatened them with lawsuits. The election, 
marred by uncertainty, was characterized by assassinations, harassment, and the 
intimidation of political opponents and their supporters (Human Rights Watch, 2014; 
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Mapuva, 2013; Vandeginste 2011). President Pierre Nkurunziza deliberately used 
violence, compelling opposing parties to boycott the presidential election, which 
improved his chances of retaining power.  
As an apparatus of democracy, elections are the foundation for selecting 
representatives, allowing political parties to vie freely for votes; indeed, such competition 
is one of the trademarks of democracy (Bratton, 2008). Many incumbents manipulate 
electoral rules and processes by distorting the level playing field to preclude opposing 
leaders from challenging elections, or sometimes by restricting certain segments of the 
population from participation in the electoral process (Birch, 2011; Mapuva, 2013).  
Incumbent presidents have an Election Management Board (EMB) or an 
Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) at their disposal. The essential reason 
incumbent presidents win elections involves the institutional and administrative 
independence of the election commission. In most African countries, the president 
nominates members of electoral commissions who often control the process (Van Ham & 
Lindberg, 2015). Figure 3 illustrates the various types of electoral manipulation in Africa 
from 1986 to 2012.  
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Figure 3. Types of manipulation in African elections (1986–2012). Note. EMB= 
Electoral management Body. Source: V-Dem Dataset v3.  
The impartiality of the electoral commission is crucial to a free and fair election. 
For instance, in Burundi, seven National Independent Electoral Commission (CENI) 
members were selected in advance by the President in meetings with other political party 
leaders, and he then submitted nominees for ratification to both chambers of the 
legislature for a final vote (Makulilo & Ntaganda, 2015). Several opposing parties 
demanded the nomination of a new electoral commission to reflect the equal number of 
members representing the ruling and opposing parties (Vandeginste, 2011). In the 
presidential elections of both 2010 and 2015, the leading opposition parties refused to 
take part in elections due to an overall atmosphere of voter intimidation, massive 
violence, pre-stuffed ballot boxes coordinated by top-level CNDD-FDD party members, 
lack of secrecy in the ballot booth, bribery, and lack of independence in electoral 
management (Human Rights Watch, 2016a; Vandeginste, 2011, 2015). Furthermore, 
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“opposition groups are also opposed to the current electoral commission because it isn’t 
complete after two of its five members fled” (Nzohabona, 2015, p. 1). It is apparent that 
when electoral management/commissions are weak or lack independence, all manner of 
manipulations and irregularities persist. These interrupt and undermine political 
participation.  
The literature on electoral malpractice has acknowledged several elements 
explaining the intricacies of elections in Burundi. The relationship between elections, 
electoral violence, and democratization is multifaceted. As the cornerstones of 
democracy, elections increasingly create passionate discussions across the continent. The 
existing research on electoral malpractice in Africa, and Burundi in particular, has 
revealed the enduring legacy of incumbent presidents, their unrestricted powers, and their 
use of state resources, which weaken opposition parties and makes it difficult for them to 
compete effectively. For elections to function as instruments of democracy, they must be 
inclusive and free from misconduct. Hence, institutional safeguards are needed to 
safeguard the integrity of elections. These include distributing the authority to manage 
several electoral functions among various bodies and offering a counterbalance to the 
electoral administration (Birch, 2007; Bratton, 2008). As much as electoral malpractice 
allows leaders to stay in power, corruption and greed enable leaders to manipulate weak 
political systems, allowing them to maintain power for extended periods.  
Greed and Corruption 
Scholarly attention to the ways in which greed and corruption have motivated 
many leaders in Africa to cling to power has increased over the past decade. Due to a lack 
of robust checks and balances and weak government institutions, an overbearing head of 
51 
state and his associates can effortlessly misuse or seize state resources and exploit their 
wealth to repress opposing parties and bolster their enormous power (Mosbacher, 2013). 
Taking this perspective, Yeh (2011) and Rakner et al. (2007) agreed that many African 
leaders see the presidency as an opportunity for amassing wealth and exploiting state 
resources, which helps to feed their struggles for control of power. Collier (2000) added, 
“Once a society becomes corrupt, there are powerful forces tending to keep it corrupt” (p. 
197). 
Anneke Van Woudenberg, deputy director of the Human Right Watch Africa 
division argued the following: 
Retiring as a head of state in Africa does not usually come with a lot of benefits. 
Very few African countries—in fact almost none—have any kind of pension or 
security scheme for former presidents or heads of state. So, out of power means 
out of money. (Gaffey, 2015, p. 2) 
In the same vein, Tangri and Mwenda, (2010) suggested, 
Contributing to perpetual incumbency is the fact that executive power has brought 
with it many opportunities for accumulating wealth in an African context of 
scarcity and poverty and limited avenues of private accumulation. For example, 
the riches and private fortunes derived from Angola’s oil and diamonds have 
constituted a key motivation for President Jose´ Eduardo dos Santos and a narrow 
band of regime insiders to hold on to power for an indefinite period. (pp. 32-33)  
This trend is widespread in Africa, where many leaders have used their political 
positions to embezzle resources, making themselves wealthy while leaving their citizens 
in absolute poverty. As Ayittey (2005) implied, the presidency in Africa is a gateway to 
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power and wealth accumulation, and presidents are prone to take any measure to preserve 
their power and wealth. Gurr (1970) suggested that the likelihood political conflict 
increases with perceptions of inequality and marginalization, while pervasive corruption 
conceivably encourages citizens to resort to violence. While President Nkurunziza and 
top-ranking CNDD-FDD elites enjoy an extravagant lifestyle, millions of Burundians 
lack basic human needs, such as education, healthcare, housing, food, and access to clean 
water and sanitation. In the case of Burundi, Vandeginste (2015) agreed that high-level 
corruption is a major motive for discontent with President Nkurunziza and his CNDD-
FDD party, which is likely to prompt a new trend in political instability. In a similar 
view, International Crisis Group (2012) detailed the growing corruption scandals 
concerning high-level CNDD-FDD and state officials, which curtailed hope among 
Burundians of a change in governance and fair access to resources. The deepening 
corruption crisis discredited post-conflict reconstruction and drove political and social 
anger.  
Since, in Burundi, access to state power also means access to wealth, which 
prolongs President Pierre Nkurunziza and his CNDD-FDD party’s consolidation of 
power, Siegle (2015) contended, 
In addition to the natural desire of many leaders in positions of authority to extend 
their time in power, Nkurunziza’s efforts to retain control of the presidency likely 
stem from a Burundian political economy that rewards senior officials financially. 
Access to political power in Burundi allows for considerable control over public 
procurement processes, the mining sector, international financial assistance, and 
reimbursements for peacekeeping deployments. (p. 3)  
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Furthermore, an International Crisis Group (2012) report claimed that President 
Nkurunziza and his party officials are regularly involved in high-level government 
corruption scandals, using kickbacks and bribes via a public bidding and private mining 
and oil concessions permits. Siegle (2015) echoed the same view, arguing that 
presidential power allows for control over the public sector, privatization dealings, land 
and property sales, and import and exports. President Nkurunziza is able to do this by 
stacking key government institutions with supporters, developing patronage systems in 
which political loyalty is exchanged for resources. 
Burundi’s anti-corruption officials have constantly faced intimidation from top 
government officials. The International Crisis Group (2012) report added that the “heads 
of these anti-corruption institutions are also often subjected to strong pressure, adding to 
them the direct supervision of the executive: "They lack independence because some of 
their staff are activists or hold political office in the presidential party” (p. 11). Arguably, 
corruption is a manifestation of institutional ineptness or bad governance, and the 
political leadership in Burundi has depended mostly on misappropriation of the country’s 
resources to maintain a political elite.  
Much of literature reviewed in this section shows that President Nkurunziza and 
CNDD-FDD party elites undermined both the legislature and the judiciary, which are 
tasked with holding the executive accountable for corruption. It is clear that institutions 
set up to monitor greed and corruption in Burundi are ineffective and weak. Yeh (2011) 
clarified this notion by claiming, 
Corruption is not only caused by a lack of checks and balances but also serves to 
prevent the emergence of the institutional reforms necessary to create checks and 
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balances. In the majority of African countries, corruption pervades the institutions 
that normally provide such checks and balances: the police, the judiciary and the 
legal system. (p. 632)  
The core problem is a lack of effective government institutions to fight elite 
corruption. As a result, top-level corruption in Burundi creates an indispensable means of 
strengthening the present government in power. Experiences in Burundi indicate that top-
level CNDD-FDD leaders are extremely powerful, allowing for the creation of effective, 
impartial anti-corruption commissions. With no efficient limitations on government 
conduct, corruption became widespread, which enabled President Pierre Nkurunziza and 
his CNDD-FDD ruling elites to turn state-owned institutions into mechanisms for self-
enrichment. This created marginalization as well as grievances and discontent against 
President Nkurunziza and the ruling elites. One can conclude that access to political 
power is a major driver of corruption in Burundi. Ruling elites or governing elites use 
government resources to enrich themselves; more destructively, they use corruption to 
support client-patronage connections to heighten their political dominance and safeguard 
their inner circles.  
Fear of Punishment 
Many scholars underscored fear of punishment as another reason that autocratic 
leaders retain power. Scholars such as Carter (2016), Tangri and Mwenda (2010), Igwe 
(2008), and Baker (2002) have suggested that the reason African leaders stay too long in 
power is because of fear of punishment for their human rights violations and corruption. 
For example, Baker (2002) argued, the unwillingness of leaders to “leave office may be 
that presidents fear a rush of lawsuits or even criminal and human rights prosecutions. 
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Chiluba, for instance, was said to fear such an eventuality in Zambia and for good reason, 
as current events demonstrate” (p. 287). According to Tangri and Mwenda (2010), a 
motive for clinging to power is that leaders fear being prosecuted for their various 
misdeeds. There are presidents with dismal human rights records, and those who 
have been especially venal and rapacious while in office have perpetuated their 
political incumbency to prevent new leaders uncovering their abuses and 
prosecuting them for their corruption and personal enrichment. (p. 33)  
This was the case in Gambia when President Yahya Jammeh agreed to step down 
after losing the December 2016 presidential election. A week later, he reversed his 
position, denouncing Thad election results after some opposition party members 
suggested prosecuting him for crimes against humanity and corruption (Reid, 2016). The 
Gambian case, and many other cases across Africa, highlighted how fear of punishment 
has encouraged some African leaders to cling to power.  
Recently, the ICC charged several former African presidents with crimes against 
humanity. In June, 2016, Jean-Pierre Bemba, former vice president of the DRC, received 
an eighteen-year prison sentence for war crimes and crimes against humanity (Simons, 
2016). In May, 2012, former Liberian warlord and President Charles Taylor received a 
fifty-year prison sentence for his part in the decade-long Sierra Leonean civil war 
(Simons & Goodman, 2012). Former President Laurent Gbagbo of Ivory Coast was sent 
to The Hague to face charges of post-election violence in 2011 (British Broadcasting 
Corporation, 2016b). In the case of Burundi, the ICC prosecutor’s office examined 
several reports describing acts of rape, other methods of sexual violence, torture, killing, 
false imprisonment, and enforced disappearances (ICC, 2016). Similarly, in April, 2017, 
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the prosecutor of the ICC stated that they were beginning an investigation into the crisis 
in Burundi (Human Rights Watch, 2017a). Siegle (2015, December 9) noted that the ICC 
Prosecutor’s office warned, “any invocation to ethnic violence would be used as evidence 
in a future ICC investigation, have led to the tempering of such inflammatory remarks. 
Nonetheless, the intimidation and targeted killings continue” (p. 2). In addition, UN 
investigators reported, 
Crimes were committed by Burundian state agents or individuals under their 
control. It said this included high-level officials of the National Intelligence 
Service, which reports directly to the president, the national police force, military 
and Imbonerakure, the ruling party's youth league. (British Broadcasting 
Corporation, 2017c, p. 2) 
The report urged the ICC to act because human rights violations are crimes 
against humanity. 
In recent years, many African leaders have ramped up their political powers to 
defy the impartiality of the ICC in order to make sure that incumbent leaders were 
shielded from prosecution, even when charged with crimes against humanity and other 
offenses under international law (Jalloh, 2009; Roth, 2014; Ssenyonjo, 2013; Sserunjogi, 
2016). At the forefront of this effort is President Museveni of Uganda who, at the April, 
2013 inauguration ceremony of Kenya’s president Uhuru Kenyatta, accused the court of 
being “biased against African leaders.” To his own fifth term inauguration in May, 2016, 
President Museveni invited Sudan’s President, Omar al-Bashir, wanted by the ICC for 
crimes against humanity and genocide in Darfur. During his speech, President Museveni 
urged African leaders to “Forget about this ICC useless thing. Earlier, we thought the 
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ICC was useful, but to us, now African leaders, we see it is useless. It’s a bunch of 
useless people” (Duggan, Ntale, & Swails, 2016; Roth, 2014).  
Most African leaders argued that western leaders themselves commit war crimes 
with immunity while African presidents go on trial for crimes against humanity for the 
same issues. Mills (2012) added, “to date, all of the active cases the ICC is prosecuting 
are in Africa” (p. 410). Many scholars also argued that the ICC is inefficient, is solely 
concerned with African leaders, and failed to investigate similar cases elsewhere (Igwe 
2008; Kastner, 2010; Mills 2012). The AU’s relationship with the ICC and other 
international judicial bodies became more controversial in 2008. At its June 30 to July 1, 
2008 assembly meeting, the AU “passed a resolution calling on non-African states (and 
in particular European Union states) to stop the practice of arresting and trying Africans 
for grave offenses under the principle of universal jurisdiction” (Mills, 2012, p. 417). 
Some African countries went as far as withdrawing from the ICC on the grounds that the 
court mainly preoccupied itself with African leaders. For example, in October of 2016, 
Burundi’s legislature approved, with an overwhelming vote, to abandon the Rome 
Statute. Similarly, South Africa’s Foreign Minister signed an Instrumental Withdrawal 
from ICC on October 19, 2016, and Gambia confirmed its decision to exit the Rome 
Statute on October 26, 2016 (Dersso, 2016). This occurred because African governments 
accused the ICC of unfairly targeting leaders from the continent. 
In addition to fearing punishment for their human rights violations by 
international justice apparatuses, some African leaders were also prosecuted for 
corruption in their own countries. Moussa Traoré, former president of Mali, was 
convicted of corruption in Bamako in 1999, but former President Alpha Oumar Konaré 
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later pardoned him. Rutazigwa (2014) described a similar situation: 
An example of such a situation was in Zambia, where the late president Levi 
Mwanawasa ordered an enquiry into the late President Fredrick Chiluba’s 
financial conduct, who was found to have swindled resources from the state 
coffers; this was enough to send him to serve a prison sentence, and this has sent a 
clear signal to most leaders on the continent that leaving office on legal basis is 
another way of making oneself (the incumbent) susceptible to prison sentence. 
The same case arose in Malawi, where President Bakili Muruzi, who was replaced 
by Bingu wa Mutharika, was subjected to a prison sentence after leaving the 
corridors of power. (p. 1)  
Canada, France, and the United Kingdom each froze stolen assets from Zambia, 
Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, and Congo-Brazzaville. Carter (2016) posited that Equatorial 
Guinea’s Teodoro Obiang and the Republic of the Congo’s Denis Sassou-Nguesso were 
targeted by anticorruption prosecutors in France and the United States, where these 
leaders have assets and residential properties. Furthermore, in 2007, a court in London 
found Frederick Chiluba, former president of Zambia, guilty of embezzling $46m (£23m) 
in state funds (Transparency International, 2011; British Broadcasting Corporation, 
2007). The main catalyst for this decision was lack of transparency and accountability, 
which is a suitable breeding ground for unrestricted power for political and economic 
gain. Chad’s former president Hissene Habre was convicted in May, 2016 for crimes 
against humanity and received a life sentence at a groundbreaking hearing in Dakar, 
Senegal. This verdict was the first time that a former president has been found culpable in 
another African country (British Broadcasting Corporation, 2016c). Due to fear of 
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punishment, most African leaders have taken on the presidency as a lifetime profession 
and, in some cases, a father passes the position on to his son to avoid prosecution for 
human rights and economic crimes.  
To summarize, the literature on presidential term limits in Africa and Burundi 
revealed a direct link between adherence to presidential term limits and peace and 
stability. President Nkurunziza’s third-term bid in Burundi exemplified this notion. As 
the literature review noted, lack of checks and balances, weak government institutions, 
electoral malpractice, greed and corruption, and fear of punishment are all reasons why 
President Nkurunziza decided to extend his term beyond the required two terms.  
Gaps in the Literature 
Generally, the analyses and arguments presented in this section share one unifying 
notion—presidential term limit manipulations in Africa, and in Burundi in particular, 
continue to be a challenge to democratization, peace, and stability; and, by most criteria, 
they are also a recipe for violence. The literature review pertinent to presidential term 
limit manipulation in Burundi is diverse and explains some thought-provoking concepts 
and dynamics; nonetheless, gaps exist in the literature. For example, two of the major 
gaps include lack of research or discussion on conflict resolution practices regarding 
presidential term manipulation and the perceptions of Burundians regarding presidential 
term limit manipulation.   
One reason for the present study was that the current literature only explored this 
topic from a comparative political science discipline, revealing political consequences 
and dimensions of presidential term limits. To bridge the gap, it is important to examine 
this issue through the prism of the field of conflict resolution, which examines strategies 
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and practices for resolving conflict. 
While previous studies have examined the Arusha agreement and constitutional 
interpretations of term limits, the literature has rarely explored the perceptions of 
Burundians regarding presidential term limits and peace. Conceptually, this study adds to 
the emerging literature on presidential power and how leaders in the Great Lakes Region 
are seeking to evade presidential term limits in order to prolong their terms in office.  
Theoretical Framework 
The conflict in Burundi developed out of a deeply multifaceted political, ethnic, 
and socio-economic situation, but it would be a mistake to use a single theory to describe 
how the conflict surrounding presidential term limit manipulation has affected the 
perceptions of peace and stability among people in Burundi. In this section, three theories 
(elite theory, intergroup conflict theory, and structural violence theory) weave throughout   
useful analyses of the conflict. The theories highlight several key assertions about the 
intersection between control of state power, the use of violence to sustain power, ethnic 
dynamics, and the critical roles that competing elites play in this conflict. These 
theoretical consideration further refine the research question. 
Explaining the Conflict with Elite Theory 
Gaeteno Mosca, Wilfredo Pareto, and Robert Michaels are credited for 
developing the elite theory concept. In their reasoning, power is constantly exerted by a 
small elite group. An important concept of elite theory is that all societies are apportioned 
into two core groups—a ruling minority and the ruled—all vying for power and class 
structure in society (Berberoglu, 2005; Bottomore, 1964; Parry, 1969). In later years, C. 
Wright Mills concentrated on power relations and dynamics in society. In The Power 
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Elite, Mills (1956) argued that power elites are divided into three fundamental sectors 
(political, economic, and military) and that power elites control all three sectors. This is 
true in Burundi’s case.  
The epistemological context for elite theory is that governing elites or the ruling 
class control a substantial amount of wealth, resources, and capacities, occupying high-
level government positions and exercising power through several networks (Berberoglu, 
2005; Pakulski, 2012). Another important component of this theory is that all political 
and economic structures are controlled and systematized to benefit few elites. Elite theory 
is suitable for explaining presidential term limit manipulation in Burundi and the desire 
of governing elites or the ruling class to retain power.  
At the heart of elite theory lies the main question of how conflict and competition 
operate within social groups in society. For the purpose of this dissertation, the researcher 
uses Wilfredo Pareto’s "governing elites" and Gaeteno Mosca’s "ruling class" 
interchangeably to argue why President Pierre Nkurunziza and CNDD-FDD political 
elites or ruling class manipulated the Constitution to stay in power beyond two terms. In 
Mind and Society, Pareto (1916) suggested that power elites are devoted to the status quo 
and are prepared to use violence in its defense. In Ethnicity and Power in Burundi and 
Rwanda: Different Paths to Mass Violence, Uvin (1999) argued that “Violence has 
tended to occur at key points of political change when the interests of the elites were 
threatened” (p. 263). For Mosca, the central tenet of elite theory is that the ruling class 
controls the state apparatus and society in general. In his book The Ruling Class, Mosca 
(1939) suggested,  
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In all societies… two classes of people appear—a class that rules and a class that 
is ruled. The first class, always the less numerous, performs all political functions, 
monopolizes power and enjoys the advantages that power brings, whereas the 
second, the more numerous class, is directed and controlled by the first. (p. 50) 
These notions of governing elites or the ruling class are applied in Burundi’s past 
and present history. Since Burundi gained its independence, Tutsi elites captured its 
political and economic institutions. Hutu marginalization led to many violent conflicts. 
Today, CNDD-FDD political elites systematically use their power and positions to extend 
their rule, a cause of conflict with the Tutsi minority (International Crisis Group, 2012). 
Turner (2007) argued that politics in Burundi are determined by a few powerful elites in 
private, without the public knowledge, and that the current condition is the consequence 
of ambiguous laws and policies that the elites themselves created. Buttressing this notion, 
Hatungimana, Theron, and Popic, (2007), and Nindorera, (2012) all recognized that 
Burundi’s civil war emanated from a power struggle perpetuated by the political elites or 
the ruling classes to attain and/or stay in power. Ndikumana presented a more pertinent 
and theoretically-connected description of Burundi’s conflict (1998). For example, 
Ndikumana argued that “the ruling elite has basically ‘privatized’ the state: through 
clientism, patronage, and rent seeking, state institutions are used to accumulate wealth 
and to serve and protect the interests of individuals and ethnic and regional entities” (p. 
30). The governing elites or the ruling class in Burundi constitute the president, high-
level government officials, key cabinet members, close advisers, and high-ranking 
military officers who are constantly seeking to control government. Historically, Burundi 
has endured many routes of power alteration, from single party, military rule, and multi-
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party forms of politics to imperial presidencies. At the center of Burundi’s problems is a 
powerful ruling class that misuses the country’s resources and wealth, obstructing 
democratization efforts. Conversely, the governing elites, or the ruling class in Burundi, 
created governance systems for their own benefit, and they struggle with each other over 
who is most suited to sit on top of the hierarchy. The political elites who have ruled over 
Burundi since the end of colonialism saw government as a source of power and personal 
enrichment. The aspiration for wealth accumulation and power remains a fundamental 
problem in Burundi.  
When concentrating on the topic of governing elites in Burundi, it is important to 
discuss the vast gap between the governing elites who exercise power and the citizens 
they rule. To fully understand Burundi’s governing elites, one must critically look at two 
fundamental dimensions of the role that governing elites in Burundi play. These two 
dimensions are the methods that governing elites use to hold the reins of power and the 
ethnic distribution of power. Both of these dimensions play a critical role in Burundi’s 
political structure and power dynamics. In terms of methods used to maintain elites in 
power, President Nkurunziza and his CNDD-FDD party members orchestrate repression 
and intimidation to strengthen their grip on power and state resources. Ahluwalia (2016), 
Human Rights Watch (2016a), and Vandeginste, (2015) all agreed that in previous 
elections President Nkurunziza deliberately used violence and intimidation during pre–
election phases, election phases, and post-election phases, which compelled opposing 
parties to boycott the presidential election, hence improving his chances of retaining 
power. According to Daley (2006), “The ongoing violence is attributed to an increasingly 
factionalised political elite, based on the multiple cleavages in Burundi society, who 
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mobilize ethnicity in their struggle for control of the state” (p. 657). The role of political 
elites in Burundi, in some degree, has produced an atmosphere of uncertainty.  
The concept of governing elites that Mosca (1939) described places emphasis on 
the importance of the desire of the ruling class to control government agencies and 
society. Burundi’s CNDD-FDDs are suitable examples of the governing elites, or the 
ruling class’, persistent consolidation of power while systematically restricting political 
participation. Vandeginste (2015) agreed that Burundian economic, social, and political 
structures for the last two decades or more have been controlled by governing elites’ 
sharing of state resources among their networks. This political marginalization produces 
discontent, which leads to the type of violence epitomized in Burundi. Mosca (1939) and 
Pareto's (1916) critical examination of elite theory led to the conclusion that President 
Nkurunziza and his CNDD-FDD elites exhibit all the features of the elite theory of 
governance and dominance.  
In terms of the ethnic distribution of power in Burundi, ethnicity has proven 
repeatedly to be a powerful mobilizing force for elites. In his book Inequality and Post-
Conflict Fiscal Policies in Burundi, Janvier Nkurunziza suggested that “ethnic factors 
served the interest of the ruling elites responsible for the catastrophic consequences of 
their discriminatory policies” (2012, p. 219). In many ways, ethnic resentment and 
politics of distrust may be regarded as the chief threats to peace and stability in Burundi. 
Tutsis have been a minority in Burundi, but they run the nation’s elite institutes, such as 
the military, whereas Hutus constitute approximately 85% of the population but have 
held little power, leading to feelings of anger (Kliegman, 2016). In the last decade, 
however, these power dynamics have shifted. A Human Right Watch report (2016a) 
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added that although there are several Tutsi in high-level government positions, many of 
the important high-level government positions, including security services, were held by 
CNDD-FDD party members. Siegle (2015) echoed the same view, arguing that Pierre 
Nkurunziza’s ruling CNDD-FDD leaders have been increasingly “employing ethnically 
polarizing tactics. Purges among senior military and government officials have largely 
been ethnically based” (p. 2). To contextualize Burundi’s political elites, this theory 
establishes the critical role of the governing elites, particularly the role that President 
Pierre Nkurunziza played in the political development of Burundi, which, essentially, put 
the ruling CNDD-FDD elites in a higher position than the mass of the people.  
Explaining the Conflict with Intergroup Conflict Theory 
Another theoretical approach used to explain the crisis in Burundi is intergroup 
conflict theory. Intergroup conflict occurs between different groups because of 
differences like race, class, ethnicity, educational levels, or when two or more groups are 
vying for power or inadequate resources. In Burundi’s case, competition for power and 
resources, and the deep-rooted hostility between Hutu and Tutsi ethnic groups, remains a 
cause of violence, mistrust, and political struggle at all levels. Intergroup conflict is 
multifaceted—between groups, their self-interests, and their group’s welfare. Given 
Burundi’s history of violent ethnic conflict, ethnic groups are easily identifiable. A 
variety  of political dynamics—ranging from political oppression to ethnic association 
and leadership—strengthens strong group connections.  
The classic work of Muzafer Sherif provided groundbreaking research into 
intergroup conflict theory. Sherif (1951) underscored that conflict arises when two or 
more groups are vying for inadequate resources and power. In Sherif’s reasoning, group 
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identity and categorization play significant roles in driving conflict. Furthermore, Allport 
(1954) and Doise (1978) described the dynamics of group conflict in terms of various 
kinds of prejudices. Intergroup conflict thrives on groupings and differentiation. In 
Burundi, political elites have used ethnicity to exploit the association between political 
allegiances and ethnic divisions. This creates intergroup violence. Understanding how 
Hutu and Tutsi have interpreted their conflicted past is essential for understanding the 
nuances of their intergroup conflict. For example, in November, 2015, high-level CNDD-
FDD party leaders started using ethnically inflammatory language, evoking the example 
used in the Rwandan genocide. In his speech to supporters in Kirundi, Burundian Senate 
President Reverien Ndikuriyo lamented, "on this issue, you have to pulverize, you have 
to exterminate—these people are only good for dying. I give you this order, go” (Siegle, 
2015, p. 2).  
Ethnic conflicts have long been known as among the major threats to political 
stability, institutional order, and state cohesion in Burundi. Ethnic radicals on both sides 
have used ethnic feelings to underline the risk posed by the other group. On the one hand, 
Tutsi extremists have emphasized every Hutu-on-Tutsi act of violence, thereby fostering 
group unity against the Hutu threat. From another perspective, Hutu extremists have also 
referenced every Tutsi-on-Hutu act of violence, promoting group unity against the Tutsi 
threat. In this manner, both groups have strengthened their hold on power, limited state 
resources, and the state's powerful apparatus, which has amplified and increased the 
stereotypes and prejudices that both groups hold about the other, with mutual fear of 
massacre leading to preemptive attacks in the name of self defense (Daley, 2006; 
Ndikumana, 1998; Nindorera, 2012). In Burundi’s case, perceptions of past violent 
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conflict play a vital role in sustaining and worsening intergroup conflicts. Violent 
conflicts in 1965, 1972, 1988, 1991, and 1993 confirmed this notion.  
Moreover, social scientists have pinpointed circumstances under which group 
identities became destructive. For example, Tajfel and Turner (1979) portrayed how 
conflict over the allocation of inadequate resources strengthens self-identification with 
the group, causes ethnocentrism, and encourages hostile out-group behavior. Uvin (1999) 
stated, “Burundi presents a typical example of how discrimination and unequal access to 
scarce resources lead to violence. As the discrimination took place largely along ethnic 
lines, the violence and counter-violence became ethnic too” (p. 253). Unequal 
distributions of limited resources are prone to exaggerate conflict between majority and 
minority groups. As Ndikumana (2005) reinforced, “Distribution of economic resources 
and political power may be equal or unequal. Equal distribution of resources promotes 
cohesive group dynamics while unequal distribution creates antagonism between the 
privileged groups and the marginalized ones” (p. 413). In Burundi, it is clear access to 
power also means access to wealth and resources. Marginalization from politics causes 
discontent and can lead to ethnic violence. Gurr (1993), for instance, concluded that 
resentments stemming from inter-group competition for resources usually incites ethnic 
cohesion. Groups deprived of the allocation of resources often share both a common 
grievance and a common identity. In Burundi’s case, disparity in the allocation of state 
resources and political control through ethnic identity became instruments of conflict.  
It is necessary to understand that the existence of multiethnic societies can lead to 
intergroup conflict for economic resources, the struggle for political power, and vying for 
ethnic domination. The power struggle between Hutus and Tutsis stems from a 
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combination of factors, such as competition for scarce resources and governance policies 
and practices, which cause economic and social exclusion. The combination of these 
factors strengthened ethnic tensions in Burundi, particularly between the elites and the 
counter-elite. Arguably, the source of intergroup conflict in Burundi lies in the inclination 
of people to benefit psychologically from their group membership.  
Explaining the Conflict with Structural Violence Theory 
The theory of structural violence provides a practical context for understanding 
structural deficiencies that systematically deny marginalized citizens their basic 
economic, political, social, and human rights. Galtung (1969), who coined the term and 
concept of structural violence, argued that unequal advantage is built into the political, 
economic, and social structures that rule societies. In structural violence theory, direct 
violence comes in different forms, which may include physical force, killing, torture, 
rape, sexual assault, beatings, and verbal violence (Galtung, 1969), while “structural 
violence is defined by inequality, particularly when it comes to the distribution of power 
in a social structure” (Galtung, 1969, p. 175). Galtung (1969) used a triangle to explain 
these three types of violence, assigning structural and cultural violence to the base, the 
left, and the right sides of the triangle, with direct violence at the top. Galtung (1969) 
argued that direct violence is the immediate result of the preventable failure to meet 
people’s basic human needs. In essence, the crisis in Burundi exemplifies Galtung’s 
structural violence theory. The human needs of the people in Burundi were long 
neglected. When people find it hard to meet essential needs and lack opportunities to 
develop to their full potential, they are forced to use direct violence, as happened during 
the demonstrations in Burundi.  
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The theory of structural violence may be utilized to examine relationships 
between structural and direct violence in Burundi. One could argue that structural 
violence is the primary cause of direct violence. In Burundi’s case, direct violence was 
prompted as a result of conflicts of interest between the ruling CNDD-FDD and 
opposition parties. Taylor (2014) confirmed, 
Structural violence, inequality, and political killings provide the evidence. 
Ordinary Burundians frequently claim a lack of confidence in the state, citing 
corruption and the absence of good governance as major concerns, as well as the 
threat of further violence that is a consequence of impunity. (p. 198)  
It is appropriate to understand the political and economic systems that have 
shaped the phenomenon of structural violence. The main components of structural 
violence were reinforced by the government forces killing, physical force against, and 
beatings of citizens and opposition members in Burundi. These kinds of violent acts 
negate democratic principles and stability. Recent political violence in Burundi indicated 
that established structures and systems—political, economic, social, and judicial—
usually favor governing elites or the ruling classes, who have the bargaining power to 
bypass these structures with impunity. This shows that a disconnect exists between the 
government and its people, indicated by the history of repressive autocratic leaders.  
The people of Burundi and their political leaders know that the issues at stake in 
the months leading up to the 2015 presidential election's violence went far beyond just 
the failed political system and oppressive laws that President Pierre Nkurunziza’s and his 
party officials established. Oppression negatively affected the people and the socio-
economic, political, religious, and cultural lives of people in Burundi. For instance, after 
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President Pierre Nkurunziza announced that he would seek a third term in the April, 
2015, thousands were killed, and more than 300,000 people fled Burundi. People fled in 
fear of mass violence and the threat of a return to civil war, and also from abductions and 
torture (ACLED, 2016; UNHCR, 2016). The government failed to investigate effectively 
credible allegations of excessive use of force, extrajudicial executions, human rights 
abuses, and mistreatment by supporters of the CNDD-FDD party’s youth group, the 
Imbonerakure. Neither the National Intelligence Service, nor the Burundian National 
Police, nor President Nkurunziza or his administration embarked on an effort to hold 
these groups accountable (Amnesty International, 2015; Thomas-Greenfield, 2015; 
Vandeginste, 2015). Similarly, before the 2010 presidential election, President 
Nkurunziza clamped down on the 
[f]reedom of movement of opposition leaders, arrested dozens of opposition
activists, and banned all opposition party meetings. The elections were further 
marred by political violence that escalated with the kick-off of the presidential 
campaign on June 12, including nearly 100 grenade attacks, the killings of at least 
two ruling party activists and opposition activist, and arson attacks on at least 35 
local offices of the ruling party. (Human Rights Watch, 2010) 
These kinds of violence are embedded in the political, economic, and judicial 
structures in Burundi. Inequitable access to resources and political power are types of 
structural violence that often create direct violence. In Burundi, access to power and state 
resources is tantamount to the survival of President Pierre Nkurunziza and his party 
officials, and violence is the most effective tactic for silencing his opponents. To reform 
this system, Rubenstein (1999) emphasized that reforming political systems would 
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bolster opposition parties' contributions to decision-making and would also address deep-
rooted structural issues. 
Galtung (1969) articulated that structural violence has the ability to create and 
direct the behavioral effects of certain conflict situations. The behavior of demonstrators 
in burning government buildings, police vehicles, and other public property occurred 
because of the deep-seated nature of the structural violence involved. Since direct 
violence reinforces structural violence, President Pierre Nkurunziza and his security 
forces have been getting away with killings because they are protected by the system. 
One could argue that the people’s actions were traceable to structural violence since the 
people were motivated by institutional direct violence. These kinds of direct violence acts 
in Burundi were carried out by government forces and the institutions that are supposed 
to protect citizens’ interests. The people of Burundi feel severely undermined by the 
structural violence that encouraged cycles of violence from the different institutions of 
government. 
Structural violence limits individuals’ and groups’ access to legal, political, 
social, and economic progress. It grants greater access to privileged groups like 
government officials to goods, services, resources, and opportunities, while other groups 
are denied (Winter, 2012). Such unequal arrangements are fostered in the fabric of social, 
economic, and political structures and systems that control outcomes in Burundi. 
Structural violence generally manifests as power imbalance, lack of basic needs, the 
refusal of fundamental human rights, unequal access to resources, and marginalization in 
policymaking (Ho, 2007). 
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As Winter (2012) argued, the concept of structural violence requires examination 
in relation to a general societal system structured on the foundation of aggressive political 
control; that is, one based on the degree of hostile political restriction imposed on 
opposition parties in Burundi. Weak government institutions are some of the sources of 
structural violence in Burundi, as they systematically deny, and marginalize citizens from 
achieving, their basic economic, political, social, and human rights. Moreover, the 
ineffectiveness of security forces (police, military, and intelligence services) and a culture 
of impunity exacerbates structural violence. For instance, in Burundi, several opposition 
members and their supporters have been killed, jailed, and arrested, and the government 
has failed to investigate excessive use of force effectively. This miscarriage of justice 
appears to be creating a culture of impunity. Another cause of structural violence in 
Burundi is political violence. Political violence often occurs due to the failure of 
opposition parties, citizens, and other actors in government to solve perceived or real 
grievances. Political violence is motivated by a number of factors: power inequity, 
ineffectiveness of security services, culture of impunity, weak penalties, corruption, and 
bad governance. These components are all visible in Burundi. 
Rubenstein (1999) argued that many of these structural sources of conflict can be 
solved through reforming social structures or government institutions and open, 
transparent political participation. For example, in Burundi, opposing parties and civil 
society groups want strong democratic institutions to protect free space for political 
participation, the separation of powers, electoral reforms, respect for presidential term 
limits, and an appropriate balancing of economic and political power. If anything, 
Galtung’s (1969) concept of structural violence can strengthen the ability of governments 
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to hold violent leaders accountable for their actions. The concept of structural violence, in 
other words, does not merely develop a logical understanding of the root causes of 
political violence phenomena, but it also offers a foundation for effective action to 
resolve conflict. 
Elite theory, intergroup conflict theory, and structural violence theory all provide 
a conceptual framework for understanding the history, power struggle, inequalities, and 
ethnic dynamics of the conflict surrounding presidential term limit manipulation in 
Burundi. All three theories can explain the root causes and effects of the phenomenon 
under study from an interdisciplinary viewpoint. 
Summary and Conclusion 
This chapter merges the literature on term limit manipulation to establish an 
understanding of how the conflict surrounding presidential term limit manipulation has 
affected the perceptions of peace and stability among people in Burundi. The literature 
connects the frameworks and concepts of presidential term limit manipulations, 
democratization, and violence. The literature review focused on five reasons for these 
phenomena considered most relevant to the research problem: (a) lack of checks and 
balances, (b) weak government institutions, (c) electoral malpractice, (d) greed and 
corruption, and (e) fear of punishment. These five factors are the main enablers of many 
African leaders lengthening their grip on power, and particularly President Pierre 
Nkurunziza.  
However, more research is needed in the field of conflict resolution to determine 
whether identity politics or ethno-politics play any role in conflict and presidential 
longevity. Furthermore, elite theory, intergroup conflict theory, and structural violence 
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theory were all part of the analyzation process in the search for the root causes of the 
crisis and an understanding of why the crisis developed. These theories provide a filter 
for explaining how the conflict surrounding presidential term limit manipulation has 
affected the perceptions of peace and stability among people in Burundi. 
In Chapter 3, a mixed method research methodology is applied to understanding 
the phenomenon under study. Chapter 3 also provides a comprehensive description of the 
steps followed to collect and process the data for this research. 
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Chapter 3: Research Method 
Introduction 
Chapter 3 contains an overview of the research purpose and methodologies 
applied in data collections and data analysis stages. This chapter covers the synopsis of 
the philosophical framework for the research, case study, research question, validity and 
reliability; and ethics and reflexivity.  
Overview of Research Methodology 
The researcher chose qualitative and quantitative approaches to examine how the 
conflict surrounding presidential term limit manipulation affected the perception of peace 
and stability among people in Burundi. Creswell (2005) inferred that qualitative research 
methods are mainly helpful for exploring the deep meaning of a specific experience and 
to understanding that people link these experiences to their lives. For example, Bogdan 
and Biklen, (2003), Creswell (2005), Denzin and Lincoln (2000), and Yin (2009) argued 
that qualitative research methodologies are mainly important for discerning the meaning 
that individuals give to the events they experience. For Stake (1995), qualitative 
methodology is necessary when the types of research questions asked involve 
examination. Both Patton (2002) and Seidman (1991) maintained that qualitative research 
gives the researcher a comprehensive backdrop to what is going on relative to the subject. 
Strauss and Corbin (1998) stressed that qualitative research allows the researcher to study 
experiences, such as feelings, which are hard to reveal or study via quantitative research 
methods. Qualitative research occurs using case studies (Stake, 1995), phenomenology 
(Moustakas, 1994), grounded theory (Charmaz, 2006), ethnography (Hammersley & 
Atkinson, 2007), or narrative (Riessman, 2008). Whichever approach is chosen, Smith, 
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Flowers, and Larkin (2009) added, “Qualitative research is time-consuming, labor-
intensive, and both imaginatively and emotionally demanding” (p. 42). A mixed methods 
case study methodology was suitable for this dissertation as it promoted a clear 
understanding of how the conflict surrounding presidential term limit manipulation has 
affected the perceptions of peace and stability of the people in Burundi.  
Furthermore, the researcher used quantitative survey questionnaires to collect data 
from Burundians. Yin (2013) and Creswell (2013) asserted that survey research was 
useful for collecting a sizable amount of data and offering a far-reaching view of the 
phenomenon under study. Denscombe (1998) indicated that a quantitative survey 
approach is particularly helpful to finding data centered on a representative sample and 
generalizing those data to a large group or groups. For the purposes of this study, an 
independent t-test was used to determine whether a statistically significant difference 
existed between people in Burundi. At the end, the researcher integrates quantitative and 
qualitative methods so that these different approaches shed light on the phenomenon 
under study.  
Philosophical Foundation 
Applied in this dissertation, centered within the social constructivist paradigm, 
was a case study method used to understand how the conflict surrounding presidential 
term limit manipulation affected the perceptions of peace and stability among people in 
Burundi. Qualitative case study research offers two popular approaches. The first, which 
Merriam (2009) and Stake (1995) proposed, is a constructivist model, while the second, 
by Eisenhardt (1989), Flyvbjerg (2011), and Yin (2012), is a post-positivist viewpoint. 
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Both approaches added to the development of theoretical frameworks for the 
methodology.  
Patton (2001) asserted that qualitative research examines a “real world setting 
[where] the researcher does not attempt to manipulate the phenomenon of interest” (p. 
39). According to Stake (1995), “Most contemporary qualitative researchers nourish the 
belief that knowledge is constructed rather than discovered. The world we know is a 
particularly human construction” (p. 99). Merriam (2009) and Stake (1995), who based 
their case study methods on a social constructivist paradigm, argued that constructivism 
believes that people create the meaning of experiences and events and create the realities 
in which they take part. Furthermore, in qualitative case study research, a social 
constructivist paradigm reinforces a transactional approach, where the researcher 
develops a particular relationship with the phenomenon under study. Qualitative case 
studies also connect the researcher and the participants (Merriam, 2009; Stake, 1995).  
This dissertation was based on understanding how the conflict surrounding 
presidential term limit manipulation has affected the perceptions of peace and stability 
among people in Burundi. Participants constructed their perceptions based on individual 
and shared experiences. For this dissertation, the researcher conducted ten interviews, 
reviewed pertinent documents, and conceptualized the data to make sense of how 
research participants constructed their individual views of the conflict in Burundi.  
Case Study 
To understand how the conflict surrounding presidential term limit manipulation 
affected the perception of peace and stability among people in Burundi, it was imperative 
to conduct a case study. Case studies facilitate the exploration and explanation of 
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multidimensional phenomenon, which allows for the collecting of several viewpoints 
from a variety of sources. Muvingi and Duckworth (2014) stated that case study research 
is fitting for exploring multifaceted social phenomena such as conflicts and the most 
effective actions to end or resolve them. As such, the researcher used a case study 
approach to explore and understand the phenomenon under study. A case study is fitting 
when (a) a researcher wants to answer how and why questions, (b) the researcher cannot 
influence participants’ feelings or the data, (c) the context or phenomenon under study is 
important, or (d) there is lack of clarity explaining the relationship between the 
phenomenon and the context (Yin, 2003, 2013). Stake (1995) and Yin (2003) described 
the case study method as an approach of study in which the researcher studies an 
individual, group, event, program, or process. Furthermore, Stake (1995) and Yin (2003) 
used several terms to define various case studies. Stake (1995) outlined case studies as 
instrumental, intrinsic, or collective. Yin (2003) classified case studies as exploratory, 
explanatory, or descriptive, and he distinguished between holistic case studies, single 
case studies, and multiple case studies. For this study, the researcher applied an 
exploratory and an explanatory case study design to understand the phenomenon. An 
exploratory case study is generally useful for examining circumstances wherein the 
action assessed has no well-defined, particular established results (Yin, 2003), whereas an 
explanatory case study design usually answers questions to describe supposed causal 
connections in everyday life that are very difficult for experimental or survey approaches 
to ascertain (Yin, 2003).  
Stake (1995, 2000) and Yin (2003) claimed that researchers using a case study 
gather comprehensive information via multiple sources of data gathering methods over a 
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specified duration of time. The researcher collected data via phone calls and audio Skype 
sessions, in-depth interviews, online-based surveys, and document reviews. Yin (2009) 
categorized five essential parts of a successful case study research design: (a) research 
questions; (b) purpose of the study; (c) unit of analysis; (d) the logic that connects data to 
propositions; and (e) the criteria for interpreting findings. The research questions address 
"how" and "why" type questions. In this study, the researcher asked how President Pierre 
Nkurunziza’s decision to manipulate the Constitution affected the perceptions of peace 
and stability among people in Burundi. The second part of a case study research approach 
is describing the main reason for the study. The main purpose of the dissertation was to 
understand how the conflict surrounding presidential term limit manipulation affected the 
perception of peace and stability among people in Burundi. The third part of a case study 
research method is describing the unit of analysis, which defines the case. The unit of 
analysis in this study was Burundians’ views of the current conflict. The fourth part of a 
case study approach is linking research data to propositions. The proposition in this study 
was that the impact of presidential term limit manipulation on peace and security in 
Burundi would differ along ethnic lines, but not significantly along gender lines. The 
researcher linked data to propositions after the data collection stage as themes developed. 
The researcher also matched subject matter that emerged in the data to the main 
propositions of the study. The fifth part of a case study approach is setting standards for 
the purpose of translating results. After developing the themes, the researcher gained 
understanding of results, which helped to determine suggestions for future study.  
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Research Questions 
As the purpose of this dissertation was to understand the conflict surrounding 
presidential term limit manipulation in Burundi, it was fitting to frame a research 
question to help inquire into the root causes of violence. To understand this phenomenon, 
it was appropriate to ask the following research questions.  
Qualitative Research Question 
1. How has term limit manipulation affected the perception of peace and stability
of people in Burundi? 
Sub-Questions 
1. Why did President Nkurunziza manipulate Burundi’s Constitution to stay in
power? 
2. How has term limit manipulation affected Burundians?
3. How can Burundians avoid more violence and create a pathway to peace and
stability?  
Quantitative Research Questions 
1. What are the differences in perceptions between Hutu and Tutsi towards the
conflict surrounding presidential term limit manipulation? 
2. What are the differences in perceptions between men and women towards the
conflict surrounding presidential term limit manipulation? 
Hypotheses 
Based on the above research questions, the following hypotheses were created: 
H01. There is no significant difference between Hutu and Tutsi perceptions of 
the conflict surrounding presidential term limit manipulation. 
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H11. There is a significant difference between Hutus and Tutsis perceptions of the 
conflict surrounding presidential term limit manipulation.  
H02. There is no significant difference between men and women in perceptions of 
the conflict surrounding presidential term limit manipulation. 
H12. There is a significant difference between men’s and women’s perceptions of 
the conflict surrounding presidential term limit manipulation.  
Data Collection Methods 
The mixed-methods design followed a convergent, parallel design: Quantitative 
and qualitative data were collected simultaneously and then integrated. The goal of using 
quantitative data is to rationalize, strengthen, and offer more background to qualitative 
results. Yin (2009) detailed a well-organized case study research gain from using various 
data sources, which effectively safeguarded the study. Baxter and Jack (2008) noted, “In 
a case study, data from multiple sources are then converged in the analysis process rather 
than handled individually. Each data source is one piece of the ‘puzzle,’ with each piece 
contributing to the researcher’s understanding of the whole phenomenon” (p. 554). For 
this study, the researcher used three data sources: (a) online-based survey questionnaires, 
(b) open-ended, in-depth phone/Skype interviews; and (c) a document review. The
integration of various data enhances findings and supports an understanding of the case. 
Using multiple data sources is also useful for answering research questions and helps 
readers to understand the history of, and viewpoints on, the phenomenon under study 
(Creswell, 2003, 2013).  
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Quantitative Data Collection 
The researcher obtained data using online survey questionnaires representative of 
Burundians. Online survey questionnaires were used to support the qualitative data on 
how term limit manipulation affected the perception of peace and stability of people in 
Burundi. Of the 200 people recruited to take part in the online survey, 153 participated. 
The online survey questionnaires comprised 15 mixed questions on a 5-scale Likert 
measurement––Strongly Disagree = 1, Disagree, 2, Neutral = 3, Agree = 4, Strongly 
Agree = 5 (see Appendix A). The online survey was administered electronically using 
Survey Monkey. A web link to the SurveyMonkey websites was included in the email. 
SurveyMonkey offers participants guidelines on how to take and submit the survey. The 
researcher was also able to use the SurveyMonkey website to assess the online survey 
completion frequencies the entire data collection process. The researcher used Statistical 
Package for Social Science software Version 20.0 (SPSS) to analyze online survey 
questionnaires.  
All participants met the inclusion criteria in this study in that they were all 
Burundians, both male and female, and over the age of 18 at the time of taking the 
survey. All of the participants who consented to take the survey varied in age, ranging 
from 18 to 45 years. All participants communicated with the researcher in English. 
Online survey participants also included both Hutus and Tutsis, the two predominant 
ethnic groups in Burundi and Twa. However, some of the participants selected “Other,” 
as this could mean mixed-ethnicities—individuals with a Tutsi father and a Hutu mother 
or vice versa. The only exclusion criterion in this study was that participants who did not 
speak or read English were excluded. 
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Due to the severity of the crisis in Burundi, the researcher used two research 
gatekeepers and several organizations in Burundi to help with recruiting participants who 
were relevant to the phenomenon under study. The organizations were the Association 
Saint François d'assise, IBurundi, both civil society groups from Burundi, and 
BurundiFacts, a pro-government group. The objective was to gather diverse views of the 
phenomenon under study. The research gatekeepers were Burundian nationals—one a 
refugee in Kenya and the other living in Burundi. Before data collection, both 
gatekeepers were briefed on any risks associated with this study and privacy concerns.  
After the gatekeepers and Association Saint François d'assise, IBurundi, and 
BurundiFacts provided 200 names, the researcher applied simple random sampling. That 
is, the researcher randomly selected 175 participants out of the 200 names using a table of 
random numbers. Out of the 200 names provided, 110 were males and 90 were females. 
The researcher contacted them via email, phone, WhatsApp, or Skype to explain the 
nature of study. At the end of this process, 153 participants (103 males, 49 females and 1 
“other”) agreed to take part in the online survey. The researcher will detail the 
underrepresentation of females in chapter 5 of the study limitations section. 
Forty-eight hours before they took the online survey, the researcher sent consent 
forms to participants detailing the purpose of the study and the potential risks of 
participating in the study (see Appendix B). The researcher electronically sent survey 
links to each individual participant’s email address. On average, the online survey took 
about 10 minutes to complete. All online survey participants in this study voluntarily 
agreed to participate.  
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Qualitative Data Collections 
For the qualitative data collection, interviews and document analysis were the 
main approaches to data collection. For the interview, the sampling criteria was based on 
choosing participants who experienced the conflict and who were in favor of or against 
President Nkurunziza’s third term bid. Purposeful sampling techniques were applied to 
recruit participants. In purposeful sampling, the focus is on certain features of a 
population who are of interest to answer research questions (Creswell, 2013). In addition 
to knowledge and experience, availability and willingness to share experiences and views 
are crucial in purposeful sampling (Bernard, 2002). 
For the interview portion, the researcher used open-ended, semi-structured phone 
and Skype interviews. The interview comprised 10 questions (see Appendix C). The 
researcher initially began interviewing on June 19, 2017 and completed the last interview 
on October 11, 2017. All interview participants met the inclusion criteria in this study in 
that they were all Burundians and male or female over the age of 18 at the time of taking 
part in the interview. All the participants who consented to the interviews varied based on 
age, ranging from 18 to 35 years. All participants communicated with the researcher in 
the English Language. Similar to the online survey participants, interviewees were also 
composed of Hutus and Tutsis, the two predominant ethnic groups in Burundi, or “other.” 
The only exclusion criterion for this phase of the study, as for the last, was that 
participants who did not speak or read English were excluded. The participants in the 
interviews were drawn from the same population as the online survey population. The 
researcher recruited participants who had characteristics pertinent to the phenomenon 
under study. 
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The researcher also contacted these participants via email, phone, WhatsApp, or 
Skype to explain the nature of study. Of the 14 people recruited from the pool of online 
survey participants, 10 agreed to interviews. Forty-eight hours before the study, the 
researcher sent consent forms to the interviewees detailing the nature of the study and the 
potential risks of participating in the study (see Appendix D). With participants’ 
approval, the researcher audio recorded the interviews and then transcribed them 
following each interview. Interviews were approximately 28 minutes on average. All 
interviewees in this study voluntarily agreed to interviews about the phenomenon. 
Because of the severity of the crisis, participants were assigned alphabetical letters to 
protect them from potential harm due to participating in this study.  
The researcher applied Merriam’s (2009) interview approach to elicit 
demographic information and to reveal how the conflict surrounding presidential term 
limit manipulation affected the interviewees’ perceptions of peace and stability in 
Burundi. Esterberg (2002) noted that an interview is usually considered an exchange 
between the interviewer and interviewee, whereby the interviewer inquires and the 
interviewee answers. Stake (1995) suggested that using interview data allows for the 
triangulation of data attained from additional sources, which boosts the reliability of 
study results. The researcher followed the six question criteria that Merriam (2009) 
proposed for case study research: (1) experience/behavior, (2) opinion/belief, (3) feeling, 
(4) knowledge, (5) sensory, and (6) background/demographic. Using these six criteria are
important to the research question because they allow participants to share their 
experiences, especially how they feel and how they interpret their views. The researcher 
avoided leading questions in order to encourage participants to answer freely and openly. 
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The researcher followed up with questions when needed to encourage the participants to 
elaborate on a response.  
Since the interviews occurred via phone/Skype, the researcher applied active 
listening skills to capture what participants were saying. During the interviews, the 
researcher was twice faced with delays due to a poor Internet connection. The researcher 
rescheduled several interviews at different days and times. Moreover, the researcher 
explained pertinent information regarding the main purpose of the study, together with 
information about himself, with each participant to build the trust and rapport essential an 
interview. This allowed participants to be comfortable, which was important for an ideal 
interviewing atmosphere. The researcher also asked each participant if he or she had 
additional questions and concerns about the nature of the study or research techniques.  
While interviews and online survey questionnaires were the main approaches of 
data collection, the researcher also gathered and examined documents to obtain meaning, 
gain understanding, and corroborate participants’ experiences. Documents used as part of 
the study included: Afrobaromater, ACLED, Human Rights Watch Reports, Amnesty 
International Reports, International Crisis Group Report, United Nations Reports, 
newspapers, and transcripts from United States Congressional Testimony Hearing on 
Burundi. In addition to the authenticity, accuracy, credibility, and representativeness of 
selected documents, decisions in selecting documents were based on the research 
question and sub-questions and the theoretical perspectives germane to the study. For 
Afrobarometer data, the researcher only searched for documents that covered surveys 
done on Burundi about term limitations, the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation agreement, 
and democratization over the past five years. For ACLED, the researcher only used 
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documents that examined violence related to term limits and ethnic violence from 2015-
2018. For Human Rights Watch Reports, Amnesty International Reports, and 
International Crisis Group Reports, the researcher used annual data from 2010-2018 on 
Burundi. Some of the key words used to identify relevant components of the documents 
included ethnic violence, gender-based violence, violence by security forces, 
Imbonerakure youth militia, and armed opposition groups. For UN data, the researcher 
examined documents that covered term limitations, the Arusha agreement, ethnic 
dynamics, increased militia violence, armed opposition violence, refugee issues, and 
security issues. For newspaper data, the researcher analyzed reports linked to term limits, 
gender-based violence, ethnic matters, and violence by security forces, Imbonerakure 
youth militia, and armed opposition groups. All these documents were accessed from the 
organizations’ respective websites.  
Quantitative Data Analysis 
The researcher used the Likert scale to measure feelings, values, and opinions 
with the online survey questionnaires (Likert, 1932; Norman, 2010) with the response 
options Strongly Disagree, Disagree, Neutral, Agree, and Strongly Agree. To prepare the 
data for analysis, Likert scale responses were recoded into numeric values as follows: 
Strongly Disagree = 1, Disagree, 2, Neutral = 3, Agree = 4, and Strongly Agree =5. 
Descriptive statistics, such as the demographic characteristics of participants, were 
provided. In addition, an independent t-test was used to determine whether a statistically 
significant difference existed between Hutu and Tutsi, as well as female and male, 
opinions on how the conflict surrounding presidential term limit manipulation affected 
the perception of peace and stability among people in Burundi. Moreover, Levene’s test 
88 
for equality of variances was conducted for each t-test. When Levene’s test is significant, 
it indicates significant differences in variance, thereby indicating that the homogeneity of 
variances assumption is violated. When the homogeneity of variance of assumption is 
violated, a corrected, more conservative t-test is used, one that is explicitly designed for 
instances in which equal variances are not assumed (Field, 2013; Wright & London, 
2009). Descriptive statistics explain descriptions of a particular data set by offering short 
summations about the sample and measures of data.  
Qualitative Data Analysis 
Data analysis for the qualitative component in this mixed-methods case study 
research proceeded as follows. As Strauss and Corbin (1998) suggested, qualitative 
research studies entail a constant collaboration between data collection and data analysis. 
This includes reducing and organizing significant amounts of collected data to understand 
their meaning. Unlike for quantitative analysis, there are no agreed upon procedures for 
qualitative analysis. For example, Marshall and Rossman (2006) suggested that 
qualitative data analysis does not develop in a linear manner. Creswell (2013) and Strauss 
and Corbin (1998) advised researchers on good practices and techniques to enrich the 
validity of qualitative studies. These data analysis techniques were used to make sure that 
findings from this study were valid, credible, and dependable.  
The researcher applied thematic analysis to code the data collected. A thematic 
approach is suitable for theorizing through several cases, finding shared thematic 
components across research participants and the events they report (Braun & Clarke, 
2006; Creswell, 2013). This procedure also demanded exhaustive reading and re-reading 
of transcripts to look for similarities and differences, which allowed the researcher to 
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build themes and categories. To guide the data analysis stage, the researcher utilized 
Braun and Clarke’s (2006) six steps of data analysis procedure. In step one, the 
researcher familiarized himself with the data. This included completely engaging the data 
by first transcribing the interviews then reading and re-reading the transcripts to 
understand the material and viewpoints conveyed. In step two, the researcher started 
generating initial codes, identifying preliminary initial codes that were important. In step 
three, the researcher searched for themes. This process included the interpretative 
analysis of key themes. Step four involved reviewing the themes. In this stage, the 
researcher classified the initial themes and inquired into whether to integrate, isolate, or 
reject them. Step five was defining and naming the themes. This involved refining and 
describing the themes and possible subthemes within data. Step six was producing the 
report. This final step included writing the report by using themes extracted from the 
data.  
Following each interview, the researcher placed transcripts into Microsoft Word 
documents and thoroughly reread the transcripts line-by-line to make sure that they were 
detailed and correct. Chapter 4 will include a thorough description of the coding and 
theme development. The researcher used open and axial coding to analyze the data 
(Corbin & Strauss, 2007).  
The categorizing stage involved using categorical groping to create themes and 
sub-themes. By classifying groups for comparison, the researcher gave each group of 
words a theme applying Atlas.ti, a qualitative data analysis program, enabling themes and 
sub-themes to emerge. Interviewees’ personal information was omitted and replaced by 
an assigned alphabet letter to safeguard their privacy. Using both computer-assisted data 
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analysis coupled with manual checks improved the trustworthiness, credibility, and 
validity of findings.  
The document analysis involved reading through the data obtained from ACLED, 
Human Rights Watch Reports, Amnesty International Reports, International Crisis Group 
Report, United Nations Reports, newspapers, and transcripts from the United States 
Congressional Testimony Hearing on Burundi. This procedure entailed a thorough, more 
focused rereading and analysis of the data (Braun & Clarke, 2006; Corbin & Strauss, 
2008; Silverman, 2000), and the researcher took a closer look at selected data and 
performed coding and category building. This process included thematic analysis. 
Thematic analysis involves pattern identification within data and themes developing into 
categories for examination (Creswell, 2013). After identifying relevant documents, the 
researcher placed data into Microsoft Word documents. The findings section will show a 
detailed report of the coding and theme development. Open and axial coding was also 
used to examine the data, which enabled themes to develop on their own (Corbin & 
Strauss, 2007). The next stage included a categorizing stage, which included categorical 
groping to create themes and sub-themes. The researcher again used Atlas.ti to help with 
the classifying and grouping of themes and sub-themes.  
Validity and Reliability 
One of the core principles of any research study is the reliability and validity of 
the data and results. Reliability concerns the consistency, dependability, and replicability 
of the results obtained (Nunan, 1999). As already noted, an independent t-test was 
utilized in the quantitative portion of this study to determine whether a statistically 
significant difference existed between Hutu and Tutsi, as well as between male and 
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female, perceptions of the crisis. The online survey questionnaire consisted of five 
demographic questions and fifteen thematic questions. The researcher used a Likert scale 
for the online survey questionnaires. According to Babbie (2007), a “Likert scale is a type 
of composite measurements developed in an attempt to improve the levels of 
measurement in social research” (p. 171). Obtaining similar results in quantitative 
research is rather straightforward using a Likert scale because data are presented in 
numerical form (Nunan, 1999). 
Validity in qualitative research means whether the research really measures that 
which he or she planned to measure and to how accurate the research findings are 
(Golafshani, 2003). For example, Yin (2013) advised researchers to use three sources of 
data collection and analysis for case studies to improve the validity and reliability of 
studies. The three sources include several data sources, building a case study file, and 
maintaining a sequence of verification. Yin (2013) further stressed that the triangulation 
of data is one approach that a researcher can use to tackle problems of validity.  
The importance of triangulation is that it minimizes biases, particularly the 
problem of relying on one data collection method. Patton (2002) supported the use of 
triangulation, noting that “triangulation strengthens a study by combining methods. This 
can mean using several kinds of methods or data, including using both quantitative and 
qualitative approaches” (p. 247). In the triangulation stage, the researcher looked for 
uniformities in data sets and ensured that all aspects of the phenomenon were included in 
the examination and that all aspects were thoroughly examined. To check for validity 
within the qualitative data, the researcher followed Merriam’s (2002) concept of member 
checks by showing interviewees a copy of their interview transcripts and asking them to 
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validate the correctness of the content. Finally, the researcher maintained a chain of 
evidence, which helped him to track the information from the study database to the 
research question and the concept it was intended to examine. This process enabled the 
researcher to verify that the conclusions that the researcher drew from the data were 
reliable. 
Ethics and Reflexivity 
In every research study, ethical implications exist, such as participants’ safety, 
confidentiality, potential benefits, biases, and prejudices. Thus, the researcher assumed 
responsibility for ensuring that all relationships and materials investigated were respected 
at all times. Berg (2009), and Guillemin and Gillam (2004) defined ethics in research as 
following guidelines of acceptable and unacceptable conduct in research, which includes 
matters of privacy, the safety, and the confidentiality of data.  
Guillemin and Gillam (2004) described reflexivity as a tool for understanding 
data and its collection and for understanding the type of ethics in qualitative research 
methods and the ways that ethical practice in research is accomplished. Research 
comprising human participants begins from an understanding of ethical tension 
(Guillemin & Gillam, 2004). It is incumbent upon the researcher to uphold participants’ 
rights to confidentiality and privacy and right to be free from physical and mental harm 
during and after the study. Therefore, in both the interview and online survey consent 
forms, the researcher summarized the purpose of the study, how he would protect the 
research participants’ anonymity, and what measures would occur to secure interview 
audio recording and survey questionnaires when the study was completed. Research 
participants were informed that they had the option of either stopping the interview or 
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withdrawing from the research study altogether. To avoid coercion or inducement, 
participants in the study were not compensated. According to Bentley and Thacker 
(2004), compensating participants to take part in research raises concerns about inducing 
participants into taking part in a study that they would not participate in otherwise or 
influencing participants’ answers to research questions. As part of the ethics protocol, the 
researcher conducted himself within the guidelines and conceptual frameworks of ethical 
practice in research and Nova Southeastern University guidelines when exchanging 
confidential information electronically. The researcher ensured that all data from 
newspapers, websites, memos, archival records, transcripts of interviews, and annual 
reports came from valid and credible sources and that they characterized the phenomenon 
in the most accurate possible way.  
Before submitting to the Institutional Review Board (IRB), the researcher 
completed the mandatory Collaborative Institutional Training Initiative (CITI) Ethics 
Training Program offered through Nova Southeastern University. This study was 
conducted with approval from, and in compliance with, Nova Southeastern University 
IRB, project number 2017-373 (see Appendix E). Before starting the interview and the 
online survey questionnaire, respondents were provided with written consent forms 
expressing their agreement before taking part in this study. Research respondents were 
additionally asked to verify they were over 18 years of age. 
Another ethical issue of concern was the researcher’s personal biases on this 
topic. As an advocate of presidential term limits, democracy, and good governance in 
Africa, the researcher might hope to prove that manipulating constitutions, such as by 
amending term limits to stay in power, created political violence and instability in many 
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African countries. The interpretation of data was at risk of being influenced by the 
researcher’s biases, which would affect the validity and reliability of the findings. To 
address this issue, the researcher adhered to high ethical standards and transparency 
throughout the research. Perkins and Baxter (2011) agreed that researchers should be 
aware of their own feelings, motives, and biases and identify possible preconceptions 
before these impact their studies.  
Given the researcher’s views on this topic, he applied several bracketing 
techniques to mitigate his biases. Gearing (2004) described bracketing as “a scientific 
process in which a researcher suspends or holds in abeyance his or her presuppositions, 
biases, assumptions, theories, or previous experiences to see and describe the 
phenomenon” (p. 1430). Tufford and Newman (2010) reinforced that “bracketing is a 
method used by some researchers to mitigate the potential deleterious effects of 
unacknowledged preconceptions related to the research and thereby to increase the rigor 
of the project” (p. 81). A methodical examination of different aspects of bracketing helps 
researchers to recognize their biases and find ways to mitigate them within their chosen 
qualitative research methods (Fischer, 2009; Gearing, 2004; Tufford & Newman, 2010). 
During the data collection phase, the researcher wrote memos and abstract notes 
that clarified his thoughts and views. Writing down memos and notes following each 
interview enabled the researcher to deeply engage with data and helped him to document 
his personal biases about the subject under study. The researcher used bracketing during 
each interview session and each transcription to expand his understanding and 
engagement with the participants and the data. Thus, “bracketing interviews can increase 
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the researcher’s clarity and engagement with participants’ experiences by unearthing 
forgotten personal experiences” (Tufford & Newman, 2010, p. 86).  
During the data analysis phase, the researcher used reflexive journaling. As 
Fischer (2009) explained, “reflexivity provides self-awareness, including awareness of 
how one has participated in developing particular understandings” (p. 588). Before 
undertaking this study, the researcher identified his preconceptions and made notes of 
them throughout the research process. Using this method throughout the entire research 
process alleviated the risk of the researcher leaning toward his own preconceptions and 
interpretations. Ahern (1999) added that adopting reflective journaling could improve a 
researcher’s ability to maintain a reflexive standpoint. Using bracketing during the data 
analysis phase enabled the researcher to balance his biases and helped to bring both major 
themes and negative circumstances to the surface. Bracketing also helped the researcher 
to maintain self-awareness throughout the data collection, data analysis, and 
interpretation phases.  
Summary and Conclusion 
Chapter 3 provided a summary of the methodology applied in the study and shed 
light on the mixed methods case study approach. The chapter provided a discussion of 
employing semi-structured interviews, survey questionnaires, and document review as 
the main data sources. Chapter 3 also provided an explanation of the approach used for 
the study, a mixed method case study design positioned within a constructivist model, 
which utilized constructivist data examination approaches. The researcher also explained 
the ethical concerns of the ethics protocol specified by Nova Southeastern University’s 
IRB committee. The researcher addressed specific issues linked with online survey 
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questionnaires, interviewing, transcribing, and coding and analyzing interview and 
document data. Also discussed in the chapter were methodological triangulation, validity 
and reliability, and researcher reflexivity during the transcribing, coding, and analyses 
processes. In Chapter 4, the findings of the study are presented.  
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Chapter 4: Research Findings 
Discussion of the Research Findings 
The purpose of this study was to examine how the conflict surrounding 
presidential term limit manipulation affects perceptions of peace and stability among 
people in Burundi. Understanding this phenomenon was extremely important because the 
current crisis in Burundi affects economic conditions as well as peace and stability. The 
mixed-methods approach used required the collection of online survey questionnaires, 
interviews, and documents to measure the perceptions of Burundians. The mixed-
methods design followed a convergent, parallel design: Both quantitative and qualitative 
data were collected independently and integrated in the analysis stage. The goal of the 
qualitative data analysis was to rationalize, strengthen, and offer more background to 
quantitative results.  
Quantitative Data Analysis 
In this chapter, the results are explained and the data are presented by research 
category (i.e., quantitative data are presented first, followed by qualitative data). Data 
were triangulated to check the reliability and strengthen the results. For example, Tables 
3-7 feature the demographic information of participants. Table 8 lists an in-depth analysis
of Hutu and Tutsi perceptual differences regarding the conflict using an independent t-
test to determine whether a statistically significant difference existed. Table 9 shows a 
detailed analysis of gender differences and participants’ perceptions of the conflict. An 
independent t-test determined whether a statistically significant difference existed 
between female and male perceptions of the conflict. The quantitative portion of this 
study addressed the following research questions: 
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RQ 1. What are the differences in perceptions between Hutu and Tutsi towards 
the conflict surrounding presidential term limit manipulation?   
RQ 2. What are the differences in perceptions between men and women towards 
the conflict surrounding presidential term limit manipulation? 
Of the 20 online survey questions, five of the questions requested demographic 
information from the participants. The researcher ran an independent t-test analysis for 15 
of the online survey questions to determine whether a statistically significant difference 
existed between Hutus and Tutsis as well as gender perceptions of the crisis.  
First, ethnic conflict has overshadowed the lives of Burundi’s people as far back 
as 1962, when the country attained independence from Belgium. For example, a 
significant feature of the political makeup in Burundi entails more than four decades of 
on-and-off intractable conflict over control of power and access to resources, wealth, and 
economic opportunity along with a history of inequitable policies between the Tutsi 
minority and the Hutu majority. Secondly, it is critical to uncover gender perceptions 
since armed conflict and its outcome touch women’s lives in ways that vary from the 
effects on men. For example, during the 1993-2005 Burundian civil war, women and girls 
were affected disproportionately. 
Of the 200 people recruited to take part in the online survey, 153 participated. 
Below, Table 3 contains the frequencies for age demographics of the online survey 
participants. In terms of the age distribution of participants, six groupings were created 
(18-25 years old; 26-35 years old; 36-45 years old; 46-55 years old; 56-65 years old; and 
66 and older). The largest age group was 18-25 years (n=75, 49%) and second largest age 
group was 26-35 years (n=61, 39.9%), followed by 36-45 years (n=17, 11.1%). No 
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respondents aged 46 and older responded to the online survey. The researcher only ran 
analysis on Hutu-Tutsi differences as well as gender differences. This is because identity 
seems to be the most significant factor in the conflict.  
Table 3  
Age Distribution of Participants 
Range Frequency Percent 
18-25 Years old 75 49 
26-35 Years old 61 39.9 
36-45 Years old 17 11.1 
46-55 Years old 0 0 
56-65 Years old 0 0 
66-or older 0 0 
Total 153 100 
Table 4 comprises the frequencies for the gender demographics of the online 
survey participants. Concerning gender demographics, the majority of the sample 
identified as male (n=103, 67%), followed by female (n=49, 32%) and other (n=1, 0.7%). 
Even though women constitute over 50% of Burundi’s population, more men than 
women responded. 
Table 4 
Gender of Participants 
Gender Frequency Percent 
Male 103 67.3 
Female 49 32 
Other 1 0.7 
Total 153 100 
Table 5 illustrates the frequencies of ethnicity of the participants surveyed. The 
sample was close to evenly split between individuals who identified as Hutu (n=76, 
49.7%) and Tutsi (n=68, 44.4%). Individuals who identified as other (n=8, 5.2%) were 
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those with a Tutsi father and a Hutu mother, or vice versa, and only one (n=1, 0.7%) 
identified as Twa. 
Table 5 
Ethnicity of Participants 
Ethnicity Frequency Percent 
Hutu 76 49.7 
Tutsi 68 44.4 
Twa 1 0.7 
Other 8 5.2 
Total 153 100 
Table 6 shows the highest level of education completed among participants, 
measured at a six-level variable (high school, technical/vocational training, bachelor's 
degree, master's degree, professional degree, and doctoral degree). There was an even 
split between those who identified as having a bachelor’s degree (n=52, 34%) and those 
who had technical/vocational training (n=53, 34.6%). Furthermore, a small percentage of 
participants responded that they held a master’s degree (n=15, 9.8%), and no participants 
earned either a professional or a doctoral degree.  
Table 7 shows the occupation level of participants. “Unemployed” was the largest 
occupation category (n=56, 36.6%) and “student” was the second largest occupation 
category (n=42, 27.5%). Respondents who identified as self-employed were the third 
largest occupation category (n=22, 14.4%), “private sector” was the fourth largest 
occupation category (n=16, 10.5%), and “government” was the fifth largest occupation 
category (n=12, 7.8%), followed by “other” (n=5, 3.3%).  
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Table 6 
Education Level of Participants 
Level of Education Frequency Percent 
High School 33 21.6 
Bachelor's Degree 52 34 
Master's Degree 15 9.8 
Technical/Vocational Training 53 34.6 
Professional Degree 0 0 
Doctoral Degree  0 0 
Total 153 100 
Table 7 
Occupation of Participants 
Occupation Frequency Percent 
Government 12 7.8 
Private sector 16 10.5 
Self-employed 22 14.4 
Student 42 27.5 
Unemployed 56 36.6 
Other 5 3.3 
Total  153 100 
An independent t-test determined whether a statistically significant difference 
existed between the two groups, Hutus and Tutsis (see Table 8). The 15 online survey 
questions were relevant to the research question and they also unearthed Burundi’s past 
conflicts, which entailed governance issues, the protracted history of the power struggle, 
lack of equal opportunities to access political power, and violent ethnic divisions between 
Hutus and Tutsis. Participants used a scale ranging from 1=Strongly Disagree to 5= 
Strongly Agree. Table 8 illustrates some significant differences between the two groups’ 
responses to all of the questions.   
On the question, I support presidential term limits, the resulting t-test was 
significant t(138.538) = -8.63, p < .001. This result indicated that Hutus and Tutsis had 
different opinions on this matter, with those who identified as Hutu (M = 2.50, SD = 
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1.447), indicating greater disagreement and Tutsis (M = 4.34, SD = 1.101), indicating 
greater agreement. In terms of whether President Nkurunziza's third term bid violated the 
Arusha agreement, a significant difference existed between Hutus (M = 1.92, SD = 
1.129), who indicated greater disagreement, and Tutsis who indicated agreement (M = 
4.41, SD = 0.981), t(142) = -14.057, p < 0.001. Opinions differed between Hutus and 
Tutsis regarding the question, violence has increased due to Pierre Nkurunziza third term 
bid. The t-test indicated that Hutus (M = 2.32, SD = 1.073) had stronger disagreement 
than Tutsis (M = 4.40, SD = .831), t(139.212) = -12.080, p < .001. The question 
Presidential term limit manipulation is the root of the current crisis also resulted in 
different opinions. The t-test indicated that Hutus (M = 2.32, SD = 1.098) had stronger 
disagreement than Tutsis (M = 4.06, SD = 1.035), t(142) = -9.771, p < .001.  
Perceptions were once again divided on the statement Presidential term limits 
should be taken out of the constitution with the results of the t test showed that Hutus (M 
= 3.47, SD = 1.419) had stronger agreement than Tutsis (M = 1.59, SD = 1.136), t(142) = 
8.735, p < 0.001. With regard to the question, The crisis has enduring impact on the 
population including persistent fear. The t-test results for this question showed that Hutus 
(M = 2.67, SD = 1.063) expressed more disagreement than Tutsis (M = 4.06, SD = .731), 
t(133.449) = -9.206, p < .001. Likewise, opinions were divided on the statement; The 
current crisis will make Burundi more volatile. The t-test revealed that Hutus (M = 2.57, 
SD = .984) expressed more disagreement than Tutsis (M = 3.82, SD = .897), t(141.950) = 
-8.023, p < .001. Furthermore, Hutus (M = 2.39, SD = 1.223) showed more disagreement
with the statement Government forces are responsible for the violence than Tutsis (M = 
4.25, SD = .998), t(142) = -9.902, p < .001. Opinions were also divided on the statement, 
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Armed opposition groups are responsible for the violence. The results of the t test 
showed that Hutus (M = 4.30, SD = 0.589) had stronger agreement than Tutsis (M = 3.35, 
SD = 1.243), t(93.279) = 5.749, p < 0.001. 
Table 1 
Hutu and Tutsi Perceptions of the Conflict 
Questions Ethnicity M SD t df 
Sig. 
(2-tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
I support Presidential 
Term Limits 
Hutu 2.50 1.447 -8.630 138.538 *** 
p<.001 
-1.838
Tutsi 4.34 1.101 
President 
Nkurunziza's Third 
Term bid violated the 
Arusha agreement  
Hutu 1.92 1.129 -
14.057 
142 *** 
p<.001 
-2.491
Tutsi 4.41 0.981 
Violence has 
increased due to 
Pierre Nkurunziza 
third term bid 
Hutu 2.32 1.073 -
12.080 
139.212 *** 
p<.001 
2.081 
Tutsi 4.40 0.831 
Presidential term 
limit manipulation is 
the root of the current 
crisis 
Hutu 2.32 1.098 -9.771 142 *** 
p<.001 
-1.743
Tutsi 4.06 1.035 
Presidential term 
limits should be taken 
out of the constitution 
Hutu 3.47 1.419 8.735 142 *** 
p<.001 
1.885 
Tutsi 1.59 1.136 
The crisis has 
enduring impact on 
the population 
including persistent 
fear of attack 
Hutu 2.67 1.063 -9.206 133.449 *** 
p<.001 
-1.388
Tutsi 4.06 0.731 
The current crisis will 
make Burundi’s more 
volatile 
Hutu 2.57 0.984 -8.023 141.95 *** 
p<.001 
-1.258
Tutsi 3.82 0.897 
Government forces 
are responsible for 
the violence 
Hutu 2.39 1.223 -9.902 142 *** 
p<.001 
-1.855
Tutsi 4.25 0.998 
Armed opposition 
groups are 
responsible for the 
violence 
Hutu 4.30 0.589 5.749 93.279 *** 
p<.001 
0.950 
Tutsi 3.35 1.243 
As with the other statements, The Imbonerakure youth militia group is 
responsible for the violence yielded significantly more disagreement among Hutus (M = 
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2.01, SD = 1.400) than Tutsis (M = 4.13, SD = 1.495), t(142) = -8.781, p < 0.001. 
Differences in opinion were also found with the statement, President Nkurunziza third 
term in office risk causing a new civil war. The t-test indicated that Hutus (M = 2.34, SD 
= .946) expressed more disagreement than Tutsis (M = 3.84, SD = .857), t(141.974) = -
9.957, p < .001. Perceptions were divided on the statement, The current crisis disrupted 
my life. The t-test disclosed that Hutus (M = 2.47, SD = .824) stated more disagreement 
than Tutsis (M = 3.85, SD = .718), t(141.904) = -10.732, p < .001. 
Moreover, dissimilarities in perceptions between groups were present in responses 
to the statement, The government is working to improve peace and security. The t-test 
showed that Hutus (M = 4.49, SD = .663) expressed more agreement than Tutsis (M = 
2.97, SD = 1.184), t(102.663) = 9.331, p < .001. Differences in opinions were also 
present with the statement, The government lacks the capacity to guarantee security. The 
t-test showed that Hutus (M = 1.63, SD = .670) expressed greater disagreement than 
Tutsis (M = 2.91, SD = 1.255), t(99.765) = -7.510, p < .001. Finally, no significant 
difference occurred between Hutus (M = 4.16, SD = 1.317) and Tutsis (M = 4.46, SD = 
1.014), t(138.993) = -1.530, p =0.128) in responses to the statement, Participants to the 
crisis should engage in dialogue to resolve the crisis. This means there were no 
differences between Hutus and Tutsis. Additionally, looking at the mean values for each 
group, it can be concluded that both Hutus and Tutsis tended to agree with this statement. 
In Table 9, a detailed analysis of the gender differences of participants is 
presented. An independent t-test determined whether a statistically significant difference 
existed between female and male perceptions of the conflict. Forty-nine participants  
identified as female and 103 participants identified as male. One participant identified as 
“other” and was excluded from analysis. The participant was excluded 
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because the researcher was interested in the differences between men and women. 
Questions were recoded into numeric values as follows: Strongly Disagree = 1; Disagree, 
2; Neutral = 3; Agree = 4; Strongly Agree =5. Table 9 illustrates some significant 
differences existed between the two groups in some of the questions. 
With regard to the statement, I support Presidential Term Limits. The resulting t-
test was not significant t(106.073) = 0.963, p = .338. This implied that females (M = 3.59, 
SD = 1.442) and males (M = 3.34, SD = 1.636) did not have statistically significant 
different perceptions of this statement. Similarly, the statement, President Nkurunziza's 
third term bid violated the Arusha agreement resulted in a t-test that was not significant 
t(104.954) = 1.060, p = .291. That is, females (M = 3.35, SD = 1.508) and males (M = 
3.06, SD = 1.691) did not have statistically significant differing opinions about this 
statement. 
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Table 2 
Gender Differences 
Questions Gender M SD t df 
Sig. 
(2-tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
I support Presidential Term 
Limits 
Female 3.59 1.442 0.963 106.073 0.252 
Male 3.34 1.636 
President Nkurunziza's Third 
Term bid violated the Arusha 
agreement  
Female 3.35 1.508 1.06 104.954 0.289 
Male 3.06 1.691 
Violence has increased due to 
Pierre Nkurunziza third term 
bid 
Female 3.59 1.153 1.572 120.585 0.349 
Male 3.24 1.511 
Presidential term limit 
manipulation is the root of 
the current crisis 
Female 3.45 1.100 2.106 121.980 *p<.05 0.449 
Male 3.00 1.462 
Presidential term limits 
should be taken out of the 
constitution 
Female 2.39 1.511 -
0.886 
150 -0.243
Male 2.63 1.615 
The crisis has enduring 
impact on the population 
including persistent fear of 
attack 
Female 3.63 0.951 2.037 119.153 * p<.05 0.371 
Male 3.26 1.228 
The current crisis will make 
Burundi’s more volatile 
Female 3.41 0.888 1.667 125.619 0.292 
Male 3.12 1.223 
Government forces are 
responsible for the violence 
Female 3.67 1.231 2.395 111.787 * p<.05 0.547 
Male 3.13 1.480 
Armed opposition groups are 
responsible for the violence 
Female 4.00 1.000 1.239 150 0.223 
Male 3.78 1.057 
The Imbonerakure youth 
militia group is responsible 
for the violence 
Female 3.43 1.744 1.845 150 0.564 
Male 2.86 1.771 
President Nkurunziza’s third 
term in office risks causing a 
new civil war 
Female 3.22 0.848 1.286 133.920 0.224 
Male 3.00 1.276 
The current crisis disrupted 
my life 
Female 3.35 0.948 1.328 150 0.240 
Male 3.11 1.084 
The government is working 
to improve peace and security 
Female 3.76 1.146 0.218 150 0.046 
Male 3.71 1.257 
The government lacks the 
capacity to guarantee security 
Female 2.16 1.007 0.776 115.896 -0.147
Male 2.31 1.260 
Participants to the crisis 
should engage in dialogue to 
resolve the crisis 
Female 4.35 1.165 0.408 150 0.085 
Male 4.26 1.212 
Note. N-144 *p<.05.*05. **p<.01, ***p<.001 
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Equally, the statement, Violence has increased due to Pierre Nkurunziza third 
term bid resulted in a t-test that was not significant t(120.585) = 1.572, p = .119. This 
meant that females (M = 3.59, SD = 1.153) and males (M = 3.24, SD = 1.511) did not 
have statistically significant different opinions on this matter. 
For the statement, Presidential term limit manipulation is the root of the current 
crisis, the resulting t-test was significant t(121.980) = 2.106, p = .037, suggesting that 
females (M = 3.45, SD = 1.100) showed more agreement with this statement than males 
(M = 3.00, SD = 1.462). In terms of the question regarding whether Presidential term 
limits should be taken out of the constitution, the resulting t-test was not significant t(150) 
= -0.886, p = .377. This indicated that females (M = 2.39, SD = 1.511) and males (M = 
2.63, SD = 1.615) did not have statistically significant differing perceptions on this 
matter. The statement, The crisis has enduring impact on the population including 
persistent fear, the resulting t-test was significant, t(119.153) = 2.037, p = .044. This 
showed that females showed more agreement (M = 3.63, SD = 0.951) than males (M = 
3.26, SD = 1.228) on this issue. Likewise, for The current crisis will make Burundi more 
volatile, the resulting t-test was significant, t(125.619) = 1.667, p = .098. This inferred 
that females (M = 3.41, SD = 0.888) showed more agreement with this statement than 
males (M = 3.12, SD = 1.223). Likewise, for Government forces are responsible for the 
violence, the resulting t-test was significant, t(111.787) = 2.395, p = .018. This meant that 
females (M = 3.67, SD = 1.231) showed more agreement with this statement than males 
(M = 3.13, SD = 1.480). 
With regard to the statement, Armed opposition groups are responsible for the 
violence, the t-test result was not significant, t(150) = 1.239, p = .217, suggesting that 
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females (M = 4.00, SD = 1.000) and males (M = 3.78, SD = 1.057) did not have 
statistically significant different opinions on this matter. For the statement, The 
Imbonerakure youth militia group is responsible for the violence, the resulting t-test was 
not significant t(150) = 1.845, p = .067. This meant that females (M = 3.43, SD = 1.744) 
and males (M = 2.86, SD = 1.771) did not have significant differing perceptions on this 
matter. 
With regard to the statement, President Nkurunziza’s third term in office risks 
causing a new civil war, the resulting t-test was not significant, t(133.920) = 1.286, p = 
.201. This meant that females (M = 3.22, SD = 0.848) and males (M = 3.00, SD = 1.276) 
did not have statistically significant differing perceptions on this statement. The 
statement, the current crisis disrupted my life, the resulting t-test was not significant, 
t(150) = 1.328, p = .186. This showed that females (M = 3.35, SD = 0.948) and males (M 
= 3.11, SD = 1.084) did not have statistically significant different perceptions of this 
matter. For the statement, The government is working to improve peace and security, the 
t-test result was not significant, t(150) = 0.218, p = .827. This meant that females (M =
3.76, SD = 1.146) and males (M = 3.71, SD = 1.257) did not have statistically significant 
differing perceptions of this matter. For the statement, The government lacks the capacity 
to guarantee security, the t-test result was not significant, t(115.896) = -0.776, p = .440. 
This meant females (M = 2.16, SD = 1.007) and males (M = 2.31, SD = 1.260) did not 
have statistically significant different perceptions of this statement. Finally, for the 
statement, Participants to the crisis should engage in dialogue to resolve the crisis, the t-
test result was not significant t(150) = 0.408, p = .684. This suggested that females (M = 
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4.35, SD = 1.165) and males (M = 4.26, SD = 1.212) did not have statistically significant 
differing perceptions on this matter. 
The researcher used two hypotheses outlined in chapter 3. Below are the complete 
hypotheses results from the online survey. The researcher used t-test to determine 
whether a statistically significant difference existed between Hutu and Tutsi as well as 
female and male perceptions of the conflict. 
H01. There is no significant difference between Hutu and Tutsi perceptions of the 
conflict surrounding presidential term limit manipulation. 
H11. There is a significant difference between Hutus and Tutsis perceptions of the 
conflict surrounding presidential term limit manipulation.  
Based on hypothesis one (1), the null hypothesis H01 is rejected. Thus, there is a 
significant difference between Hutus and Tutsis perceptions of the conflict surrounding 
presidential term limit manipulation.  
H02. There is no significant difference between men and women perceptions of 
the conflict surrounding presidential term limit manipulation. 
H12. There is a significant difference between men and women perceptions of 
the conflict surrounding presidential term limit manipulation.  
For hypothesis two (2), the researcher did not find sufficient support to reject the 
null hypothesis. 
Quantitative data summary. The purpose of the quantitative data analysis was 
to examine how the conflict surrounding presidential term limit manipulation affects the 
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perceptions of peace and stability among people in Burundi. Data were collected through 
an online survey for the quantitative section. An independent t-test determined whether a 
statistically significant difference existed between Hutu and Tutsi as well as female and 
male perceptions of the conflict. In examining the data for Hutus and Tutsis, the results 
indicated that some statistically significant differences existed between the two groups in 
their responses to all of the questions. That is, Hutus and Tutsis viewed this crisis along 
ethnic lines. Overall, Hutus supported President Nkurunziza’s decision to run for a third 
term, while Tutsis opposed President Nkurunziza’s decision to run for a third term. Hutus 
blamed the violence on armed opposition groups, while Tutsis blamed members of the 
youth movement of the ruling party, Imbonerakure, and security forces for the violence. 
With regards to some questions, perception of females and males were different. For 
instance, on issues like whether term limit manipulation is the root of the current crisis, 
whether the crisis has enduring impact on the population including persistent fear of 
attack, and whether government forces are responsible for violence, the mean values 
showed that women agreed more with these statements than men. Also, the mean values 
showed that women agreed more with term limitations and the Arusha agreement more 
than men. However, in most of the questions, there were no gender differences observed. 
 Qualitative Interview Data Analysis 
The quantitative data results showed statistically significant differences between 
Hutus and Tutsis, as well as some significant gender differences, with regard to attitudes 
about the conflict surrounding presidential term limit manipulation. For the qualitative 
phase of the study, qualitative data were collected with interviews and data from 
Afrobaromater, ACLED, Human Rights Watch Reports, Amnesty International Reports, 
International Crisis Group Report, United Nations Reports, newspapers, and transcripts 
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from the United States Congressional Testimony Hearing on Burundi. The purpose was 
to obtain meaning, gain understanding, and corroborate the survey information with 
participants’ experiences. 
Of the 14 people invited to participate, 10 agreed to complete interviews. Due to 
the severity of the crisis, participants were assigned alphabet letters to protect them from 
potential harm due to participating in this study. A demographic analysis of participants 
is shown in Table 10.  
Table 10 
Demographics of Interviewees (n = 10) 
Demographics n % 
Age 
18-25 Years old 4 40 
26-35 Years old 6 60 
36-45 Years old 0 0 
46-55 Years old 0 0 
56-65 Years old 0 0 
66 Years or older 0 0 
Gender 
Male 6 60 
Female 4 40 
Other 0 0 
Ethnicity 
Hutu 4 40 
Tutsi 4 40 
Twa 0 0 
Other 2 20 
Level of education 
High School 0 0 
Technical/Vocational training 0 0 
Bachelor’s degree 8 80 
Master’s degree 2 20 
Professional degree 0 0 
Doctoral degree 0 0 
Occupation 
Self-employed 0 0 
Student 3 30 
Government 1 10 
Unemployed 2 20 
Private sector 4 40 
Retired 0 0 
Other 0 0 
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Out of the 15 interview questions, five questions gathered demographic 
information from participants. The majority of interviewees were 26-35 years old (n=6, 
60%) and 40% were 18-25 years old (n=4, 40%). No respondents aged 36 or older were 
interviewed even though they were recruited. In terms of gender distribution, the majority 
of interviewees identified as male (n=6, 60%) and 40% identified as female (n=4). For 
ethnic distribution, the numbers were evenly divided between Hutus (n=4, 40%), and 
Tutsis (n=4, 40%). Interviewees who identified as “other” (n=2, 20%) were individuals 
with a Tutsi father and a Hutu mother, or vice versa. No interviewee identified as Twa. 
Concerning education levels, the majority of interviewees identified as having a 
bachelor’s degree (n=8, 80%) and 20% identified themselves as holding master’s degree 
(n=2, 20%). No interviewee had earned only a high school graduation, 
technical/vocational training, professional, or doctoral degree. In the occupation category, 
private sector employment was the largest occupation category (n=4, 40%) and students 
were the second largest occupation category (n=3, 30%). Interviewees identifying as 
unemployed were the third largest occupation category (n=2, 20%), government 
employees were the fourth largest occupation category (n=1, 10%), and no interviewee 
identified as self-employed or retired.  
Braun and Clarke’s (2006) analysis process was applied to the 10 interview 
transcriptions for the purpose of understanding the lived experiences of each of the 
interviewees from their personal accounts. The researcher applied thematic analysis to 
code the qualitative data collected because that approach suits questions connected to 
participants’ experiences or participants’ opinions and perceptions. Braun and Clarke’s 
(2006) six steps were used for categorizing, examining, and reporting the qualitative data 
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using thematic analysis. The six steps are as follows: (a) familiarizing oneself with the 
data, (b) generating initial codes, (c) searching for themes, (d) reviewing themes, (e) 
defining and naming themes, and (f) writing the report.  
Interview participants were asked to answer 10 interview questions about their 
experiences with the conflict. The questions were as follows:  
1. Tell me about your experiences with the conflict surrounding presidential term 
limit manipulation?  
2. How have President Pierre Nkurunziza’s third term aspirations affected you?  
3. Why do you think President Pierre Nkurunziza extended his term in office? 
4. Did President Pierre Nkurunziza’s third term aspirations contribute to violence? If 
yes, how so?  
5. What does presidential term limits means to you?  
6. What do you perceive as some of the consequences of term limit manipulation? 
7. How should Burundians deal with President Pierre Nkurunziza’s third term in 
office? 
8. Could you reflect on the devastating cost to Burundi caused by President Pierre 
Nkurunziza’s decision to pursue a third term in office? 
9. How has your family been affected by the crisis? 
10. Is there anything else you would like to offer that I did not ask? 
After each interview, the researcher placed transcripts into a Microsoft Word 
document and reread transcripts line-by-line. Open and axial coding was applied to 
analyze data. Seven key themes were uncovered from the thematic analysis of interview 
data: (a) importance of term limits, (b) concern of ethnic violence, (c) economic impact, 
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(d) sense of fear and insecurity, (e) culture of impunity, (f) violation of Arusha agreement
and the Constitution, and (g) culture of greed and corruption. While themes were 
described as separate, a great similarity existed between them. Moreover, interviewees’ 
answers to questions repeatedly touched on multiple themes. In those instances, interview 
data were explained where they clearly belong. Table 11 shows a summary of the themes 
and sub-themes established from the interview data. Data are presented with 
interviewees’ quotes from transcripts used to support and refine the qualitative data 
analysis process.  
Table 11 
Themes and Sub-Themes from Interview Transcript 
Theme Sub-themes 
Importance of term limits Need for two-term limits 
Dictatorship 
Respect for term limits 
Democracy 
Rule of law 
Economic impact Lack of jobs 
Refugee crisis 
People fled Burundi 
Economy affected 
Foreign investors left 
Businesses closed their doors 
Concern of ethnic violence, Fear of ethnic violence 
Ethnic issues 
Fear of civil war 
Hutu and Tutsi representation 
Sense of fear and insecurity Fear 
Insecurity 
Refugee issues 
Fled the country 
Many people died 
Gender violence 
Cycle of violence 
Culture of impunity Lack of report on civilian deaths 
Violence by Imbonerakure militia 
Violence by armed opposition groups 
Lack of rule of law 
Violence between police and youth 
Violence against demonstrators 
Some people sabotaged the government 
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Human rights violations 
Violation of Arusha agreement and the Constitution Violated the Constitution 
Arusha agreement violated 
Lack of clarity in the Constitution 
Constitutional issues 
Constitution violated 
Lack of respect for the Constitution 
Culture of greed and corruption Greed 
Corruption 
African leaders are greedy and corrupt 
Power comes with lots of opportunities 
Theme 1: Importance of term limits. The concept of term limits refers to a 
limitation on the number of years that a president can serve in an elected office. The 
current crisis in Burundi is due, in part, to President Nkurunziza’s desire to seek a third 
term despite a two-term limitation in Burundi’s Constitution. Interviewees expressed 
different perceptions on, and prescriptions for, the need for two-term limitation in 
Burundi. For example, interviewees viewed two-term limits as curbing dictatorship as 
well as a prerequisite to democracy and good governance. For instance, interviewee H 
linked the importance of term limits to democracy and argued that term limits are 
important to preventing dictatorship. He suggested, 
Term limits for president, for me, is very important in democracy or in democratic 
country. Here, we are refereeing to leadership that we are having in Africa or in 
other countries. Somebody in power start to rule, have an agenda or having a 
project; if his first term expires, people will evaluate him. If he does it well, he 
has a chance to go for another term. If citizens like him, they will vote for him 
again. But, in order to avoid dictatorship . . . it is important to have term limits. In 
order to bring new ideas, new projects, term limits are important for that. (Age 
35)  
Interviewee D supported this line of argument, stating, 
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We have this text that regulates the way a country functions. The way . . . the law, 
which we have to abide by. So, I think that, personally speaking, term limits . . . is 
a way or a sign of saying that a country is democratic or not democratic. (Age 26)  
For interviewee C, term limits were an important component of the Arusha 
agreement and of Burundi’s Constitution. This interviewee believed that term limits were 
necessary to check abuses of power. He extensively detailed the importance of term 
limits by arguing,  
For me, it means, I now have to put it in the context of Burundi. Why they put 
third term . . . or term limits in Arusha agreement in our Constitution. That is, 
basically . . . you can find in Burundi’s history the fact that we went from 
dictators to dictators. So, the negotiators at the Arusha talks, they had that in 
mind. Bringing term limits in the text was to ensure that we don’t fall back into 
the abuse of power. So, for me, the term limit in Burundi’s context is really to 
fight against the abuse of power that we have experienced in the past regime. 
People staying in power . . . without holding elections or without being 
accountable to anyone because no one voted for them; they just took power 
through violence. Basically, to have term limits . . . for us, it really helps to 
safeguard Burundi’s democracy. I will try to avoid going into the broader 
meaning of term limits because it depends on the different context. As exactly, 
our leaders, now they tend to kind of argue when we talk about term limits. They 
bring examples of Germany or UK, where they have parliamentarian systems, but 
without term limits. I think . . . for me to explain the meaning of presidential term 
limits, I want to explain that in the context of Burundi. (Age 30)  
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Furthermore, interviewee E believed that leaders should serve their mandates and 
step down to allow other leaders to bring new ideas. She maintained,  
Well, like, any leader or government elected is supposed to run for a certain 
period and, later, he may give that position to another one to continue to bring 
new things to the lives of the people. So, the term limits, I think, are necessary; 
otherwise, the president will stay for a long time. They need to retire; they need to 
give the place to another; we need other people: we need to see other leadership 
because they are not the only people that are able to save the country. This is why 
I think term limits are necessary. (Age 24)  
Interviewee E provided a recommendation to avoid the recurrence of this kind of 
violence in Burundi. She suggested, 
Maybe we should extend to avoid some problems . . . it’s my opinion . . . because 
if we have that thing that comes around every 5-year, each 5-year we don’t know. 
It will be a circle, and it may never end; maybe for 10 years or forever. (Age 24)  
These diverse perceptions of the importance of two-term limits suggested that term limits 
are imperative to Burundians. From this assessment, it appears that term limits are an 
important component of democracy and good governance. 
Theme 2: Concern of ethnic violence. This theme captured each of the 
interviewees’ concerns about ethnic violence and the longstanding ethnic struggle for 
control of power and state resources in Burundi. Ethnic violence, in this context, means 
violence between the Hutu majority and the Tutsi minority. Although the crisis in 
Burundi is often described in relation to political conflicts and division, it is not 
completely grasped without studying ethnic problems. While previous bouts of ethnic 
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violence were expressed in ethnic terms, the current violence hinges on political 
divisions. Interviewees were concerned that the violence could turn into an ethnic 
conflict. Previous ethnic crises in Burundi left a lasting effect on the people, including 
persistent fear of violence, communal division, and arbitrary violence. Many of the 
interviewees underscored this notion. For instance, interviewee I associated it with social, 
political, and psychological issues related to the current crisis. She stated,  
…You know, people hate each other right now because . . . like the Hutu and 
Tutsi. Like, oh, the Hutu are in power, okay; now we have to revenge. You see 
revenge in the long run, and also hatred towards Hutu and Tutsi, and everything is 
not good for the country. It is a very bad idea, and it has challenges because it 
affects people economically, socially, politically, and psychologically. (Age 21)  
Interviewee H looked at the ethnic problems through a political lens.  
He suggested: 
In some political contexts, also, he is there to do revenge of what happened in 
1972. His father was killed; that happened. It happened to other people, but now 
in his speeches, in his statements, he has been declaring that, he has been 
declaring that he will revenge. He will show what people did, especially the Tutsi 
regime, what they did to Hutu. So, that’s also revenge in political context. (Age 
35)  
Interviewee C provided historical context for the Hutu-Tutsi violent history. He 
contended, 
in 1972 . . . there was massacre against the Hutu in Burundi. So, I think 
psychologically, that plays . . . is still playing a huge role in the way the 
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government or the people in government are currently reacting. So, it’s a mix of 
revenge . . . on their parents or people that were closed to them. I think they are 
trying to say: “Okay, we are going to stay in power as much as possible.” (Age 
30)  
Interviewee E (age 24) discussed the Hutu and Tutsi power dynamics, which were 
central to the crisis in Burundi. She argued, “now, they are talking about ethnicity, saying 
that the Tutsi ruled for so long, and now is time for Hutu to rule. And they say that . . . 
they say that now Hutu should rule as long as they want.” For interviewee G (age 27), the 
Imbonerakure youth wing threatened to renew ethnic wounds left by the civil war and 
decades of sporadic ethnic killings before that. She stated,  
We see many people who are caught without reason; I mean legal reasons. And I 
can say that, um, they target people to achieve their goals. Those Imbonerakure 
have to stop attacking, and most of those women and girls attacked are Tutsi.  
Interviewee B (age 25) described Burundi’s ethnic problems as a problem of the 
past generations. He argued, 
When they came in power, they brought all these ideologies that my generation 
doesn’t have. For instance, the issue around ethnicity; in my generation, these are 
actually not our issues. These are issues of our parents that have been passed 
through.  
Interviewee F (age 22) interpreted the ethnicity problem differently. She strongly 
believed that this crisis had nothing to do with ethnicity and stated, 
It didn’t have anything to do with ethnicity, frankly speaking. Because the media 
or the opposition, they say, “Oh the Hutu . . . because he is a Hutu, he wanted to 
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destroy the Tutsi. I don’t know they want to do that . . . they are preparing; he is 
keeping the power because he is keeping the term. He is adding the third term 
because they wanna . . . they are preparing the genocide, and they wanna do it, but 
it’s just untrue. The decision was made by the president and his party. And, in his 
party, there are Hutu and Tutsi; there are all ethnicities represented in the CNDD-
FDD. It doesn’t have anything to do with that. That’s my opinion. And I think the 
crisis . . . the crisis has nothing to do with ethnicity. 
It became clear that the deeply rooted ethnic violence between Hutu and Tutsi ethnic 
groups created a foundation of fear, mistrust, violence, and political division at all levels. 
Fear of massacre by ethnic adversaries led many Burundians to flee to neighboring 
countries. This ethnic feeling behind the conflict is deep-rooted in struggles for state 
power and access to resources. 
Theme 3: Economic impact. This theme elucidates economic conditions and 
their consequences resulting from the current crisis. Some economic issues that 
interviewees highlighted ranged from declines in foreign aid, foreign trade, and 
investments as well as the influx of Burundian refugees to neighboring countries in 
search of better livelihoods. Essentially, all interviewees agreed that the economy was 
impacted due to the crisis. Interviewee A summed this up by underscoring 
life becoming different in terms of lots of investors left the country, and people 
who fled the country are the people who own businesses. The middle class and 
expats also left the country. Foreign aid was stopped, for a large part, on many 
aspects like government and NGOs. Even NGOs suffered from the crisis. The 
exchange rate dropped dramatically. So, all of that really comes down to 
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economics and life just becoming really hard on everyone. And investors, and all 
the people who are actually interested in investing in Burundi in some way or the 
other, not being interested anymore, given that Burundi was a poor country to 
begin with. (Age 30)  
It is important to note that Burundi’s economy has depended on aid from western 
donors, which was suspended in an attempt to get President Pierre Nkurunziza to 
negotiate with opposition and civil society groups. In this context, interviewee D (age 26) 
added,  
Burundi is a poor country. . . . Half of the annual budget of Burundi is coming 
from the European Union aid. Yes, it is the EU, which supports the annual budget 
of Burundi. So, this, um, has caused the economy to decrease. In 2015, a dollar 
could be bought for 1,680 Francs, but, today, it has gone up and is at 2,690 
Francs. So, this is practically a devastating cost because the local money has lost 
it value, and this affects the economy. The other thing is that there have been 
many NGOs that have closed; this created unemployment. People had to sell their 
cars; people had to change to see how they can abide. For instance, a father who 
used to get a salary of 5,000 Burundian Francs and the NGO closed, he doesn’t 
provide for the family. So, this has affected many families, and some are aware of 
life to flee to go into refugee camps.  
Interviewee F (age 22) argued that Burundi lost human capital due to the crisis, 
with qualified Burundians fleeing the country due to violence and poor economic 
conditions. This interviewee mentioned, “So, ah, the economy is low because there is 
insecurity, and what I can say is that when even Burundians, when their businesses are 
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not going well, they go to invest in another country, and that’s a lost.” In a similar vein, 
interviewee G (age 27) believed,  
Economically, many people are running away from the country. And, many 
businesses are closing since the demonstration started. And, um . . . investment 
and, so, when businesses closed their doors, many people stayed at home, and I 
think people don’t go to work because there is no money. People started to leave 
Burundi; they are becoming sick . . . you know.  
Interviewee J (age 33) concurred, 
There are many Burundians who are in foreign countries now because of the 
crisis. And, it also affected the economy of the country. People are not investing 
as they were doing before. This situation affected the economy of the country. 
The society also . . . because people were trying to invest, but the crisis stopped 
them.  
Interviewee I (age 21) also agreed, “People keep fleeing the country . . . what does that 
mean? When people flee the country, meaning, um, human capital is lost.”  
Interviewee H (age 35) also agreed,  
By chasing out a big number of people, like a director who could contribute in 
managing the life of the country . . . now they are in exile. By chasing away, also, 
a big number of poor citizens, those one who are in refugee camps in Rwanda, 
Tanzania, Uganda, and even in other countries in Europe. This is a loss for a 
country because these are capital; these are people, who could produce for the 
country, who are producing outside.  
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The perception was that people leaving Burundi affects the economy. Perceptions 
related to this theme showed that Burundi’s economic activities were seen as interrupted 
and trade within regional and local markets as distressed. Most of the elements explaining 
economic deterioration since the crisis began in April, 2015 were a result of the departure 
of foreign investors, foreign aid, and NGOs. The influx of Burundians to neighboring 
countries slowed down business and sped up the loss of human capital. 
Theme 4: Sense of fear and insecurity. The theme of fear and insecurity 
explained another outcome of the mounting repression that is driving Burundians into 
neighboring countries. Fear and insecurity, in this context, meant the anxiety and fear that 
people experienced because they felt uncertain and vulnerable. It also refers to economic 
insecurity among Burundians. This theme captured interviewees’ deep feelings about 
their lives and how they have dealt with the crisis. All of the interviewees mentioned 
fearing that their lives were at risk for supporting the government or because of the 
perception that they supported opposing parties. The interviewees also cited economic 
insecurity as a reason that Burundians were fleeing. For instance, interviewee D argued,  
A father who used to get a salary of 5,000 Burundian Francs and the NGO closed, 
he doesn’t provide for the family. So, this has affected many family, and some are 
aware of life to flee to go into refugee camps. (Age 26)  
Interviewee E echoed the same view. She claimed, “Families are torn apart . . . 
and there is high-level poverty. It’s very obvious that people are not comfortable in 
economic situation and also about security” (Age 24). Interviewee A (age 30) linked 
refugee issues to fear and insecurity. This interviewee believed that people were fleeing 
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because they feared for their lives or were targeted because of their opposition to 
President Nkurunziza’s third term. He stated, 
I didn’t choose to live in the states. My situation is getting little better, but I had a 
good job; I had my own non-profit, which was growing a lot. I was independent; I 
was well off financially; things happened, and I just had to move and start my life 
over, which hasn’t been . . . it’s very hard. Yeah, um, I am in exile now, and I am 
starting my life over because of that term and everything that happens. This 
affected lots of my friends who were protesting; a lot of them are in exile now.  
Interviewee participant B (age 25) referred to the same condition. He believed, 
My brother lost his job in 2015 and decided to go to Rwanda. There, he found a 
job, but he got to be terminated and came back to Burundi, and now he is actually 
jobless. He is actually 32 years old. He is back in Burundi because he could not 
sustain himself in Rwanda, being jobless. So, he is back in Burundi. And I had 
lots of family members who have fled. Some of them are in Rwanda, some of 
them are in Uganda. And those who could . . . they have fled to Europe and the 
western world, where they don’t even want to come back to Burundi.  
Interviewee I (age 21) linked fear and insecurity to violence and psychological 
issues. She contended, 
Obviously, people died and then… properties destroyed, houses were burned, 
people were killed. Um, people were not working. You see now there are so many 
who are psychologically unstable you know because of the memories that they 
have because of their relatives were killed in front of their eyes. It has very great 
impact.  
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Several interviewees mentioned the violence committed by Imbonerakure youth 
militia, which is the armed wing of the CNDD-FDD ruling party. Several interviewees 
accused this group of terrorizing, and instilling fear in, Burundi. For instance, interviewee 
C (age 30) claimed,  
So, we saw the past regime using the army to cling to power. We saw the past 
regime using youths to kind of target political opponents. We saw past regime 
using torture, we saw past regime using mass graves to kind of, you know trying 
to cover-up evidence of human rights violations.  
Interviewee H (age 35) blamed both the Imbonerakure youth militia and armed 
opposition groups. On one hand, he argued, 
My family was affected, of course, because, like, where I am from in Gitega 
province, the second town of Burundi, my family has been investigated several 
times by the militia Imbonerakure or people belonging to the intelligence asking 
where them where I am. My sisters were threatened several times and then they 
decided to flee to Rwanda because they were planning to take them to jail and 
rape them. So, in Bujumbura, the capital, where I was living at my aunt’s house, I 
was attacked three times there. The house was stoned, the roof was broken, then 
we had . . . you know, they did it again. Okay, so, that’s… you see, they were 
affected in terms of properties; they were affected in terms of threats.  
On the other hand, interviewee H also believed that “the violence was also seen where 
some group of young people belonging to opposition parties’ used grenades and weapons 
to also fight policeman, to fight military, to fight other civilians belonging to ruling 
party.”  
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Furthermore, interviewee J (age 33) explained the fear that he endured at the peak 
of the protest:  
I was afraid of what was happening. It was not easy to see how everything was 
going bad. Lots of people were killed . . . yes, so many people died because of the 
crisis. Everybody was afraid . . . everything was slow; people were saying that 
maybe the war was going to occur. So, it was like I was afraid of that situation.  
Interviewee G (age 27) discussed her experience at the height of the 
demonstration, accusing the Imbonerakure youth militia of instilling fear in Burundi. She 
explained,  
Yes, in the first month of the demonstrations . . . it was very hard to move around. 
It was scary to go out because of fear, because of insecurity. . . . I can say people 
are running and they are scared to stay here because those men who are in power 
are killing people and people are scared to stay here. So, yes, socially we have . . . 
there is also an issue and human rights are not respected. We see many people 
who are caught without reason, I mean legal reasons. And I can say that, um, they 
target people to achieve their goals. Those Imbonerakure have to stop attacking; 
and most of those women and girls attacked are Tutsi.  
This theme shed light on the constant fear and insecurity among the interviewees. Many 
interviewees described the climate of fear that drove hundreds of thousands of 
Burundians to flee their country. Interviewees agreed that government forces, 
Imbonerakure youth militia, and some armed opposition groups committed human rights 
violations. The interviewees linked insecurity to lack of economic opportunities that 
prompted Burundians to flee to neighboring countries. 
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Theme 5: Culture of impunity. The term “culture of impunity” describes the 
condition in Burundi where impunity, over the years, became institutionalized and 
systematized. Broadly, it means that leaders can get away with anything. The concept is 
opposed to the idea of the rule of law, with the result that victims and survivors never 
obtain justice and perpetrators are never brought to justice. In essence, the absence of 
justice eliminates a vital deterrent to future perpetrators. Interviewees discussed their 
perceptions of the culture of impunity from different viewpoints.  
Interviewee C (age 30) used historical context to discuss the culture of impunity. 
He stated,  
We saw the past regime using youths to kind of target political opponents. We 
saw past regime using torture, we saw past regime using mass graves to kind of, 
you know trying to cover-up evidence of human rights violations. We saw people 
fleeing the country because of the crisis. We are trying to understand the Burundi 
conflict, the current Burundi crisis…within the historical context.  
Interviewee A (age 30) explained, at great length, the lack of rule of law. He feared that 
the president not following the law could set the precedent of encouraging lawlessness. 
He argued, “It’s just lack of rule of law; just lawlessness and people fearing that if that 
guy is supposed to be the leader and doesn’t follow the laws that were established by the 
leadership, why should I follow the law?” Interviewee B (age 25) equated the lack of rule 
of law and presidential impunity with the president using his position of authority in an 
abusive manner. He explained,  
It creates a bad ideology around impunity, and also the fact that actually if you are 
in power, you have a hand in whatever is around: accountability, transparency, 
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and people’s freedom. So, manipulating term limits does give to people who are 
actually the younger generation the perception that we live in a country where just 
being in power, you can do whatever you want. Nobody will come after you, or 
you don’t need to be accountable for A, B, C, or D. So, I think it’s a bad practice 
that affects a lot.  
Several interviewees alluded to the violence conducted by government forces, the 
Imbonerakure youth militia, and some armed opposition groups. The interviewees 
believed that violence prolonged the method of extra-judicial killings and political 
assassinations. Interviewee G (age 27) accused the Imbonerakure youth militia of 
targeting Tutsi men. She argued,  
Those young men had guns, you know, and they started to arrest young people 
who are not part of Imbonerakure who are not from CNDD-FDD. And most of 
those young men, most of them were men, and most of them were Tutsi.  
Similarly, Interviewee H (age 35) argued that the government failed to stop the 
Imbonerakure youth militia from committing human rights violations––including 
killings, unlawful detentions, and torture––against perceived government opponents. 
Furthermore, he stated that the president  
created another danger for the country because he armed a group of civilians, this 
militia—Imbonerakure—that he created. This is danger for the society. It is 
danger also for himself. . . . You wake up and see bodies that were killed. Another 
consequence is impunity. Impunity has given freedom for people to kill whoever 
they want. No one is controlling; justice is not working. So, at the end of it, there 
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is no powerful institution, there is no strong institution in the country. We don’t 
have a country rule by a serious institution.  
Interviewee B (age 25) blamed security forces for targeting civilians. He alleged, 
“The regime could send the police in the streets and they were shooting at people and the 
army targeting specific people and disappearances.” Interviewee J (age 33) accused 
armed opposition groups for the violence. He described armed opposition to violence this 
way: “The opposition used grenades to attack the police and the military, and the police 
went after them. And they killed military people, police, and civilians. It was a crazy 
situation. And nothing happened.”  
This theme encompassed a broad range of issues, ranging from the lack of rule of 
law, violence carried out by security forces, violence by the Imbonerakure youth militia, 
violence by armed opposition groups, and human rights abuses. The failure of the 
government of Burundi to deliver justice and accountability meant that individuals 
suffered serious violations of their rights yet received no justice or amends. 
Theme 6: Violation of Arusha agreement and the Constitution. At the core of 
the current crisis is the legality of President Nkurunziza’s third term bid. The interviews 
related to this theme assessed the relevance of the Arusha agreement and Burundi’s 
Constitution in light of his third-term bid. Both the Arusha agreement and Burundi’s 
Constitution have provisions about term limitations, but this provision was strongly 
debated by both supporters and opponents of President Nkurunziza’s third-term bid. On 
the one hand, opponents of President Nkurunziza’s third term-bid argued that under the 
Constitution and the Arusha agreement framework presidents can only seek election for 
two terms in office. On the other hand, supporters of President Nkurunziza argued, his 
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first term did not count toward the two-term limit since he was appointed by parliament 
in 2005. Interviewees extensively discussed their perceptions on this issue. For instance, 
interviewee A (age 30) explained,  
I was against the third term, but I wasn’t for the opposition either. I wouldn’t have 
cared if Nkurunziza’s party gave us another candidate regardless of how corrupt 
they are or whatever. I just wanted Nkurunziza not to get a third term because that 
just violates the Constitution.  
Interviewee B (age 25) worried that the president would eliminate term limits 
from the Constitution entirely, which could usher in authoritarian rule. He stressed, “My 
fear would be that they changed the Constitution, then we go to the authoritarian regime 
that we had in the previous. So, it means that the Arusha agreement would be thrown in 
the dustbin.” Interviewee C (age 30) believed, 
Nkurunziza’s aspiration to third term basically questioned the Arusha agreement, 
which basically ended a decade-long civil war. So, Nkurunziza’s bid for a third 
term basically attacks the social contract, as we called it at times, among 
Burundians.  
Furthermore, interviewee H (age 35) discussed the importance of Arusha 
agreement, and the Constitution, which he believed were violated by the president. He 
stated,  
Presidential term limit is written in the Constitution and in the Arusha agreement 
that no president should rule more than two terms. That sentence is enough. And, 
also, you know, ruling is about law. What is written . . . everybody considered 
what is written in the Constitution to be the law. So, just considering that, what 
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was said before even himself or in his ruling party . . . it was said that the other 
candidates . . . ah, you know, but at the end of the day he came himself.  
Interviewee J (age 33) had a different perception of President Nkurunziza’s third-
term bid. This interviewee claimed that the Arusha agreement and the Constitution were 
not clear about term limits. He argued,  
According to the Constitution of Burundi, the president was right . . . because the 
Constitution was not clear. So, it was like, what he was saying was the 
Constitution . . . even the opposition was saying the Constitution was not clear. 
According to the Constitution, in one way, it was like, what we were saying about 
term limits  
. . . the president has rights. It was not easy to say that the president was wrong 
about the third term according the Constitution. His third term is right because he 
has rights to run again. Even the Arusha agreement was not clear about term 
limits. This brought confusion between the opposition and the government. But 
the Constitution was not clear, and the Constitution is more important than the 
Arusha agreement.  
Interviewee D (age 26) shared the same perception about the lack of clarity in the 
Constitution about term limits. He suggested, 
There was the Constitution and there is an article in it, where it is written how 
many terms are limited for a presidential term. But the problem is, it was not clear 
or indicated how these terms are to be run.  
Interviewee J (age 33) reiterated this view: 
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Maybe, for me, as the Constitution was not clear, Burundians could let President 
Pierre Nkurunziza run for another term and then look for how to correct this error, 
which was the Constitution. Because when you start to analyze the Constitution, 
you can see that there is an error in the Constitution. The Constitution was stated 
in a way that the opposition went against him. So, Burundians could understand 
each other to correct the error in the Constitution.  
This theme encompassed different perceptions about the Constitution and the 
Arusha agreement. Some interviewees indicated that inconsistency between the Arusha 
agreement and Burundi’s Constitution created violence. 
Theme 7: Culture of greed and corruption. The last theme in the qualitative 
interview portion covered the culture of greed and corruption. Greed and corruption are 
defined by the desire for money or power, which often guarantee political elites full 
control over their economies and its rents. This concept suggests that politics in Burundi 
are synonymous with wealth and the quest for power. Interviewees stressed the economic 
and social costs associated with greed and corruption in Burundi.  
Some interviewees believed that President Nkurunziza extended his term in office 
because of an appetite for power, greed, and corruption. For instance, interviewee C (age 
30) implied that one of the reasons for the president to extend his term was economics.
He stated, 
If you see the level of corruption at the government level or around Nkurunziza, 
that would be one factor. The fact that they can amass lots of money . . . with 
them being in power. It sounds to me like not logical, but I would use logical for 
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the purpose of understanding. . . . In their thinking . . . if they leave power, they 
would be losing those opportunities to have access to those resources.  
Interviewee H (age 35) explained in detail the reason that President Nkurunziza 
extended his term in office. He believed that the reason was the misuse and selling of 
Burundi’s natural resources to companies. He stated,  
Another point of cause is about the economy. This is somebody that I said that 
came from the bush, who doesn’t care about others. Somebody who wants to take 
all common goods, all common goods, which should be shared by all members of 
Burundians. He wants to enjoy all this goodness of Burundi. Burundi is a country, 
which has nickel, which had gold, which has many resources, which has many 
good lands; good fertile land, which has petrol in Lake Tanganyika. All of these 
he will be enjoying, and he signed a contract with powerful countries and people. 
So, he wants to enjoy all this goodness.  
Interviewee G (age 27) argued a similar viewpoint: 
I think it was for his own ambitions, his personal ambition. He was just . . . um, he 
just wanted to stay there to keep the power, so that him and the people who are 
with him could use the country’s resources . . . um, as they want.  
Interviewee F (age 22) connected greed and corruption to power. She also viewed 
greed and corruption as a wider problem in Africa. She explained, 
You know the majority of African leaders love power, if I can say that. No one, I 
don’t know, no one wants just pass power to others. And, you understand, on one 
hand is understanding because it gives them the immunity, wealth, honor, and all 
kinds of material benefits.  
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With respect to this theme, interviewees’ perceptions of greed and corruption 
ranged from the of exploitation of natural resources and the importance of holding 
political power, which guaranteed that President Nkurunziza and his political elites could 
maintain full control over the economy and its rents. 
Interview Data Summary 
The purpose of the qualitative interview data analysis was to examine how the 
conflict surrounding presidential term limit manipulation affected the perception of peace 
and stability among people in Burundi. Data were collected through open-ended and 
semi-structured phone and Skype interviews. It was clear that the crisis in Burundi had 
different moving components, but throughout the qualitative interviews, participants 
acknowledged the consequences of the crisis to their lives. Themes that emerged from 
these interviews included the need for term limits, concern about ethnic violence, 
economic impacts, the sense of fear and insecurity, the culture of impunity, the violation 
of Arusha Accords and the Constitution, and a culture of greed and corruption. 
Interviewees established that these issues contributed to the country’s violent history and 
argued that if the political crisis was not resolved, violence risked repeating itself. These 
themes revealed the long-standing violent history of Burundi and a greater awareness of 
vulnerability among Burundians regarding the current crisis. Some interviewees broadly 
expressed views on one or several of the themes, while some interviewees made specific 
contributions regarding all themes. Accordingly, all 10 interviewees’ opinions were 
described in this study. 
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The purpose of the next section, the qualitative document analysis, was to support 
interviewees’ lived experiences with the conflict surrounding presidential term limit 
manipulation.  
Document Analysis 
For the document analysis, data were collected from Afrobaromater, ACLED, 
Human Rights Watch reports, Amnesty International reports, International Crisis Group 
reports, United Nations Security Council reports, newspapers, and transcripts from the 
United States Congressional Testimony Hearing on Burundi. Open and axial coding was 
applied to analysis of the data. This portion of the data analysis, using thematic analysis, 
revealed five key themes: (a) importance of term limits, (b) cycle of impunity, (c) climate 
of fear, (d) fear of ethnic crisis, and (e) refugee crisis. Data are presented with quotes 
from documents to strengthen and enhance the qualitative data analysis process. Table 12 
shows a summary of the themes and sub-themes established from the documents.  
Theme 1: Importance of term limits. Term limits are defined as measures to 
limit the number of years that a leader can hold office. Many of the documents analyzed 
the importance of presidential term limits. Burundi’s Constitution only allows a president 
to serve a maximum two five-year terms. President Nkurunziza and his supporters 
maintained that he was first appointed by parliament in 2005, instead of through universal 
suffrage, and that he was, therefore, qualified to run again. This was the origin of the 
current crisis. ACLED (2016) detailed the opposition to President Nkurunziza’s third 
term:  
Opponents of a third term cite term limits stipulated by Article 96 of the 
Constitution and adherence to the Arusha Accords, which ended the civil war 
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fought from 1993 to 2005 by providing constitutional checks on monopolies of 
power by any one party or ethnic group. (p. 3) 
Table 12 
Themes and Sub-Themes from Data Sources 
Theme Sub-themes 
Importance of term limits Checks and balances 
Two-term limits and democracy 
Arusha Accords 
Democracy over dictatorship 
Cycle of Impunity Corrupt judges 
Violence by security forces 
Violence by Imbonerakure 
Violence by armed opposition groups 
Corruption within courts systems 
Weak justice system 
Court ruled in favor of third term 
Lack of trust in public institutions 
Climate of fear Gender violence 
Repression against demonstrators 
Government crackdown on civil society groups 
Imbonerakure youth wing forced people to protest for the government 
Violence by armed opposition groups 
Violence by Imbonerakure  
Fear of Ethnic Crisis Ethnicity issues 
Hutu-Tutsi violence 
Ethnic issues 
Fear of ethnic violence 
Refugee crisis Influx of refugees 
Burundians fled to neighboring countries 
Refugee issues 
In her testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Thomas-Greenfield, 
(2015) argued that President Nkurunziza’s third term violated the Arusha agreement. She 
stated that President Nkurunziza’s “decision to pursue a third term also clearly violated 
terms of the 2000 Arusha agreement, which led to the end of the Burundian Civil War 
and became the foundation for relative peace and security over the past decade” (p. 2). 
Afrobarometer’s study supported this argument. Bentley et al. (2016) argued that 
president Nkurunziza’s actions “stand in sharp contrast to the convictions that Burundi 
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citizens expressed in the most recent Afrobarometer survey, in September-October 2014, 
including support for democracy, for free and fair elections and for limiting presidential 
terms to a maximum of two.” (p. 1). Bentley et al. (2016) argued, “A majority of 
Burundians (62%) favor a two-term limit on presidential mandates, as provided for by the 
Constitution of Burundi” (p. 2). A previous Afrobarometer study indicated, “Only 51% of 
Burundian citizens supported presidential term limits” (Afrobarometer, 2015, p. 1). In 
contrast, at his testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Nimuraba (2015) 
argued that “people in the countryside do not care about presidential terms or the nuances 
of constitutional law. They likely know nothing about what Arusha Accords say about 
presidential term limits” (p. 4). In a report featured on Reuters, Manirabarusha (2016) 
wrote that Burundi could eliminate presidential term limits from its Constitution since 
“Justin Nzoyisaba, chairman of CNDI, a commission set up by Nkurunziza last year to 
canvas public opinion on Burundi’s political system, said late on Wednesday that most 
Burundians wanted term limits abolished” (Manirabarusha, 2016, p. 1).  
Siegle (2015) examined the implications of term limit manipulation on a 
continental level. In his testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, he stated,  
The outcome of the term limits battle in Burundi also has political implications 
for the rest of Africa. Since 2000, a dozen African leaders have tried to 
circumvent term limits that were instituted to limit the monopolization of power 
and foster a culture of democratic transitions in Africa. (p. 3)  
An ACLED (2016) report also addressed term limit manipulation on a continental level. 
The report stated, “Burundi’s initial riots and protests starting in April 2015 mirror that of 
other African countries where long-standing presidents have attempted to defy or 
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constitutionally remove term limits” (p. 2). Furthermore, Siegle (2015) connected 
President Nkurunziza’s desire to run for a third term to greed and corruption. He 
believed,  
In addition to the natural desire of many leaders in positions of authority to extend 
their time in power, Nkurunziza’s efforts to retain control of the presidency likely 
stem from a Burundian political economy that rewards senior officials financially. 
Access to political power in Burundi allows for considerable control over public 
procurement processes, the mining sector, international financial assistance, and 
reimbursements for peacekeeping deployments. (Siegle, 2015, p. 3)  
The question of the constitutionality of President Nkurunziza’s third term was 
entirely central to the current crisis. Analysis of theme revealed that the issue of term 
limits would further entrench and divide the Burundian population, which will almost 
undoubtedly weaken the fragile peace and stability of Burundi. 
Theme 2: Cycle of impunity. The theme of the cycle of impunity covered the 
lack of consequences or lack of rule of law in Burundi leading to a culture of impunity. 
Among the overarching issues related to this theme included violence carried out by 
security forces, Imbonerakure youth militia, and armed opposition groups. This theme 
uncovered the systematic corruption within the justice system. Concern exists among 
Burundians that members of government forces, the Imbonerakure youth militia, and 
armed opposition groups involved in human rights abuses during protests were not held 
accountable. The government failed to launch an investigation or to prosecute members 
of government forces who were blamed for violence, rape, and killings. The government 
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also failed to investigate claims of killings, harassment, and the intimidation of 
individuals by Imbonerakure youth militia and armed opposition groups.  
Thomas-Greenfield (2015) argued that the cycle of impunity in Burundi was one 
of the major reasons for the continuing crisis. She stated,  
The government has not taken action to seriously investigate credible allegations 
of human rights violations and abuses by members of the ruling party youth wing, 
known as the Imbonerakure, the Burundian National Police, and the National 
Intelligence Service, nor has the government taken action to hold these same 
groups accountable. (p. 2) 
The United Nations Security Council (2017) Report of the Secretary-General on Burundi 
also alluded to the culture of impunity. The report revealed that the “alleged perpetrators 
of human rights violations continue to benefit from total impunity. Very little effort has 
been made to investigate human rights abuses committed by State agents or the 
Imbonerakure.” (p. 7). Taking a similar view, a report by Human Rights Watch (2017b) 
detailed the cycle of violence and the lack of efforts to bring perpetrators to justice. It 
stated,  
Burundi ruling party’s youth league, the Imbonerakure, have brutally killed, 
tortured, and severely beaten scores of people across the country in recent months, 
Human Rights Watch said today. The killings and other ill-treatment reflect the 
widespread impunity for Imbonerakure members and the government’s 
unwillingness to prosecute or rein in the group. (p. 1)  
A report by Amnesty International (2017a) also implicated armed opposition 
groups in violence against government officials and civilians. The report revealed:  
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In early 2016, there were regular grenade explosions in Bujumbura followed by 
targeted killings. On 22 March Lieutenant Colonel Darius Ikurakure, an army 
officer implicated in numerous human rights violations, was shot dead inside the 
army's headquarters. On 25 April gunmen fired on the car of General Athanase 
Kararuza, killing him, his wife Consolate Gahiro and his assistant Gérard 
Vyimana and fatally wounding his daughter Daniella Mpundu. The previous day 
Human Rights Minister Martin Nivyabandi and Diane Murindababisha were 
injured in an attack. On 13 July unidentified gunmen killed Hafsa Mossi, a former 
minister and member of the East African Legislative Assembly. A senior 
presidential adviser, Willy Nyamitwe, was injured in an assassination attempt on 
28 November. (p. 2)  
This account suggested that perpetrators of human rights abuses frequently enjoy 
immunity due to lack of proper investigation and punishment.  
A Human Rights Watch (2018) report agreed: “Impunity for serious crimes 
committed in Burundi remains the norm. The justice system is manipulated by ruling 
party and intelligence officials and judicial procedures are routinely flouted” (p. 5). 
Moreover, the weak justice system in Burundi is often blamed for its lack of will to 
investigate and prosecute perpetrators of violence. Amnesty International (2017a) 
concurred:  
Victims of human rights violations continued to face serious challenges in 
accessing justice. Journalist Esdras Ndikumana was tortured in August 2015 and 
filed a complaint at the Supreme Court in October 2015. No progress was made in 
the case in 2016. (p. 3) 
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Wambua and Logan (2017) of Afrobarometer suggested:  
Perpetrators have enjoyed near-impunity from a weak judicial system pressured 
into silence or collaboration. A notable example was described by former 
Constitutional Court Vice President Sylvère Nimpagaritse, who after fleeing to 
Rwanda said the high court’s judges had come under “enormous pressure and 
even death threats” to rubber-stamp as legal a disputed third term for President 
Pierre Nkurunziza in 2015. (p. 1)  
In detailing another case, Human Rights Watch (2017b) stated,  
One man said he filed a complaint with the police in February 2016, after two 
policemen raped his wife. They told him he was “staining the image of the 
security forces.” After police threatened him and Imbonerakure members beat 
him up, he withdrew the complaint. (p. 2)  
Examination of this theme revealed that there is no culpability for gross human 
rights abuses in Burundi. The several accounts related to this theme showed that state 
security forces, Imbonerakure youth militia, and armed opposition groups have 
perpetrated serious human rights violations. This theme also clarified that the justice 
system in Burundi lacks impartiality and, consequently, that the Burundian government is 
neither willing to nor capable of conducting efficient investigations or prosecutions. 
Theme 3: Climate of fear. The theme of the climate of fear emphasized the 
constant climate of fear in Burundi. A climate of fear is defined as the perception that 
individuals or groups may enflame fear in the general population in order to attain 
political objectives. In the context of Burundi, this entails fear imposed by security 
forces, Imbonerakure youth militia, and armed opposition groups. Several of the 
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documents indicated that the mounting level of human rights violations have caused deep 
and widespread fear among Burundians. The International Crisis Group (2016) report 
suggested that the “political strategy to dismantle the accord and the return of violent 
rhetoric and tactics reminiscent of the civil war have generated great fear within 
Burundian society” (p. i). Likewise, the Human Rights Watch (2017b) report implied, 
“Burundians live in fear of the next attack, afraid to speak out to denounce the killings, 
torture, and other abuses” (p. 1). The same report also stated, “victims of rape and sexual 
violence who said they had recognized members of the Imbonerakure who had raped 
them. Some women were targeted because their husbands or male relatives were 
members of opposition parties such as the FNL” (Human Rights Watch, 2017b, p. 4).  
Siegle (2015) argued, some Burundians feel a greater sense of vulnerability. He 
argued, 
The foundation for genocide—the mindset climate of fear, and polarization—has 
been laid. Some Burundians have said the level of apprehension is now worse 
than during the civil war. Then, most of the killing was between armed 
combatants. Now civilians are also being targeted, causing a greater sense of 
vulnerability. (p. 2)  
Amnesty International (2017a) emphasized intimidation conducted by 
Imbonerakure youth militia: “throughout the country, the Imbonerakure put pressure on 
people to join it or the ruling CNDD-FDD and carried out campaigns of intimidation 
against those who refused” (Amnesty International, 2017, p. 2). Human Rights Watch 
(2017b) revealed, “Many people refuse to file judicial complaints against Imbonerakure 
members because they fear them and have lost confidence in the justice system, which 
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they believe is unable to help the victims and may be involved in abuses” (p. 2). 
Furthermore, Human Rights Watch (2017b) “learned of several additional incidents of 
abuse, but victims were afraid to speak about what they or family members had suffered. 
Many said they feared reprisals from ruling party members if they spoke about the 
abuses” (p. 2). These kinds of intimidation tactics caused profound and pervasive anxiety 
among Burundians.  
In her U.S. Congressional testimony, Thomas-Greenfield (2015) suggested, 
“Some elements opposed to President Nkurunziza have conducted targeted attacks on 
government officials, police officers, and civilians. These actions also threaten to escalate 
the situation and spark more widespread violence” (p. 3). This cycle of violence instills 
fear in the general population. Again, Siegle (2015) detailed the cycle of violence 
between security forces and armed opposition groups. He observed, 
In the face of this intimidation and exodus, peaceful protests have waned, and 
violent reprisals have emerged. In early August, a well-coordinated rocket attack 
killed the most feared military figure in the country, General Adolphe 
Nshimirimana. Reflecting an apparent decapitation strategy, several other senior 
military figures have also been assassinated or targeted. Several dozen police 
officers have also been attacked. In apparent retaliation, civil society and 
opposition political leaders or their family members have been killed. (pp. 1-2)  
The same view was supported by Thomas-Greenfield (2015), who reported,  
Many of those attempting to flee have reported violent confrontations by party 
militias and police while en route. Since the crisis began in April 2015, 
amorphous groups of armed opposition actors have also carried out violence 
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against the security services and key targets in Bujumbura, and in Burundi’s 
border areas, further exacerbating the conflict. (p. 3) 
Another Human Rights Watch report (2018) underscored violence carried out by 
armed opposition groups. The report indicated that 
[l]ocal journalists and human rights activists reported several grenade attacks and 
killings believed to have been committed by armed opposition groups. Other 
armed opposition attacks appeared to be more targeted and covert. (p. 4)  
It is abundantly clear from the reports that the crisis in Burundi developed into a 
retaliatory conflict among government forces, the Imbonerakure youth militia, and armed 
opposition groups and that this instilled fear among Burundians. 
Theme 4: Fear of Ethnic crisis. The theme of fear of ethnic crisis refers to the 
existing fear of ethnic conflict among Burundians. More disturbing have been ethnic 
displays of violence emerging in Burundi. Political elites on both sides may be exploiting 
memories of past traumas for political goals, which could exacerbate the crisis. 
Concerning fear of ethnic crisis, mass ethnic violence has not been extensive in the recent 
crisis. However, the AU, UN, Burundians, scholars, and policymakers are afraid that 
persistent ethnic concern could deepen violence in the near future. The ACLED (2016) 
report concurred: “because of Burundi’s recent conflict history, some, including the UN 
High Commissioner for Human Rights Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein, have warned that the 
ethnic dimensions of the conflict ‘are flashing red’” (p. 1). An International Crisis Group 
report (2016) reported that President Nkurunziza’s third term brought issues of ethnicity 
to the forefront. The report stated, “while many Burundians and the international 
community believed the ethnic problem had been solved with the Arusha accord, it has 
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returned to the fore with President Nkurunziza’s third term” (International Crisis Group, 
2016, p. i).  
In an Op-ed for the Washington Post, Jones (2015) wrote,  
The government uses ethnic rhetoric presumably to signal to the opposition the 
potential violence that could come their way and incite citizens to participate in 
violence. The opposition uses ethnicized rhetoric to push for international 
intervention, which has the potential of changing the makeup of government. (p. 
3)  
The United Nations Security Council (2017) Report of the Secretary-General on Burundi 
also mentioned how  
political figures have used inflammatory and hate-filled language in speeches, on 
social media, in communiqués and in the press, calling on the population to 
‘protect’ the country against so-called traitors and plotters allegedly trying to 
destabilize Burundi. (p. 9) 
In Burundi, a key source of ethnic conflict is memories of past traumas, which increase 
fear and anxiety. These feelings, in turn, create a toxic pattern of doubt and suspicion that 
leads to ethnic violence. The Amnesty International’s (2017a) report implied that  
“the fragile cohesion between different ethnic groups resulting from the implementation 
of the Arusha Accords was destabilized by the political crisis. Incendiary rhetoric from 
high-level officials increased tensions towards the end of the year” (p. 3). Siegle (2015) 
substantiated this concept by arguing,  
In an effort to mobilize support among the Hutu majority, the CNDD-FDD has 
been increasingly employing ethnically polarizing tactics. Purges among senior 
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military and government officials have largely been ethnically based. In 
November CNDD-FDD leaders began invoking ethnically incendiary language, 
recalling the pattern employed in the Rwandan genocide. (p. 2)  
In his testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Nimuraba (2015) argued for 
a different point of view regarding the ethnic dynamics in Burundi: 
The shared struggle that both Hutu and Tutsi now experience is endangered by a 
small number of older people who retain vivid memories of ethnic hate the violent 
it spewed. These few sadly try to embed their fears among younger generations. 
(p. 4)  
Examination of the theme of fear of ethnic violence comprised diverse approaches 
to conceptualizing fear of ethnic crisis among Burundians. In Burundi, past ethnic 
conflict was the main source of fear and anxiety. 
Theme 5: Refugee crisis. Examination of the last theme in this qualitative data 
analysis, that of the refugee crisis, showed that the refugee crisis was a great concern to 
Burundi’s neighbors. Due to border configurations in the Greater Lakes Region, leaders 
of neighboring countries gradually became concerned that the crisis could have a 
spillover effect across their borders. This theme emphasized insecurity, sociopolitical 
concerns, and socioeconomic issues, which were the reasons that Burundians fled to 
neighboring countries for safety and better livelihood.  
For example, as the International Crisis Group (2016) reported,  
Some 250,000 Burundians have fled, including a significant portion of the 
political and economic establishment as well as civil society activists. The flight 
has drained Burundi of its most dynamic citizens and exposed divisions between 
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the regime on one hand, and the army, the capital and the Tutsi community on the 
other. (p. i)  
Amnesty International (2017b) reported that Burundian refugees continue to have a real 
fear of abuse by security forces and Imbonerakure youth movement. The report stated, 
Approximately 100,000 people fled Burundi in 2016, bringing the total number of 
Burundian refugees who had fled the ongoing crisis to over 327,000. The Office 
for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) estimated that 139,000 
people were internally displaced due to the crisis and natural disasters. People 
trying to flee were abused and robbed. Members of the Imbonerakure were 
largely responsible, although refugees also accused people in police and military 
uniforms. (p. 6)  
A UNHCR (2017) report described the humanitarian crisis by claiming, “Burundian 
refugees remain in dire need of humanitarian assistance and support in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC), Rwanda, Uganda, and the United Republic of Tanzania” (p. 
1).  
The fragile situation in Burundi is creating a constant influx of refugees to 
neighboring countries. The United Nations Security Council (2017) report of the 
Secretary-General on Burundi underscored some interrelations between the ongoing 
crisis within the country and concerns for economic decline, youth employment, and 
Burundians fleeing to neighboring countries. The report claimed:  
The key macroeconomic indicators show a decline in gross domestic product 
growth, a significant loss of foreign exchange reserves and a sharp drop in public 
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investment. Public debt increased to over 50 per cent in 2016. Unemployment 
rates are soaring, especially among youth. (p. 9) 
Another issue that has played a critical role in spilling conflict from one country 
to another in the Great Lakes Region was forced migration resulting from conflict, as a 
consequence of which Burundi’s neighbors worried about security issues and bearing the 
economic burden of the crisis. Due to the ethnic and border configuration of the region, 
refugees could easily bring conflict into neighboring countries, as there are parallel ethnic 
relationships within the Great Lakes Region. Kanyangara (2016) supported this view, 
arguing that  
the Great Lakes Region has experienced situations where refugees were able to 
trigger significantly more destabilizing dynamics by impacting directly on ethnic 
relations in their host countries, or by building a base for rebel group mobilization 
and operations. (p. 8) 
Furthermore, Thomas-Greenfield, (2015) noted, “The crisis in Burundi has also 
beset its neighbors with refugees continuing to cross into Tanzania, Rwanda, Uganda, 
and the DRC, and at times exacerbated existing regional tensions” (p. 7). Siegle (2015) 
shed light on the broader implications of economic burden on the entire region. He 
claimed, “already the Burundi crisis has placed a burden on its neighbors with 223,000 
refugees—mostly in Rwanda and Tanzania. During the 1993-2005 civil war there was 
870,000 Burundian refugees, exacting a prolonged economic burden on the region” (p. 
3).  
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This theme emphasized the broader implications of the refugee crisis in Burundi 
for the entire Great Lakes Region. The document reviewed in this section revealed the 
inherent humanitarian and economic problems of the conflict.  
Document Analysis Summary 
The purpose of the qualitative data analysis was to examine how the conflict 
surrounding presidential term limit manipulation has affected the perception of peace and 
stability among people in Burundi. The documents used in this section included 
Afrobaromater, ACLED, Human Rights Watch Reports, Amnesty International Reports, 
International Crisis Group Report, United Nations Reports, newspapers, and transcripts 
from United States Congressional Testimony Hearing on Burundi. Themes that emerged 
from this section included the importance of term limits, the cycle of impunity, the 
climate of fear, fear of an ethnic crisis, and the refugee crisis. The specific documents 
analyzed included four Afrobarometer reports on Burundi, the ACLED 2016 country 
report, the Human Rights Watch Report 2017, the Human Rights Watch Report 2018, the 
Amnesty International Report 2017, the Amnesty International Report 2016, the 
International Crisis Group 2016 report, four testimonies before the U.S. Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee Subcommittee on the political and security crisis in Burundi, the 
United Nations Security Council Report of the Secretary-General on Burundi, the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Washington Post, and Reuters News. 
Examination of these documents disclosed a long-standing violent history in Burundi and 
a greater understanding of insecurity among Burundians concerning the current crisis. 
Open and axial coding was applied for theme development. This process included 
becoming familiar with the data, generating initial codes, analyzing themes, and defining 
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themes. Some documents broadly contributed understanding of one or several of the 
themes, while some documents made equal contributions to all of the themes. Analysis of 
data in this section revealed that the root causes and dimensions of conflict in Burundi 
were multifaceted and that the country’s fragile peace is at stake, as is peace in the 
Greater Lakes Region as a whole.  
Methodological Triangulation 
Methodological triangulation is defined as the integration of quantitative and 
qualitative methods so that different perspectives can shed light on a phenomenon. An 
integration of quantitative and qualitative methods is often understood to assist in 
supporting the claims that may result from a study (Patton, 1990). The mixed-methods 
approach for this study included the triangulation of online survey questionnaires, 
interviews, and document analysis to measure how the conflict surrounding presidential 
term limit manipulation affected the perception of peace and stability among people in 
Burundi. The goal of the qualitative data analysis was to rationalize, strengthen, and offer 
more background to quantitative results. Triangulation reduced bias by acting as a check 
or balance against data from only one method (Patton, 1990). 
Quantitative results indicated that a statistically significant difference existed 
between Hutus’ and Tutsis’ perceptions of the conflict. For instance, on issues of who 
supports term limits, whether a third-term bid violated the Arusha agreement, whether 
term limits should be taken out of the Constitution, who is responsible for the violence, 
whether the crisis will have an enduring impact on the population, including a persistent 
fear of attack, and whether the current crisis will make Burundi more volatile. 
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Examination of these questions through the documents reflected some of the themes that 
were uncovered in both the interview and document analysis.  
In analysis of data when split between Hutus and Tutsis, the results indicated that 
some statistically significant differences existed between the two groups in their 
responses to all of the questions. However, both Hutus and Tutsis viewed this crisis along 
ethnic lines. These and other findings in the quantitative analysis enriched the notion of 
ethnic dynamics, fear and insecurity, the importance of term limits, the culture of 
impunity, and violations of the Constitution and the Arusha agreement, which was 
mentioned in the interviews and discussed in the document analysis. In terms of gender 
differences, the results showed significant differences between female and male 
participants. For almost all of the questions, women were opposed to violence by 
government forces, Imbonerakure youth militia, and armed opposition groups more than 
men. Across the board, women expressed greater support for term limitations and the 
Arusha agreement than did men. Furthermore, most women’s concerns about the conflict 
were not based on party or ethnic lines, while men saw the same issues along party and 
ethnic lines. That is, Tutsi men blamed Imbonerakure youth militia for the violence, 
opposed President Nkurunziza’s third term bid, and supported the Arusha agreement 
while Hutu men blamed armed opposition groups for the violence, supported President 
Nkurunziza’s third term bid, and opposed the Arusha agreement.  
Both the interview transcripts and the document analysis produced consistent and 
convergent results. The qualitative data analysis elucidated similar aspects of how the 
conflict surrounding presidential term limit manipulation has affected the perceptions of 
peace and stability among people in Burundi. The qualitative data analysis produced 
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eight combined key themes: (a) the importance of term limits, (b) violation of the 
Constitution and the Arusha agreement, (c) a climate of fear and insecurity, (d) a concern 
for ethnic violence, (d) a culture of impunity, (e) economic impacts, (f) the refugee crisis, 
and (8) the culture of greed and corruption.  
The qualitative data corresponded with, explained the quantitative data, and 
helped to categorize the common themes. The qualitative data analysis also facilitated an 
understanding of conflict resolution frameworks and interventions. The quantitative 
results allowed for an understanding of how the conflict surrounding presidential term 
limit manipulation affected the perceptions of peace and stability among people in 
Burundi while the qualitative results generated rich information relevant to the 
phenomenon under study. In terms of matters of ethnicity, there were several parallels 
between the quantitative and qualitative data. The quantitative data highlighted the 
importance of presidential term limits, the Arusha agreement, volatility, fear, insecurity, 
ethnic divisions between Hutus and Tutsis, and violence by security forces, 
Imbonerakure, and armed opposition groups. These issues were viewed along ethnic 
lines, and they have common characteristics. That is, the politics of ethnicity or identity 
politics helped Hutus and Tutsis to mobilize their bases in conflict situations. An 
important factor of this polarization also exists in the correlation between power struggle 
and the politics of ethnicity in Burundi.  
Similarly, the qualitative results emphasized the importance of presidential term 
limits, the Arusha agreement, the longstanding ethnic dynamics, fear and insecurity, 
violence by security forces, Imbonerakure youth militia, and armed opposition groups. 
The qualitative results revealed that the mains cause of political violence in Burundi is 
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fear, ethnic animosity, and power struggle. Political leaders used fear and ethnic 
resentment for their own gains. As such, the social issues examined in the themes 
explored here are exploited as grounds for promoting shared values, beliefs, or concerns, 
as well as a means of achieving security. 
In terms of gender differences, there were similarities and differences between the 
quantitative and qualitative data. In the quantitative results, there were significant 
differences between female and male perceptions of the conflict. For example, the 
women interviewed, in general, did not perceive the conflict along ethnic lines. Instead, 
they blamed the violence on government forces, Imbonerakure youth militia, and armed 
opposition groups. By contrast, men viewed the conflict primarily along ethnic lines. 
Most of the Hutu men interviewed blamed armed opposition groups for the violence, 
fear, and insecurity and accused government forces and Imbonerakure youth militia of 
fomenting the violence. The quantitative results for gender differences showed how 
Burundian men and women perceived this conflict. As suggested earlier, a possible 
reason for gender differences on this matter could be that armed conflict and its aftermath 
touches women’s lives in ways that vary from their effects on men.  
Moreover, the qualitative data generated similar results between men and women. 
Both men and women underscored the importance of presidential term limits, the Arusha 
agreement, the longstanding ethnic dynamics, the culture of impunity, economic impacts, 
refugee issues, fear and insecurity and violence by security forces, Imbonerakure youth 
militia, and armed opposition groups.  
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Chapter Summary 
The purpose of Chapter 4 was to present results that stemmed from the analysis of 
the online survey data, the interview data, and the document data. In this mixed method 
design study, the researcher used online survey questionnaires to determine whether a 
statistically significant difference existed between Hutus and Tutsis, as well as gender 
differences, regarding how the conflict surrounding presidential term limit manipulation 
affected peace and stability in Burundi. For the interview portion, the researcher used 
open-ended and semi-structured phone and Skype interviews to understand the conflict. 
For the document review, data were used from Afrobaromater, ACLED, Human Rights 
Watch Reports, Amnesty International Reports, an International Crisis Group Report, 
United Nations reports, newspapers, and transcripts from United States Congressional 
Testimony Hearing on Burundi.  
The researcher corroborated the findings derived from the data via the 
triangulation method, matching the results of the online survey responses, interviews, and 
documents. The findings verified the importance of presidential term limits in Burundi, 
the Arusha agreement, ethnic dynamics, and fear and insecurity among Burundians. In 
the following chapter, the results presented in this chapter are broadly discussed, 
connected to the literature and the theory. Furthermore, a conflict resolution framework, 
the limitations of the study, and recommendations for future research will be presented. 
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Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations  
Introduction 
This study examined how the conflict surrounding presidential term limit 
manipulation has affected perceptions of peace and stability among people in Burundi. 
Chapter 5 will review the results and interpretations of this study, their connection to the 
literature, and their connection to theory. It will also present a conflict resolution 
framework, the limitations of the study, and recommendations for future research.  
Discussions and Interpretations of Findings 
The quantitative data showing Hutu and Tutsi opinions on how presidential term 
limit manipulation affected the perception of peace and stability of people in Burundi 
indicated that statistically significant differences existed between the two groups in 
response to all of the questions asked of them. For instance, the quantitative results 
suggested that Tutsi respondents blamed government forces and Imbonerakure youth 
militia for the violence in Burundi, while Hutus blamed armed opposition groups for the 
violence. In addition, more than the Hutu respondents, the Tutsi respondents had higher 
rates of support for term limitations and believed the Arusha agreement and the 
Constitution were violated. Further, Tutsi believed, more than Hutus, that the current 
crisis would make Burundi more volatile. Additionally, Tutsi respondents had higher 
agreement with the view that the crisis has an enduring impact on the population, 
including persistent fear, than Hutus. It is important to note that, historically, political 
divisions and ethnic divisions have overlapped. For instance, “Burundi’s past conflicts 
have stemmed from divisions between social groups, primarily along ethnic lines, 
between Hutus and Tutsis, but [were] intertwined with social and institutional control, 
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economic opportunity, and a history of discriminatory policies” (Council on Foreign 
Relations, 2015, p. 1). The results suggested that Hutus and Tutsis viewed the current 
crisis along ethnic lines. Studies by Daley (2006), Ndikumana (2005), and Uvin (1999) 
on ethnic divisions in Burundi implied that identity politics or ethno-politics have served 
both Hutus and Tutsis in their struggle for power and access to resources. It also served 
both groups in their effort to attain security in conflict situations.  
The quantitative results supported the findings related to some of the themes in 
the qualitative analysis. That is because, due to violence conducted by government 
forces, Imbonerakure youth militia, and armed opposition groups, Burundians are 
concerned about ethnic violence, fear and insecurity, refugee issues, and the culture of 
impunity. The quantitative results also suggested that Hutus and Tutsis had differing 
opinions on which groups are responsible for the violence. These findings aligned with 
Vandeginste’s (2011, 2015) studies on long-standing ethnic divisions within Burundi. 
She argued that ethnicity, engineered in a manner that benefits political elite interests and 
ethnic resentment, is a learned phenomenon that develops from political struggle and the 
unfair distribution of resources. It is important to note that the role of political elites or 
governing elites in Burundi, to some degree, created some of these long-standing ethnic 
divisions. In his book, Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Africa, Posner (2005) explained 
that politics revolve around identity politics and that politicians play the ethnic card for 
purposes of political mobilization. Clearly, the issue of ethnicity is contrived in a manner 
that helps ruling or governing elite interests in Burundi. The crisis in Burundi looms with 
further division as allegations of ethnicism are directed to both Hutu and Tutsi politicians. 
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Daley (2006), Ndikumana (2005), and Vandeginste (2015) provided a better 
explanation for ethno-politics and violence in Burundi. In their conclusions, they claimed 
that ethnicity, power struggle, and violence have been the main divisive principles in 
Burundi given their successive strategies of marginalization and exclusion. In a larger 
sense, the quantitative results suggested that historical animosities and resentments 
between Hutu and Tutsi still exist. This conclusion substantiated several of the themes 
drawn out of the qualitative analysis, which referred to concern for ethnic violence, a 
climate of fear and insecurity, and the culture of impunity.  
In analyzing how gender differences in attitudes toward presidential term limit 
manipulation affected perceptions of peace and stability of people in Burundi by gender, 
the results suggested that women’s perceptions of the conflict differed from those of men. 
Namely, respondents tended to blame the violence on government forces, Imbonerakure 
youth militia, and opposition armed groups more than men. Women respondents had a 
higher agreement that presidential term limit manipulation is the root of the current crisis 
than males. Women respondents also believed that the current crisis would make Burundi 
more volatile than did men. Additionally, women had a higher agreement that the crisis 
has enduring impact on the population, including persistent fear, than men. These 
findings are relevant to previous research on gender perceptions of war and violence 
showing that women are more likely to condemn violence and to strive for nonviolent 
resolutions than men. McKay (1998) argued that since women are especially affected by 
armed conflict, they encounter tremendous challenges in contexts of war and violence. 
Another explanation for this, according to Wilén (2014), is that women in Burundi are 
opposed to violence due to the devastating effects of armed violence on women. As 
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stated earlier, after the twelve-year ethnic civil war (1993-2005), Burundian women 
suffered greatly both during and after the cessation of violence; this could be a reason 
that Burundian women’s perception of the conflict differed from those of men.  
Further, the findings of this research supported previous research on how women 
cope in post-conflict societies. Wilén’s (2014) report on gender narratives in Burundi 
suggested that women show broader support for issues related to peace and reconciliation 
than do men. The quantitative results also verified Rackley’s (2005) findings that 
although both men and women recognize the adverse impact of armed conflict on civilian 
well-being and the social fabric, there remains a key gender gap in perceptions of armed 
conflict and safety. The qualitative data––which suggested that because of the violence 
carried out by security forces, Imbonerakure youth militia, and armed opposition, most of 
the women in this study were concerned about ethnic violence and the culture of 
impunity and were highly conscious of fear and insecurity––supported previous results 
related to male and female perceptions of the crisis. Burundian women were more likely 
to condemn violence and to support the Arusha agreement and term limitations than were 
men.  
The qualitative data analysis revealed similar characteristics of how the conflict 
surrounding presidential term limit manipulation affected the perceptions of peace and 
stability of people in Burundi. The findings of the qualitative data will be discussed 
accordingly. In both the interviews and the document analysis, the findings indicated that 
term limits maintain significant oversight of the concentration of power, support 
democracy, and safeguard continuing stability. For instance, an interviewee mentioned 
that term limits are seen as precursors to multiparty democracy and as a deterrent to 
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dictatorship. Another interviewee mentioned that term limits prevent institutional 
corruption. This concept confirmed Yarwood’s (2016) and Afrobarometer’s (2015) 
conclusions about the importance of term limits. They argued that civil society groups 
and citizens are progressively asking for a more accountable government and that 
Africans desire democracy and support presidential term limitations.  
Another important concept that one interviewee expressed was that the president 
and his CNDD-FDD party officials were likely to introduce the abolishment of 
presidential term limits. One interviewee stated that the president was trying to change 
the Constitution so that he could rule forever. In the past, the government attempted to 
change the Constitution but failed. Recently, the ruling CNDD-FDD party officials 
initiated a reform process to eliminate presidential term limits. If the reform is approved, 
it would give President Nkurunziza and the ruling CNDD-FDD unlimited rule (Uwimana, 
2017; Vandeginste, 2016). This action raised alarms among opposition leaders and 
regional negotiators who maintained that the current crisis and environment are not 
suitable for constitutional change.  
The qualitative data findings underscored the significance of the Arusha 
agreement and the Constitution. At the center of the current crisis lies the issue of 
safeguarding the Arusha agreement and the Constitution. The legality of President 
Nkurunziza’s third term bid generated conflict across Burundi. Third-term opponents 
frequently used political arguments against his actions while third-term supporters used 
constitutional legality and the rule of law to support his actions. Many interviewees stated 
that concerted efforts by President Nkurunziza and his party loyalists to undercut the 
Arusha agreement and Burundi’s Constitution created significant violence. Previous 
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studies supported this point, noting that the root cause of the current crisis in Burundi was 
President Pierre Nkurunziza’s desire to run for a third term despite a two-term limitation 
in Burundi’s Constitution and the Arusha agreement. President Nkurunziza’s third term 
was a violation of both the Constitution and the essence of the Arusha agreement, signed 
in 2000, which set presidential term limits at two terms, ended Burundi’s civil war, and 
engaged a strong peace-building architecture to prevent future conflict (Green, 2015; 
Nantulya, 2015; Zamfir, 2016).  
Furthermore, one interviewee mentioned the importance of the Arusha agreement 
in balancing power between ethnic groups in Burundi. The interviewee argued that the 
Arusha agreement paved the way for an ethnic balance of power and implemented a 
power-sharing system. Another interviewee reverted to the idea that President 
Nkurunziza’s controversial decisions, combined with his broader contempt for the 
country’s Constitution, made Burundi volatile. Another interviewee mentioned that 
President Nkurunziza and the CNDD-FDD party officials are committed to increasing 
their control over political institutions and security services, which is against the Arusha 
agreement. Nantulya (2015) validated these concerns, stating that some of the hardliners 
in the ruling party deemed some of the Arusha frameworks illegal and incapable of 
solving the current crisis.  
An analysis of interviews and documents established that Burundians are living 
under a climate of fear and insecurity. For example, ACLED (2016), Amnesty 
International (2017a), and Human Rights Watch (2018) reports verified this claim, each 
stating that government forces targeted demonstrators in Bujumbura’s Tutsi minority 
neighborhoods. Almost all opposition leaders, prominent civil society group members, 
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human rights activists, and independent journalists fled Burundi because of state-
sanctioned pressure, oppression, and surveillance. Similarly, armed opposition groups 
engaged in a series of killings that mainly targeted CNDD-FDD party officials, members 
of security forces, and Imbonerakure youth militia. Interviewees, and several of the 
documents reviewed, emphasized the cycle of violence in Burundi. One interviewee 
mentioned how security forces and Imbonerakure youth militia in Bujumbura, Burundi’s 
capital, targeted him and that a similar incident occurred in Gitega province. These 
incidents made him flee Burundi for Kenya. Another interviewee mentioned how armed 
opposition groups frequently targeted ruling party officials, the security forces, or 
government sympathizers. According to this interviewee, patterns of violence like this are 
putting ordinary Burundians at risk and instilling fear and insecurity. For instance, 
frequent grenade attacks in Bujumbura have caused several deaths and many injuries. 
The Human Rights Watch (2018) report substantiated this view, claiming numerous high-
level assassinations targeted at CNDD-FDD party officials and prominent security 
officials, including army Chief of Staff Prime Niyongabo, who survived, and chief of the 
intelligence services, General Adolphe Nshimirimana, who was assassinated.  
A review of interviews and documents confirmed these concerns about ethnic 
violence in Burundi. Many Burundians fear that if the current crisis is not resolved, it 
may turn on an ethnic dimension. Findings from the qualitative data analysis showed that 
violence by government forces, Imbonerakure youth militia, and armed opposition groups 
could turn into ethnic violence if the violence continues. The violence and killings on 
both sides have made Burundi increasingly unstable. One interviewee detailed how 
Burundi’s history played a role in Burundians leaving in mass numbers to seek safety. He 
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argued that, psychologically, past ethnic violence affected the ways that people think and 
react. Anti-government and pro-government rhetoric that has regularly correlated with 
ethnic identity could destabilize the political system. This kind of ethnic rhetoric is 
especially troubling in light of the fact that conflicts in Burundi in earlier decades were 
portrayed by across-the-board ethnic killings (Jones, 2015; Vandeginste, 2016).  
As the violence continues, there is fear it could devolve into a full-scale civil war. 
An interviewee revealed that President Nkurunziza could succeed in reversing history 
and establishing a Hutu-controlled regime, which is against the Arusha agreement. 
Additionally, another interviewee explained how the ruling CNDD-FDD elites represent 
a small social base and how they use ethnic-social discourse to infuse fear in the 
population. Most of the interview data and documents addressed ethnic patterns of 
violence that appear to be developing on both sides. Historically, both Hutu and Tutsi 
elites have used ethnic cues for political purposes. In Burundi, politicians and other elites 
have used ethnicity to manipulate and exploit ethnic ties to form alliances.  
Additionally, for decades, the power base of the small faction of the Tutsi 
governing elite was based on fear, resentment, and repression of the Hutu majority, and 
the military has mainly orchestrated the violence. Thus, political, economic, and social 
biases became more rigid against Hutus, whereas the power of many Tutsis significantly 
increased (Uvin, 1999; Vandeginste, 2016). An interviewee warned that Hutus should 
prevent Tutsis from ever returning to power. There is a concern among many Tutsis 
about revenge from the ruling Hutu government. As marginalization, power imbalances, 
and unequal access to resources took place along ethnic lines, the violence and counter-
violence also developed into ethnic violence. Fear of ethnic violence was relevant in the 
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current crisis, and political division overlaps with ethnic division. One reason why 
conflict in Burundi occurred is the early introduction of ethnicity as a factor of access to 
resources and power, beginning in the colonial period. 
Another ongoing issue outlined in both the interviews and documents was the fact 
that the government of Burundi took inadequate action to hold the people responsible for 
human rights violations. The majority of the interviews and the document reviews 
confirmed that violence, murder, and rape persist among Burundians running away from 
the conflict. An Amnesty International (2017b) report indicated that between two to three 
women were raped each week, and there were reports of militias attacking opposition 
members in refugee camps in DRC and Tanzania. One interviewee recalled how the 
Imbonerakure youth militia threatened his sisters with rape several times, which 
eventually led them to flee to Rwanda. The conflict created, according to the interviewee, 
circumstances in which violence against women in general became more widespread. In 
such cases, violence against women is carried out to instill fear in local communities or in 
opposing armed groups. For Burundian women, the effects are mainly dire. 
One interviewee stated that for Burundi to move forward, the country must shed 
its history of violence and address its culture of impunity. Impunity Watch (2015) held 
that a lack of government will to effectively address Burundi’s violent past produced a 
culture of impunity for gross human rights violations and severe violations of 
international criminal law, and Uvin (1999) argued, “The issue of revenge is closely 
connected with that of impunity, a central feature of life in Burundi” (p. 264). Another 
interviewee mentioned the history of security service and judiciary failures to locate and 
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prosecute perpetrators of violence. According to the interviewee, this experience, among 
other things, created a cycle of retributive killings.  
Furthermore, the lack of rule of law encourages corruption and violence. 
Interviewees expressed this concept many times. For instance, one interviewee mentioned 
that impunity gives President Nkurunziza and top-level CNDD-FDD party members 
immunity and all kinds of material benefits. A study by International Crisis Group (2012) 
entitled Burundi: A Deepening Corruption Crisis detailed that elites’ access to public and 
private resources. The results of the study showed that corruption issues concerning high-
level CNDD-FDD officials and state officials were unpunished and that this could further 
fuel social and political anger. Some interviewees and documents reviewed indicated that 
greed and corruption are significant grievances of Burundians. Corruption is one of 
Burundi’s major challenges, and corruption among high-level government officials are 
known to many Burundians. Transparency International ranks the country high in 
corruption, at 157 out of 180 as the most corrupt country (Transparency International, 
2018). Mbogo (2012) stated, “Corruption scandals involving CNDD-FDD dignitaries and 
state officials have watered down hope of a change in governance and more equitable 
wealth distribution. The deepening corruption crisis is discrediting post-conflict 
institutions and fueling social and political resentment” (p. 1). One interviewee stated that 
when President Nkurunziza came to power in 2005, many Burundians hoped that he 
would end corruption and improve economic developments, but they lost hope.  
An International Crisis Group (2012) study reported that despite President 
Nkurunziza’s support for anti-corruption programs, his government defunded its own 
programs, placed political burdens on courts and anti-corruption taskforces, and 
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influenced state institutions to benefit party elites. An interviewee mentioned the amount 
of corruption and greed at the government level and around Nkurunziza as one of the 
factors that influenced the president to extend his term. The interviewee further argued 
that when the president and his top party members were in power, they amassed a great 
deal of money; if they left office, they would lose access to those resources and 
opportunities. Corruption creates impunity and weakens the rule of law. Several 
interviewees mentioned the idea that being an elitist provides one with multiple kinds of 
immunity. The endless cycle of corruption affects the entire government system––from 
social, political, and economic systems––and is a substantial impediment to economic 
development. Grievances associated with greed and corruption have been influential for 
rallying support for demonstrations against President Nkurunziza’s third-term bid. 
Evidently, decades of impunity for corruption in Burundi have bred a lack of trust 
amongst Burundians.  
The qualitative data also underscored the economic impact of the current crisis on 
Burundians. The economic issues that interviewees underlined ranged from a decline in 
foreign aid, foreign trade, and investments and the influx of Burundian refugees to 
neighboring countries in search of better livelihoods. Research has shown that the 
conflicts have large and substantial aggregate effects on macroeconomic symbols, such as 
GDP, foreign trade, and investments (Collier, 1999; Martin, Mayer, & Thoenig, 2008; 
Mueller & Tobias, 2016). Given Burundi’s history, the current crisis plays a significant 
role in shaping the macro-level economy. Falisse (2015) added that trade with 
neighboring countries and local markets was significantly interrupted and that the 
government of Burundi recently assessed that the crisis cost at least $32.7 million in 
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material destruction. Furthermore, the conflict only worsened Burundi’s underlying 
economic issues, and the economy shrunk by 4.1% in 2015.  
The data from both interviews and document reviews summarized the diverse 
channels and means through which the conflict can affect growth and development. 
These consequences comprised declines in employment and investment and an influx of 
refugees to neighboring countries. For instance, one interviewee revealed how life in 
Burundi became difficult because many investors left the country: Foreign aid ceased, 
NGOs stopped their programs, and the exchange rate plummeted. Another interviewee 
stated, for example, that a father who worked for an NGO and “earned 5000 Burundian 
Francs” was unable to provide for his family because the NGO for which he worked 
closed its doors. The interviewee further believed that this phenomenon affected many 
families and that some were aware of difficulties, which made them flee to refugee 
camps. Green (2015) substantiated these findings, arguing that “Burundians are leaving 
or losing their jobs as development partners pull out,” and “every time someone loses a 
job, that’s 12 people who are living off that, benefitting from that income” (p. 640). One 
interviewee mentioned that young people were not only migrating because of injustice, 
but also because of poverty. The economic impact of the crisis drove thousands of 
Burundians to seek better livelihoods in neighboring countries. The violence caused 
hundreds of thousands to flee, adding to problems in the agricultural labor markets and 
prolonging uncertainty and political violence, which have triggered many donors to stop 
their aid programs (Falisse, 2015; Green, 2015). Likewise, the violence forced foreign 
investors to leave. Indeed, since the conflict began, western donors have cut their aid to 
Burundi, whose annual budget depended on 49% of foreign aid (Falisse, 2015). One 
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interviewee substantiated this account by alluding to the fact that Burundi is a poor 
country and that “half of the annual budget” of Burundi came from EU aid. These issues 
were believed to be the cause of the influx of refugees.  
Another issue of concern related to the refugee issue was that Burundi’s neighbors 
worried about refugee issues within their borders. Many documents reviewed for this 
study noted the possibility of violence spilling over to neighboring countries. Amnesty 
International (2017b) also expressed concern about rebel activities in Tanzania, where 
rebel groups recruit and train, oftentimes engaging in cross-border attacks from 
Tanzanian territory. Kanyangara (2016) used recent history to explain how conflict in the 
Great Lakes Region moved from one region to another. He argued that “conflicts in Great 
Lakes Region countries have always been interconnected. Although conflicts tend to be 
intrastate in the beginning, due to strong cross-border dimensions and transnational ethnic 
identities these conflicts have often spread to destabilize the whole region” (p. 2). 
Previous refugee crises in the Great Lakes Region produced new conflicts around the 
region via cross-border assaults. This was the case in the 1994 Rwandan genocide, for 
example. After the genocide, Hutus fled to the DRC with their arms, began to attack 
Rwanda, and subsequently formed an armed group (Kanyangara 2016; Khadiagala, 
2006).  
To support the findings from this study, it was essential to compare the 
quantitative and qualitative data, including the online surveys, interviews, and documents 
reviewed. Triangulation of these data showed that the findings of this were reliable and 
valid. Data triangulation and interpretation indicated that Burundians were divided along 
ethnic lines and that gender differences about how the conflict surrounding presidential 
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term limit manipulation affected perceptions of peace and stability among people in 
Burundi. Both the quantitative and qualitative data revealed that inequities between and 
within identity groups, together with patterns of identity-based deprivation, tend to 
produce conflict in Burundi. Further, the findings of this study suggested that 
marginalization, ethnic divisions, power imbalance, and unequal access to resources in 
Burundi often lead to violence. What is clear about the current crisis is that a large 
number of Burundians are worried about ethnic conflict, gender-based violence, the 
culture of impunity, and a climate of fear and insecurity because of ethnic patterns of 
violence that seem to be developing.  
Connection to the Literature 
The findings from this study corroborated scholarly findings on presidential term 
limit manipulations, democratization, and governance. The literature review provided 
five justifications for why African leaders––in this case, President Nkurunziza––cling to 
power: (a) lack of checks and balances, (b) weak government institutions, (c) electoral 
malpractice, (d) greed and corruption, and (e) fear of punishment. The participants in this 
study mentioned some of these justifications.  
Studies by Ndikumana (1998) and Gurr (1970) concluded that political conflict 
increased with perceptions of lack of equal opportunities to access political power, the 
ethnization of politics, inequality, marginalization, and pervasive corruption all 
conceivably bolstered citizens resorting to violence. Burundi’s history of ethnic violence 
overlapped with power struggles, which have been predominately driven by ethnic 
tensions with roots in repression and marginalization. For instance, interviewee E (age 
24) linked problem this to the lack of equal job opportunities. She argued, “This thing 
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about ethnicity. It’s really hard work for people to apply for jobs. Because ethnicity has 
been a problem for so long but now it’s like really out in in the open.” Another 
participant expressed similar views. Interviewee C (age 30) added, “The other factor is . . 
. the power. I mean, power corrupts, as they say. So, looking at Burundi’s history that 
was dominated by Tutsi led government or Tutsi regime . . . now having a regime that 
was previously in . . . took arms against the established previous government.” 
Interviewee E (age 24) also believed that the benefits of being in power were why the 
president decided to run for a third term. She argued, “He wanted to stay in power 
because once you are in power today . . . you are in power, tomorrow you may be afraid 
to lose the position you had.” These notions suggest that power struggles resulting in 
political, economic, and social marginalization were the primary drivers of violence in 
Burundi.  
The results also confirmed Carter’s (2016), Tangri and Mwenda’s (2010), Igwe’s 
(2008), and Baker’s (2002) findings that the reason that African leaders stayed too long 
in power was because of fear of punishment for their human rights violations and 
corruption. Interviewee B (age 25) explained at length how corruption and ethnicity were 
reasons that President Nkurunziza extended his term beyond the required two-terms:  
The regime had actually . . . has been . . . a lot around corruption but also, you 
know, when they came in power, there was this discussion around ethnicity . . . 
from our history where the Tutsi faction that has been in power and because we 
have been threatened for so long. So, the country should remain in the hands of 
the Hutu ethnicity. So, I think there were those two involved—corruption and fear 
of being persecuted on these grounds.  
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Interviewee H (age 35) mentioned that President Nkurunziza was afraid to “leave 
power because of what he stole, because of many people that he killed. Because of 
whatever he did. He sees that once he leaves power, he will be followed by the justice; he 
will be taken to court.” The argument was that leaders are sometimes afraid of potential 
investigations and prosecution by succeeding governments, mainly when they have 
committed economic crimes or unlawful acts of killing and jailing political opponents 
and dissenters. Interviewee G (age 27) also believed that economics contributed to 
President Nkurunziza extending his term in office. She stated, “Yes, for economic 
reasons, but also . . . Um . . . he was… they know, after they quit, the crimes they did. So, 
that’s another reason that they have to stay there to keep the power.” Interviewee C (age 
30) suggested, “The level of corruption at the government level or around Nkurunziza, so 
that would be one factor: the fact that they can amass lots of money with them being in 
power.”  
On the issue of lack of checks and balances and weak institutions, Lebas (2016), 
Cranenburgh (2011), and Vencovsky (2007) concluded that the complete concentration 
of power in the executive branch encouraged impunity and weakened democracy, which 
suppressed opposition parties, making it impossible for political parties to function. The 
findings from this study confirmed these perceptions. Interviewee B (age 25) expressed 
that the lack of checks and balances and weak institutions in Burundi encouraged 
authoritarianism. He concluded, “I think it’s a bad practice that we are actually 
promoting. We are promoting dictatorship, and we are not actually reflecting democratic 
values that people can actually build upon them and go.” Interviewee F (age 22) believed 
that the lack of checks and balances, and weak institutions, supported impunity. She 
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concluded that unlimited power “gives them the immunity, wealth, honor, and all kinds 
of material benefits.”  
The findings from this study corroborated the literature. This section identifies the 
causes of the current crisis and explains their different dynamics, which have created 
inequality and exclusion in Burundi. If the conflicts in Burundi have their roots in 
historical factors, bad governance, weak institutions, corruption, ethnic divisions, legacies 
of authoritarianism, socio-economic crisis, poverty, human rights violations, and politics 
of marginalization, then any effort to mediate the conflicts should transcend the ideas of 
inclusive government and institutions that will manage ethnic divisions, inequalities, 
marginalization, and good governance.  
In reality, past Burundian conflicts, as discussed previously, were typical of 
political associations expressed in ethnic terms. From a historical point of view, post-
colonial Burundi inherited divisive arrangements of power within particular ethnic 
groups, setting the ground for conflict and competition along ethnic lines. Burundi’s post-
colonial elites prolonged this history of divide-and-rule to safeguard their interests and 
power, and Burundi’s weak institutions are incapable of, or unwilling to, playing the role 
of impartial authorities between competing identity groups.  
Despite the correlation between the politics of ethnization and violent conflict in 
Burundi, it is clear that identity groups have a fundamental role to play in conflict 
resolution and peace building. As the construction of identity seems to be the most 
dominant factor in Burundi’s conflict, durable peace and security depends on reforming 
the emphasis on identities as building blocks of post-conflict reconstruction and in 
conflict resolution methods. Successful conflict prevention and resolution in Burundi will 
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involve the development of more established and evenhanded social, economic, and 
political institutions.  
Connection to Theory 
The findings from this study supported the theoretical framework used to 
understand this conflict. This study used three theories (elite theory, intergroup conflict 
theory, and structural violence theory) to weave together useful analyses of the 
Burundian conflict. All three theories shed light on the intersections among the control of 
state power, the use of violence to sustain power, ethnic dynamics, inequality, 
marginalization, and the critical role that competing elites played in this conflict. The 
participants in this study referred to some of these issues as the root causes of conflict in 
Burundi. The competition for political power and control of Burundi’s resources have 
long been an avenue for conflict to develop along ethnic lines. 
In terms of elite control in Burundi, Mills (1956), Berberoglu (2005), and 
Pakulski (2012) concluded that an important component of elite theory was that all 
political and economic structures were controlled and systematized to benefit few elites. 
In Burundi, the ethnic distribution of power is a powerful mobilizing force for elites. The 
concept of governing elites, Mosca (1939) argued, put importance on the ruling class’s 
desire to control government agencies and society in general. As Uvin (1999) noted, 
“Hutu (anti-Tutsi) ethnicity and its institutionalization in public policy were key 
components of the ruling elite’s strategy of legitimization and control over the state. 
Whenever this elite was threatened, it exacerbated ethnic divisions to thwart 
democratization and power sharing” (p. 253).  
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Burundi’s CNDD-FDD party is a suitable example of the governing elites or the 
ruling class’s persistent consolidation of power while systematically restricting political 
participation. For example, Interviewee G (age 27) argued that the president and 
members of the political elites “just wanted to stay there to keep the power, so that him 
[sic] and the people who are with him could use the country’s resources.” On the question 
of why President Nkurunziza extended his term in office, interviewee D (age 26) also 
believed that being part of the political elite enabled the president to manipulate the 
system easily. He argued, “He is among the elites of the ruling party and he is also the 
president.” As Ndikumana (2005) and Uvin (1999) concluded, political elites controlled 
Burundian economic, political, and social configurations for the last five decades or 
more, distributing state resources among their inner circles. This kind of marginalization 
produced discontent, which led to the violence seen in Burundi’s history. 
Moreover, the findings were also consistent with those of Gurr (1993), Sherif 
(1951), and Uvin (1999), who that asserted conflict occurs when two or more groups are 
vying for inadequate resources and power. According to this analysis, ethnicity or group 
identity and categorization have played a significant role in driving conflict. The results 
of this study have revealed that relationships between ethnicity and opportunities are 
evident in political competition. As Interviewee E (age 24) mentioned,  
Saying that the Tutsi ruled for so long and now is time for Hutu to rule. And they 
say that  . . . they say that now Hutu should rule as long as they want. This is what 
it is all about and sometimes it is difficult for people from other ethnicities to get 
jobs because this is something they take into account: this thing about ethnicity. 
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It’s really hard work for people to apply for jobs. Because ethnicity has been a 
problem for so long, but now it’s like really out in the open.  
Given Burundi’s history of violent ethnic conflict, ethnic groups are simply 
identifiable and very important to politics. Gurr (1993) implied that groups that are 
deprived of the distribution of resources often share both a common grievance and a 
common identity. In Burundi’s case, disparities in the allocation of state resources and 
political control through ethnic groups became an instrument of conflict. Interviewee C 
reiterated this perception, arguing that there is  
fear that the Tutsi minority might again claim power or come to power in the near 
future . . . because of the fact that Hutu might lose power. The other factor is also 
history: what happened in 1972. There was massacre against the Hutu in Burundi. 
So, I think psychologically, that plays . . . is still playing a huge role in the way 
the government or the people in government currently reacting. (Age 30)  
Interviewee B (age 25) also alluded to this belief, stating that “ethnicity . . . from 
our history where the Tutsi faction that has been in power and because we have been 
threaten for so long. So, the country should remain in the hands of the Hutu ethnicity.” 
The politics of ethnicity have long been recognized as one of the main causes of 
instability in Burundi, and both Hutus and Tutsi interviewed used ethnic feelings to 
highlight the risk posed by the other group. For interviewee H (age 35), President 
Nkurunziza and his CNDD-FDD party  
Created chaos in the country by killing many people, by bringing up issues of 
ethnicity, which was already forgotten by civilians, but now he brought it up 
again. That is now created weakness in the army; because the army and the police 
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are divided even though you find them together. . . . Some in their minds they 
belong to opposition, others they belong to ruling party.  
The results from this study also echoed Galtung’s (1969) concept of structural 
violence. Galtung argued that direct violence comes in different forms, which may 
include physical force, killing, torture, rape, sexual assault, beatings, and verbal 
violence. Many of the interviewees expressed this concept. On the one hand, interviewee 
J (age 33) stated, “Many people died, and many people fled the country. The opposition 
used grenades to attack the police and the military, and the police went after them. And 
they killed military people, police, and civilians.” On the other hand, interviewee G (age 
27) blamed the Imbonerakure youth militia for the violence. She contended, “those 
Imbonerakure have to stop attacking, and most of those women and girls attacked are 
Tutsi.” Interviewee H (age 35) equally blamed both government forces and armed 
opposition groups for orchestrating violence. He argued, “You see both sides produced 
violence. So, that third term brought violence, but I can’t say that is the source of 
violence. I would say that it was a trigger because the roots causes are more than the third 
term.” In the recent political violence in Burundi, the police, the military, Imbonerakure, 
and armed opposition groups carried out violence with impunity. Evidently, structural 
violence was embedded in the social, political, and economic structures of Burundi. 
Inequitable access to resources and political power were types of structural violence that 
created direct violence.  
Issues of ethnicity, culture of impunity, fear and insecurity, violence, and the 
struggle for power and resources were widely discussed in the qualitative interviews. One 
important aspect of the ongoing violence was the role of the political elites in Burundi, 
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who use ethnicity to drive their quest for power and control of state resources. It is clear 
that, in Burundi, access to power also means access to wealth and resources. 
Marginalization from politics in Burundi causes discontent and often leads to ethnic 
violence.  
Conflict Resolution Framework 
The purpose of this study was to examine how the conflict surrounding 
presidential term limit manipulation affected the perception of peace and stability among 
people in Burundi. The conflict in Burundi entails governance issues, a protracted history 
of power struggle, a lack of equal opportunities to access political power, violent ethnic 
division between Tutsis and Hutus, and structural violence. Ethnic division and identity 
politics are deeply rooted in Burundi’s social and political fabric. Following its 
independence from Belgium in 1962, several civil wars erupted that killed hundreds of 
thousands of innocent Burundians. Since then, political arrangements in Burundi continue 
to have an ethnic factor. In essence, ethnic divisions or identity politics have brought 
about conflict between ethnic groups, as Hutu and Tutsi tribes compete with each other 
for control of economic and political power. According to Burton (1990), identity is the 
most important and highest of human needs, which explains why it triggers most of the 
conflicts. This form of deep-rooted conflict is among the most difficult to mediate as it 
requires both major political and societal changes.  
Almost three years after the crisis began, the situation in Burundi remains very 
unstable, and the country struggles to find a durable solution. The AU, EU, UN, and 
leaders around the Great Lakes Region are all concerned that the conflict in Burundi 
could have a spillover effect and destabilize the region. As such, it is important to 
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understand the nature of the conflict in order to establish the most suitable and practical 
methods and mechanisms for conflict resolution. Burundi presented an interesting case of 
conflict resolution due to its history of violence. 
In their work on conflict resolution, peace building, reconciliation, and intergroup 
conflict, Assefa (1996, 1998) and Nnoli (1998) argued that since political violence has 
potentially adverse effects on socio-economic and political development, peace building 
and reconciliation are essential to preventing further violence. Over the past decades, 
conflict resolution and peace building frameworks have become extremely relevant in 
discussions and debates across Africa and beyond. Accordingly, conflict resolution and 
peace building methods have played an important role in resolving the root causes of 
conflicts across Africa as seen in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Kenya, Rwanda, South Africa, 
and so forth.  
First, conflict resolution seeks to understand the root causes and the main 
dynamics of conflict in order to establish suitable resolutions. Second, conflict resolution 
involves changing relationships and conditions such that the resolutions that conflicting 
parties develop are sustainable in both the short and long term. The root causes of the 
conflict in Burundi are multifaceted. Unequal access to national and natural resources, 
lack of equal opportunities to access political power, protracted violent ethnic division, 
structural violence, and marginalization are among some of the dynamics that propagate 
conflict in Burundi. These matters motivate tangible or perceived inequities and 
resentments amongst ethnic groups, which oftentimes results in, among other things, 
violence. In the case of Burundi, the conflict resolution method must require taking 
several steps, such as transforming state institutions, socio-economic development, and 
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democratization. Attaining such resolutions will involve tackling the systematic structural 
violence in Burundi. Based on this argument, it is imperative to develop a robust peace 
framework to address the current Burundi conflict. One could argue that the Arusha 
power-sharing agreement, which ended Burundi’s decade-long civil war, must be a 
reference point for the current conflict. The Arusha agreement reformed the historical 
ethnic configuration of Burundi and ended the marginalization of Hutus from politics. 
Further, the Arusha agreement specifically addressed ending impunity for gender-based 
violence and crimes against humanity. The basic requirements of this framework offer 
the socio-political and economic structure for peace and stability in Burundi.  
With respect to finding a solution to the current conflict, an immediate renewal of 
dialogue must include all stakeholders to rebuild the trust lost between the parties. For 
example, the EAC inter-Burundi dialogue efforts under the leadership of President 
Yoweri Museveni of Uganda and Benjamin Mkapa, former president of Tanzania, have 
not yielded any sustainable agreement. This is due, in part, to President Nkurunziza’s 
refusal to include the real stakeholders in the conflict, including armed opposition groups, 
CNARED, civil society groups, religious groups, media groups, women, and youths in 
the negotiations. The fundamental purpose of any negotiation is to engage adversaries 
across the negotiating table; President Nkurunziza views this process differently. Clearly, 
without the involvement of all parties to the negotiations, including armed opposition 
groups involved in assaults on the security forces and government officials, a political 
solution to end the almost three-year conflict is unlikely. Proposed changes to the 
Constitution in May, 2018 could lead to even more unrest. Any proposed amendment to 
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eradicate presidential term limits runs against the constitutional spirit of the Arusha 
agreement.  
For Burundi to attain a sustainable peace, it must focus on building democracy 
and ensuring socio-economic development for all Burundians, regardless of ethnicity and 
gender. Assefa (1996) and Nnoli (1998) argued that democratization and socio-economic 
development practices were considered important components in peace building and 
conflict resolution. This practice is expected to remove all adverse characteristics related 
to the root causes of the conflicts: dictatorial and authoritarian inclinations, the politics of 
ethnicity, practices of social discrimination, tyranny, and marginalization. This, in turn, 
will expand multi-party politics, civil society groups, and freedom of the press and 
speech. In this manner, the government of Burundi can redress past and present 
economic, social, and political marginalization. Such an initiative could also mitigate 
future conflicts. Moreover, socio-economic development grounded on beliefs in equality 
across the board is likely to lower poverty and unemployment and increase the standard 
of living of the majority of Burundians. Under such circumstances, conflicts can 
significantly be reduced in Burundi.  
Even if the current conflict is resolved, ending the cycle of violence will be 
difficult without addressing issues of ethnicity, the culture of impunity, fear and 
insecurity, gender-based violence, the struggle for power, refugees, and greed and 
corruption. The results of this study related to gender suggest that the efforts of 
Burundian women cannot be ignored in the prevention and resolution of conflicts. A 
report by Lindborg (2017) argued that “women participants in peace processes are 
usually focused less on the spoils of the war and more on reconciliation, economic 
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development, education and transitional justice—all critical elements of a sustained 
peace” (p. 1). As such, women’s roles in peace negotiations and the transformation of 
Burundian society will be fundamental to sustaining peace, economic and social growth, 
and reconstruction.  
Identity conflict in Burundi has existed for decades. Since its independence in 
1962, Burundi experienced several events of mass ethnic violence, including massacres 
in 1972, 1988, and 1993. These events created bitter memories, crystallized Hutu and 
Tutsi violence, and produced an atmosphere of perpetual mutual fear. Throughout the 
1993 to 2005 civil war, fighting between Burundi’s the two main ethnic groups, the Hutu 
and the Tutsi, left approximately 300,000 people dead. The quantitative results of this 
study indicated that Hutus and Tutsis viewed the crisis along ethnic lines. Additionally, 
the findings from the interviews and document analysis suggested that previous ethnic 
violence in Burundi has had a long-term effect on the population, including a continuous 
fear of violence and ongoing communal division. Similarly, Ndikumana (2010) added, 
“Deeply seated fear, hatred, mistrust and feelings of revenge characterized the 
relationship between Hutus and Tutsis and have been shaping Burundi political, social 
and economic structures ever since” (p. 269). Arguably, ethnic tensions in Burundi have 
been driven not merely by belief systems, but generally by ethnicity or by political elites 
or governing elites’ capability of provoking ethnic resentment for their personal gain. 
Further, various scholars indicated that ethnic dynamics in Burundi are the main 
drivers of conflict. Assefa (1996), Mpangala (2004), Ndikumana (2005), and Nnoli 
(1998) all agreed that the competition for control of the Burundian state has long been an 
avenue where conflict turns out to be ethnic. Specifically, ethnic background and 
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opportunities usually move hand-in hand and manifest in political struggles. To mitigate 
the unequal distribution of power and access to resources, which seem to be drivers of 
conflict in Burundi, the government must also promote equality across ethnic groups as 
stated in the Arusha agreement. As Ndikumana (2005) argued, attaining economic and 
political stability in Burundi will involve the formation of institutional mechanisms that 
address the history of inequality of access to political and economic power across ethnic 
groups. By focusing on equal distribution, Burundi can foster lasting peace.  
Intergroup conflicts encompass both objective and subjective components, both of 
which require addressing effective de-escalation (Assefa, 1996). This is achieved through 
third-party intervention. Since intergroup conflicts are so multifaceted, especially in 
Burundi, a viable reconciliation between Hutus and Tutsis must begin with a 
comprehensive conflict analysis. This method should entail a complete change in 
structures and systems. The politics of reconciliation and justice should be adopted at 
both the local and national levels as well as between the two main ethnic groups, and they 
should be part of the development of democratization to prevent future ethnic conflict. 
The AU, UN, EU, and EAC can play a key role in ensuring that ethnic reconciliation is 
sought in a way that will address decades of impunity and historical grievances. Such an 
initiative would be based on the common interest of the people rather than interests of a 
minority elite.  
Moreover, the transformation of state institutions should encompass transforming 
the security sectors and the Imbonerakure youth militia of the ruling CNDD-FDD, who 
are believed to function under orders of intelligence services and national police. Equally, 
armed opposition groups must also stop targeting government officials, security officials, 
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and civilians. Such a transformation should change ideologies and structures so that 
Burundi can return to normalcy. To complement this, the government of Burundi must 
allow an outside observer mission that guarantees an end to security forces, 
Imbonerakure, and armed opposition violations. In this regard, the government of 
Burundi should accept the AU’s 5,000 peacekeeping force for Burundi, as proposed in 
December, 2015. Arguably, a peacekeeping mission in Burundi is necessary to avoiding 
the lessons of failures in Sierra Leone and Rwanda. 
As previously discussed, the Burundian political arena mostly functions according 
to rules familiar to the elite. That is, a violent political arena can still be functional for the 
country’s elites as long as the violence remains managed internally and by elite 
unanimity. Many Burundians and leaders around the region worry that the current crisis 
in Burundi could turn into a competition that has a spillover effect. Various efforts to 
promote dialogue, including EAC inter-Burundi dialogue under the leadership of 
President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda and Benjamin Mkapa, former president of 
Tanzania, remain unsettled. In the case of Burundi, the question of the legality of a third 
term was vital in the current crisis. That said, the long-term solution to the current crisis 
would involve the formation of institutional structures to solve or correct the history of 
disparity in access to power and resources across ethnic groups.  
Limitations of the Study 
Some limitations existed in this study. The first limitation was the language 
barrier. Although Kirundi is the language of the majority of Burundians, Burundi is 
considered a Francophone country, which means that French is the official language, 
while the selection of participants was based on people who were fluent in English. A 
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large number of Burundians were excluded from this study, therefore, because only a 
small part of the population is proficient enough to read, write, or speak the English 
language in a manner that allows them to interact with the researcher.  
The second limitation was the sample size. Several reasons existed for the sample 
size, one of which was the language barrier. The second limitation for sample size is the 
underrepresentation of females in the online survey portion. The fundamental reason for 
women’s underrepresentation in this research is fear of reprisals for taking part in this 
study. Gender-based violence is one of the most widespread human rights abuses in 
Burundi. The other reason for women’s underrepresentation in this research is gender 
disparity in education. That is, fewer women than men are proficient enough to read, 
write, or speak the English. While the sample size was proper for this study’s purpose, it 
was conceivable that it may not provide an accurate depiction of all Burundians’ views of 
how the conflict surrounding presidential term limit manipulation affects the perception 
of peace and stability among people in Burundi.  
The third limitation of the study was the researcher’s personal beliefs and biases 
on this topic. As a supporter of presidential term limits, democracy, and good governance 
in Africa, the researcher might hope to oppose manipulating constitutions, such as by 
amending term limits, which creates political violence and instability in many African 
countries. To address this issue, the researcher maintained self-awareness throughout data 
collection, data analysis, and interpretation phases of the study. For instance, the 
researcher used bracketing during the data analysis phase to enable him to balance his 
biases.  
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This study was primarily concentrated on Burundi, meaning that the sample size 
was selected to gain an understanding of how the conflict surrounding presidential term 
limit manipulation affected the perception of peace and stability of people in Burundi. 
Consequently, the conclusions from this study are not generalizable beyond this study. 
Future research should examine what was not addressed in this study. Certainly, 
however, the results of this study will be useful in the field of conflict resolution and 
peace studies. 
Recommendations for Future Research 
The results of the study provided an important understanding of how the conflict 
surrounding presidential term limit manipulation affected the perception of peace and 
stability among people in Burundi. Since it is challenging to examine everything in one 
study, the need for more research on presidential term limit manipulations in Africa is 
imperative given the recent violence related to term limit manipulations in the Greater 
Lakes Region. Based on the findings of this study, the researcher recommends the 
following studies: 
 a comprehensive study with a focus on the role of identity politics or ethno-
politics in presidential longevity; 
 a study with a focus on how term limit manipulations in the region influence other 
African leaders to follow suit;  
 a study with a focus on how good governance ensures peace and stability; and  
 a study with a focus on the intersection between multi-party democracy, 
inclusion, and political violence.  
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Chapter Summary and Conclusion 
The purpose of this study was to examine how the conflict surrounding 
presidential term limit manipulation has affected the perception of peace and stability 
among people in Burundi. The current conflict in Burundi involves governance problems, 
a prolonged history of violent ethnic division between Tutsis and the Hutus, lack of equal 
access to resources and power, and systematic structural violence. Results in this study 
indicated fear and insecurity, but the issue also stretches to include economic security and 
the practicality of livelihoods, greed, corruption, accountability, and the failure and 
reluctance of the government to truly deal with past and current impunity. 
Using a mixed-method case study approach, the researcher obtained detailed 
information from research participants and document reviews. Quantitative data indicated 
that statistically significant differences existed between Hutus and Tutsis as well as 
between genders related to the phenomenon under study. The qualitative data analysis 
revealed similar characteristics. Eight combined key themes were developed from the 
thematic analysis of the interview and document analysis: (a) importance of term limits, 
(b) violation of the Constitution and Arusha Accords, (c) the climate of fear and 
insecurity, (d) concern for ethnic violence, (e) a culture of impunity, (f) economic impact, 
(g) a refugee crisis, and (8) a culture of greed and corruption. These themes unearthed the 
long-standing violent past of Burundi and a better understanding of fear and insecurity 
among Burundians concerning the current crisis. The findings from the interviews mainly 
supported data gathered from the online survey responses and documents. The results of 
the study, concerning disputes and conflicts related to term limit manipulation, 
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democratization, and governance, provided knowledge applicable to the field of conflict 
resolution and peace studies  
These findings also verified previous studies on governance, democratization, 
political violence, and power struggles. For example, the literature review was essential 
as it connected backgrounds and concepts of presidential term limit manipulation, 
governance issues, democratization, and violence. According to the literature review, it 
was stated that the lack of checks and balances, weak government institutions, electoral 
malpractice, greed and corruption, and fear of punishment were reasons or factors for 
access to power and sustaining it. The theories presented in the literature review made 
several key claims about the connection between control of state power, the use of 
violence to sustain power, ethnic dynamics, and the significant role that competing elites 
play in the conflict. The three theories—elite theory, intergroup conflict theory, and 
structural violence theory—provided analysis of the root causes of the crisis and helped 
to reveal why the crisis developed. 
Burundi’s current crisis has unfolded through almost three years of growing 
violence and repression. The situation in Burundi remains very volatile and the country 
struggles to find a long-term solution to the current crisis. Currently, the country is 
marked by political violence, targeted assassinations, and accusations of torture. Large 
numbers of Burundians fled the country because of fear and insecurity. The biggest 
impact of the current conflict in Burundi is not only the increase in refugee arrivals in 
neighboring countries, but also the regionalization of the conflict in the Great Lakes 
Region, as armed groups function out of both Tanzania and the DRC. Although accounts 
of overt violence have reduced, human rights groups have underscored a rise in killings, 
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enforced disappearances, and torture predominantly conducted by security forces and the 
CNDD-FDD Imbonerakure youth militia. Armed opposition groups are also part of this 
web of violence. Several high-level assassinations have targeted government or security 
officials, including high-level military officials. These retaliatory killings increasingly 
concerned President Nkurunziza and his CNDD-FDD party, and some party officials 
used ethnic rhetoric to gather support. This kind of ethnic rhetoric is alarming because 
previous conflicts in Burundi were categorized by across-the-board ethnic massacres. As 
the conflict continues, there is real concern that it could turn into civil war, which could 
destabilize the region. 
The conflict resolution framework provides significant suggestions for explaining 
the root causes of the conflict in Burundi and approaches to attain durable peace. First, 
the Arusha agreement ushered in a significant political change. Its power-sharing 
arrangement improved Burundi’s past ethnic structure of government and ended the 
marginalization of the majority Hutus from government. The Arusha agreement deserves 
respect, and emphasis must be placed on additional programs that improve equality 
throughout ethnic groups and support institutional accountability. Secondly, regional 
peace dialogues have been unsuccessful, with neither President Nkurunziza nor the 
deeply divided opposition parties making any sincere propositions about viable long-term 
solutions. It is also unlikely that negotiations will yield meaningful resolutions if key 
parties to the conflict are excluded. If serious negotiations fail to chart a conflict 
resolution roadmap, severe consequences will result in the Great Lakes Region as the 
opposition becomes more rebellious and hundreds of thousands continue to live in 
refugee camps. Without a peaceful resolution imminent, and with President Nkurunziza’s 
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desire to eliminate presidential term limits, the risk is high for further violence turning 
into all-out war. 
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Appendix A: Survey Questionnaire 
Introduction and demographic information 
 
How old are you? 
What is your sex? 
What is your ethnicity?  
What is your level of education? 
What is your occupation?  
 
Survey questionnaire 
Please read the following statements and clearly and honestly circle the most correct response. 
Use the scale below. Your feedback is greatly appreciated!  
 
1=Strongly Disagree   2=Disagree    3=Neutral     4=Agree     5=Strongly Agree  
 
1. I support presidential term limits 
1 2 3 4 5  
2. President Nkurunziza’s third term bid violated the Arusha agreement  
1 2 3 4 5  
3. Violence has increased due to Pierre Nkurunziza third term bid 
1 2 3 4 5  
4. Presidential term limit manipulation is the root of the current crisis 
1 2 3 4 5  
5. Presidential term limits should be taken out of the constitution  
1 2 3 4 5  
6. The crisis has enduring impact on the population, including persistent fear of attack  
1 2 3 4 5 
7. The current crisis will make Burundi’s more volatile 
1 2 3 4 5 
8. Government forces are responsible for the violence 
1 2 3 4 5 
9. Armed opposition groups are responsible for the violence 
1 2 3 4 5 
10. The Imbonerakure youth militia group is responsible for the violence 
1 2 3 4 5   
11. President Nkurunziza third term in office risk causing a new civil war 
1 2 3 4 5 
12. The current crisis disrupted my life  
1 2 3 4 5  
13. The government is working to improve peace and security  
1 2 3 4 5 
14. The government lacks the capacity to guarantee security 
1 2 3 4 5 
15. Participants to the crisis should engage in dialogue to resolve the crisis  
1 2 3 4 5 
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Appendix B: Online Survey Participation Consent Letter 
 
 
Online Survey Participation Consent Letter for the Research Study entitled:  
A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF PRESIDENTIAL TERM LIMITS IN AFRICA: A MIXED-
METHOD CASE STUDY OF CAUSES OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN BURUNDI  
 
Funding Source: None 
IRB protocol #: 2017-373  
Principal Investigator    Co-Investigator 
Foday Darboe     Ismael Muvingi 
420 NW 11th Ave    Nova Southeastern University 
Unit 1002     3301 College Avenue, Ft. Lauderdale  
Portland, Oregon 97209   Florida 33314-7796    
Cell (503) 728-8039    Tel (954) 262-3023  
 
This is a research study. Please read and decide if you would like to participate. Feel free to ask 
questions at any time.  
 
What is the study about? 
The purpose of this study is to understand the conflict surrounding presidential term limit 
manipulation in Burundi. The crisis in Burundi began on April 25, 2015 when President Pierre 
Nkurunziza declared that he would run for a third term, despite a two-term limitation in Burundi’s 
constitution. This triggered opposition parties and civil society groups to organize peaceful 
protests to challenge his third term bid. Understanding this phenomenon is extremely important 
because the recent hike of violence among Burundians has negatively affected the peace and 
stability of Burundi.  
 
Why are you asking me? 
Because you are a Burundian who experienced the crisis at first hand. Because of this 
your participation in this study is imperative to the researcher in understanding more about the 
conflict surrounding presidential term limit manipulation in Burundi. Your participation in this 
survey is solely voluntarily and is really appreciated. 
 
What will I be doing if I agree to be in the study? 
If you agree to participate in this study, you will be asked to complete demographic 
questions and this should only take a minute or two to finish. The survey questionnaire will ask 
you 15 questions. This section will comprise a more sensitive line of questioning about your 
perception of President Nkurunziza third term bid. This section should take approximately 25 
minutes. 
 
Is there any audio or video recording? 
No audio or video recording will take place 
What are the dangers to me? 
There are risks associated with this study such as physical and psychological harm. 
Participants could face physical harm from government officials if their identities are made 
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public. Moreover, participating in this study can also result in psychological discomfort or 
distress. That is, collecting information about disturbing events may bring psychological issues to 
the surface. If you are uncomfortable, you may skip answering a question or stop participation, 
either temporarily or permanently. If you have any questions about this study, your research 
rights, or have experience physical and psychological harm as a result of your participation in this 
study, please contact Foday Darboe at (503) 728-8039 or email me at fd234@nova.edu You can 
also contact the IRB at the numbers indicated above with questions as to your research rights. 
 
Are there any benefits for taking part in this research study? 
There are no direct benefits; your participation will help the researcher gain additional 
understanding of the conflict, the result of the study will help advise project proposal and policy 
design as well as serve as guiding material for future research and interventions by development 
agencies interested in peace-building within the region.  
Will I get paid for being in the study? Will it cost me anything? 
 
You will not be compensated for taking part in this study, nor will it cost you anything 
for taking part in the study.  
 
Participant Rights  
Your participation in this study is completely voluntary. You have the right to withdraw 
from this study at any time or decline to participate. During the interview, you may avoid any 
questions that you do not wish to answer. If you choose to withdraw, any information collected 
about you will be destroyed at the conclusion of the study and will not be part of the study. 
 
How will you keep my information private? 
All the information gathered in this study is strictly confidential except disclosure is 
required by law. Nonetheless, the Internal Review Board (IRB) or my co-Investigator may review 
research records if deemed necessary. Any information obtained during this research will be 
confidential; the real names of participants will not be used. All electronic correspondence, 
consent forms, survey results and data analysis will be password-protected, and all printed 
material will be locked. All data files will be destroyed 36 months from the conclusion of the 
study. You have the right to withdraw from this study at any time or decline to participate. If you 
choose to withdraw, any information collected about you will be destroyed at the conclusion of 
the study and will not be part of the study. 
 
Voluntary Consent by Participant: 
I have carefully read this consent form by my own admission without being forced or 
coerced and duly accept my participation in this survey. I understand all of the questions and 
voluntarily consent to take part in the survey. If I have any additional questions, I will contact the 
principal investigator Foday Darboe.  
  
Clicking on the “I agree button” below, I am agreeing to participate in this study: 
 
I Agree Exit 
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Appendix C: Interview Questions 
Introduction and demographic information 
 
How old are you? 
What is your sex? 
What is your ethnicity?  
What is your level of education? 
What is your occupation? 
Interview Questions 
1. Tell me about your experiences with the conflict surrounding presidential term 
limit manipulation?  
2. How have President Pierre Nkurunziza’s third term aspirations affected you?  
3. Why do you think President Pierre Nkurunziza extended his term in office? 
4. Did President Pierre Nkurunziza’s third term aspirations contribute to violence? If 
yes, how so?  
5. What does presidential term limits means to you?  
6. What do you perceive as some of the consequences of term limit manipulation? 
7. How should Burundians deal with President Pierre Nkurunziza’s third term in 
office? 
8. Could you reflect on the devastating cost to Burundi caused by President Pierre 
Nkurunziza’s decision to pursue a third term in office? 
9. How has your family been affected by the crisis? 
Is there anything else you would like to offer that I did not ask? 
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Appendix D: Interview Participation Consent Letter 
Interview Participation Consent Letter for the Research Study entitled:  
A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF PRESIDENTIAL TERM LIMITS IN AFRICA: A MIXED-
METHOD CASE STUDY OF CAUSES OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN BURUNDI  
Funding Source: None 
IRB protocol #: 2017-373 
Principal Investigator Co-Investigator 
Foday Darboe  Ismael Muvingi 
420 NW 11th Ave Nova Southeastern University 
Unit 1002 3301 College Avenue, Ft. Lauderdale 
Portland, Oregon 97209  Florida 33314-7796 
Cell (503) 728-8039  Tel (954) 262-3023 
This is a research study. Please read and decide if you would like to participate. Feel free to ask 
questions at any time.  
What is the study about? 
The purpose of this study is to understand the conflict surrounding presidential term limit 
manipulation in Burundi. The crisis in Burundi began on April 25, 2015 when President Pierre 
Nkurunziza declared he would run for a third term, despite a two-term limitation in Burundi’s 
constitution. This triggered opposition parties and civil society groups to organize peaceful 
protests to challenge his third term bid. Understanding this phenomenon is extremely important 
because the recent hike of violence among Burundians has negatively affected the peace and 
stability of Burundi.  
Why are you asking me? 
Because you are a Burundian who experienced the crisis at first hand. Because of this 
your participation in this study is imperative to the researcher in understanding more about the 
conflict surrounding presidential term limit manipulation in Burundi. Your participation in this 
survey is solely voluntarily and is really appreciated. 
What will I be doing if I agree to be in the study? 
If you agree to participate, Foday Darboe will interview you for no longer than 90 
minutes. You will be presented with the interview guide ahead of time (see attached interview 
guide for complete list of questions). The interview covers 10 questions about your perception of 
President Nkurunziza third term bid. Your participation will last for the amount of the time the 
interview takes.  
Is there any audio or video recording? 
The full interview will be recorded on a digital voice recorder. 
What are the dangers to me? 
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There are risks associated with this study such as physical and psychological harm. 
Participants could face physical harm from government officials if their identities are made 
public. Moreover, participating in this study can also result in psychological discomfort or 
distress. That is, collecting information about disturbing events may bring psychological issues to 
the surface. If you are uncomfortable, you may skip answering a question or stop participation, 
either temporarily or permanently. If you have any questions about this study, your research 
rights, or have experience physical and psychological harm as a result of your participation in this 
study, please contact Foday Darboe at (503) 728-8039 or email me at fd234@nova.edu You can 
also contact the IRB office with questions as to your research rights at (954) 262-5369/Toll Free: 
866-499-0790 or email IRB@nsu.nova.edu  
 
Are there any benefits for taking part in this research study? 
There are no direct benefits; your participation will help the researcher gain additional 
understanding of the conflict, the result of the study will help advise project proposal and policy 
design as well as serve as guiding material for future research and interventions by development 
agencies interested in peace-building within the region.  
 
Will I get paid for being in the study? Will it cost me anything? 
You will not be compensated for taking part in this study, nor will it cost you anything 
for taking part in the study.  
 
Participant Rights  
Your participation in this study is completely voluntary. You have the right to withdraw 
from this study at any time or decline to participate. During the interview, you may avoid any 
questions that you do not wish to answer. If you choose to withdraw, any information collected 
about you will be destroyed at the conclusion of the study and will not be part of the study. 
 
How will you keep my information private? 
All the information gathered in this study is strictly confidential except disclosure is 
required by law. Nonetheless, the Internal Review Board (IRB) or my co-Investigator may review 
research records if deemed necessary. Any information obtained during this research will be 
confidential; the real names of participants will not be used. All electronic correspondence, 
consent forms, survey results and data analysis will be password-protected, and all printed 
material will be locked. All data files will be destroyed 36 months from the conclusion of the 
study. You have the right to withdraw from this study at any time or decline to participate. If you 
choose to withdraw, any information collected about you will be destroyed at the conclusion of 
the study and will not be part of the study. 
 
Participants Signature  
Your signature below indicates that you voluntarily agree to participate in this study, that 
the study has been explained to you, that you have been given time to read this document, and 
that your questions have been satisfactorily answered. You will receive a copy of the written 
informed consent prior to your participation in the study.  
 
Participant’s Name (Printed)…………………………………………………………… 
 
(Participant’s Signature)………………………………….. (Date)…………………….. 
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MEMORANDUM 
To: Foday Darboe  
From Pei-Fen Li, Ph.D., 
Center Representative, Institutional Review Board 
Date: June 7, 2017 
Re: IRB #: 2017-373; Title, “ 
A critical analysis of presidential term limits in Africa: A mixed-method case study of 
causes of political violence in Burundi” 
I have reviewed the above-referenced research protocol at the center level. Based on the 
information provided, I have determined that this study is exempt from further IRB review under 
45 CFR 46.101(b) (Exempt Category 2). You may proceed with your study as described to the 
IRB. As principal investigator, you must adhere to the following requirements: 
1) CONSENT: If recruitment procedures include consent forms, they must be obtained in such a
manner that they are clearly understood by the subjects and the process affords subjects the
opportunity to ask questions, obtain detailed answers from those directly involved in the
research, and have sufficient time to consider their participation after they have been
provided this information. The subjects must be given a copy of the signed consent
document, and a copy must be placed in a secure file separate from de-identified participant
information. Record of informed consent must be retained for a minimum of three years from
the conclusion of the study.
2) ADVERSE EVENTS/UNANTICIPATED PROBLEMS: The principal investigator is
required to notify the IRB chair and me (954-262-5369 and Pei-Fen Li, Ph.D., respectively)
of any adverse reactions or unanticipated events that may develop as a result of this study.
Reactions or events may include, but are not limited to, injury, depression as a result of
participation in the study, life-threatening situation, death, or loss of
confidentiality/anonymity of subject. Approval may be withdrawn if the problem is serious.
3) AMENDMENTS: Any changes in the study (e.g., procedures, number or types of subjects,
consent forms, investigators, etc.) must be approved by the IRB prior to implementation.
Please be advised that changes in a study may require further review depending on the nature
of the change. Please contact me with any questions regarding amendments or changes to
your study.
The NSU IRB is in compliance with the requirements for the protection of human subjects 
prescribed in Part 46 of Title 45 of the Code of Federal Regulations (45 CFR 46) revised June 18, 
1991. 
Cc: Ismael Muvingi, Ph.D. 
Pei-Fen Li, Ph. D.  
